The nexus of control: intentional activity and moral accountability by Conradie, Niël
THE NEXUS OF CONTROL: INTENTIONAL ACTIVITY AND 
MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Niël Conradie 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
at the 
University of St Andrews 
 
  
2018 
Full metadata for this thesis is available in                                                      
St Andrews Research Repository 
at: 
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this thesis: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13660  
 
 
 
This item is protected by original copyright 
 
This item is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Licence  
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
 
 
 
 
The nexus of control: intentional activity and moral 
accountability 
 
 
Niël Conradie  
 
 
 
 
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD  
at the  
University of St Andrews 
 
 
 
26th January 2018 
Abstract 
My aim in this thesis is to untangle a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral 
responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What 
is the relationship between an agent’s openness to moral responsibility and the intentional 
status of her behaviour? My answer to this question is developed in three steps. I first develop 
a control-backed account of intentional agency, one that borrows vital insights from the 
cognitive sciences – in the form of Dual Process Theory – in understanding the control 
condition central to the account, and demonstrate that this account fares at least as well as its 
rivals in the field. This control condition will be explained as the requirement for a kind of 
oversight over behaviour, namely: System 2 Oversight. Secondly, I investigate the dominant 
positions in the discussion surrounding the role of control in moral responsibility. After 
consideration of some shortcomings of these positions – especially the inability to properly 
account for so-called ambivalence cases –  I defend an alternative pluralist account of moral 
responsibility, in which there are two co-extant variants of such responsibility: attributability 
and accountability. The latter of these will be shown to have a necessary control condition, 
also best understood in terms of a requirement for oversight (rather than conscious or online 
control), and in terms of the workings of the dual system mechanism. I then demonstrate how 
these two accounts are necessarily related through the shared role of this kind of control, 
leading to my answer to the original question:  if an agent is open to moral accountability 
based on some activity or outcome, this activity or outcome must necessarily have positive 
intentional status. I then apply this answer in a consideration of certain cases of the use of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1956, Elizabeth Anscombe famously protested the decision of an Oxford 
University committee to award an honorary degree to the then ex-president Harry 
Truman. Her reasoning, presented in a speech to her colleagues, was that by ordering 
the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which resulted in the deaths 
of a great many civilians – some of them babies – Truman had committed a war 
crime. In light of this, she argued that one might as well “honor Genghis Khan, Nero, 
or Hitler” (Stoutland, 2011: 4). This was not a popular position at the time, and it 
remains a controversial one today. However, it is not Anscombe’s criticism of 
Truman to which I wish to draw attention, but rather one of the responses she 
received in his defence. This line of argument maintained that Truman was not 
morally responsible for the deaths of the civilians (or at least that this responsibility 
was of a much lower order), as he had not intended to kill them, and so their deaths 
were a regrettable, but unintentional, side-effect of deploying the atomic weapons. 
Along with this went the implicit assumption that the ex-president’s intention in 
ordering the use of the bombs, usually presented as the intention to end the war, was 
itself a morally permissible one, whose good consequences outweighed the bad.  This 
kind of response confronts us with the intricate tangle that is the relationship between 
moral responsibility and the intentional status of human action, as well as the severity 
of the potential “real world” consequences of untangling this knot one way or the 
other. Indeed, lives can hang on this decision.1 Determining the extent or presence of 
an agent’s moral and/or legal blameworthiness for his actions, is intimately bound to 
the question of what it was that the agent intended, and what it was that the agent did 
intentionally. 
That there is some relationship between the intentional status of an action and an 
agent’s moral responsibility for it is about as uncontroversial as any claim about 
moral responsibility is likely to be. After all, as evidenced by the defence of Truman 
discussed above, our everyday practices surrounding moral responsibility are 
permeated with considerations of the intentional status of actions and consequences. 
Imagine the following situation: a man is reversing his car out of his driveway, and in 
                                               
1 One need only consider examples such as those of Oscar Pistorius (Mail&Guardian, 2013), Sanele 
May (SABC, 2013), and Gilberto Valle (The New York Times, 2013) to see this importance in action. 
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doing so he runs over a neighbour’s child, killing her. It seems immediately apparent 
that he is causally responsible for the child’s death. However, the question of whether 
he is morally responsible cannot be decided given only the facts of the case as 
presented thus far. It is my argument that the salient missing facts are those 
concerning the intentions of the driver, and the intentional status of his actions and 
their consequences. Consider now that we fill out this situation in one of two ways: 
(1) With Intention and (2) Without Intention. In (1), the driver, when it is demanded 
of him to explain his actions, states (truthfully), “I always hated that child, and so I 
intentionally reversed over her.” In (2), when the same question is raised, he responds, 
“I had no idea she was there! I didn’t do it intentionally!” It seems very clear that the 
agent in each of these versions of the situation are not on the same footing in terms of 
their openness to moral responsibility, and I will argue that it is the difference in the 
intentional status of the killing of the child in the two cases that explains this uneven 
footing. 
At least partly in response to situations such as these, Anscombe embarked on her 
ground-breaking work on intention. For if the intentional status of the consequence of 
an action can play such a central role in determining the moral responsibility of an 
agent, then it is important to be clear about what we mean by such status, as well as 
when to ascribe it. Following Anscombe, I aim to investigate the relationship between 
moral responsibility and intentional action, at least as it pertains to individual 
responsibility. In other words, to do some work untangling this conceptual knot. The 
difficulty lies in the fact that disentangling the knot involves the consideration of a 
host of related notions, all of which stand in important relationships with intentional 
action, moral responsibility, or both. These notions – including but not limited to: 
control, agency, knowledge, moral reasons, free will, action, and desert – are not only 
complicated in and of themselves, but are also part of a web of mutual support and 
tension. This presents a challenge for any attempt at providing a simple account of 
any single knot within this web of knots, since any such account will, likely as not, 
implicate changes to several other significant relationships. 
It is not my aim to map out the entirety of this web of interrelations. Rather the focus 
of this piece will be – to extend the metaphor – on only one part of the web, one knot 
in its network, one which I take to be crucial. I take this knot to be best expressed in 
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the form of the following question: is there a necessary relationship between an 
agent’s moral responsibility for some action and the intentional status of said action. 
Developing an answer to this question requires the provision of convincing accounts 
of both the two central notions at stake: intentional action and moral responsibility. 
Presenting and defending my own accounts of each of these notions will form the 
primary tasks of my project, as I take it to be the case that once these accounts are in 
hand the relationship between the two notions is readily apparent. This dictates the 
structure of my dissertation: in Chapters 1 and 2 I develop an account of intentional 
action, while in Chapter 3 I develop an account of moral responsibility and 
demonstrate how these two accounts relate through the shared role played by control 
in both. 
The first section of Chapter 1 examines the features that we can expect to find in 
control accounts of intentional action, and introduce what I label as the reason-
backed, intention-backed, and knowledge-backed approaches to understanding 
intentional action – each named for what they take to be the characteristic feature of 
intentional action. These will then be tested by how they fare against the challenge of 
accounting for several difficult types of cases of intentional actions, what I call fringe 
cases.  Although knowledge-backed accounts will be shown to fare best, none of the 
approaches will prove capable of providing satisfactory answers in all the cases. 
Finally, I tackle each approach in turn, raising what I take to be the most compelling 
objection to each. 
In Chapter 2, I introduce my own account of intentional action. My account is what I 
call control-backed, as it takes the presence of a certain kind of control as the 
characteristic feature of intentional behaviour. It is also a mechanism-focussed 
account, in that I argue we should start our attempt to understand what is 
characteristic of intentional behaviour by investigating the actual mechanism through 
which an agent exerts her or his rational agency in behaviour. I begin with the 
identification of the requirements that must necessarily be met by such a mechanism. 
Having outlined these, Dual Process Theory is then introduced, a theory of human 
reasoning within the cognitive sciences in which our cognitive processes can be 
understood as falling into one of two systems (System 1 and System 2), each with its 
own distinct characteristics. I argue that the mechanism in question is best understood 
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as, and the previously discussed requirements best met by, System 2 oversight. This 
leads to my provisional formulation of the control condition on intentional action as 
System 2 Oversight (S2O). 
I then move on to accounting for the epistemic condition on intentional action and 
widening the scope of my account beyond intentional action to encompass intentional 
omissions, and the intentional outcomes of actions and omissions. The first of these is 
achieved by defending the necessary role played by a belief to try in the proper 
formulation of S2O. The second requires the recognition that intentional actions are 
not in fact ontological particulars, but rather abstractions individuated from the stream 
of activity under the guidance of their intentional status. I will argue that the same is 
true for intentional omissions (which I will group with actions under the label of 
activities), but that intentional outcomes derive their intentional status somewhat 
differently, because of the difference in the directness of control exercised over 
activities and outcomes respectively. I also adduce support for my account of 
intentional activity and outcomes by showing that it can explain the unity of the three 
applications of the concept intention identified by Anscombe (1963). 
Having completed one half of the two overarching tasks in the first two chapters, 
Chapter 3 has two central aims: To provide a convincing account of moral 
responsibility – or at least that part of moral responsibility that stands in a necessary 
relationship to intentional activities and outcomes, and to explicate the relationship 
between this account and that of intentional agency already developed. To achieve 
this first requires positioning my account relative to two live debates within the moral 
responsibility literature: that between merit-based versus consequentialist 
understandings of responsibility, and the longstanding argument about the 
relationship between free will, determinism (and indeterminism), and moral 
responsibility. I then clarify how my account treats the relationship between 
responsibility, praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness, and present a brief exploration 
of the complexities that emerge when considering the relationship between moral 
responsibility and intentional action, drawing out the salience of questions of control. 
The current discussion regarding the role of control in moral responsibility is then 
unpacked. This involves discussing the approaches of supporters and critics of a 
necessary role for control in moral responsibility, these being volitionists and 
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attributivists respectively. Having explored these existing accounts, I follow Watson 
(2004) and Shoemaker (2015) in pushing an objection applicable to accounts of both 
approaches: that no invariantist account of moral responsibility can capture the 
ambivalent nature of our responses to certain cases of moral responsibility. I also 
follow them in taking the best solution to this objection to be the endorsement of 
pluralism about moral responsibility. I introduce my own dual-variant account, that 
takes there to be two variants of moral responsibility: attributability and 
accountability. I further argue that only the latter of these has a necessary control 
condition, and that given the vital role of control in my account of intentional 
activities and outcomes, it is this variant of responsibility that stands in a necessary 
relationship with intentional behaviour. 
Next comes unpacking the control condition on moral accountability, which I will 
argue is best understood as normal System 2 Oversight, a qualified version of the 
control condition on positive intentional status. I then extend this condition on 
accountability to intentional consequences. Due to the relationship between the 
control conditions on intentional agency and moral accountability, I argue that the 
relationship between moral responsibility and the intentional status of a behaviour is 
best understood in the following way: an agent is open to being accountable for a 
given behaviour only if that behaviour is intentional. Finally, I close out by returning 
to consider the motivating case, that of Anscombe and Truman. I identify that the 
defence of Truman is an example of the Doctrine of Double Effect, and argue that this 
defence is unsuccessful, as there is no morally relevant distinction as far as 
responsibility is concerned between an agent’s intended outcomes and intentional 
outcomes solely based on whether they are intended or intentional. 
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CHAPTER 1: EXAMINING EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF 
INTENTIONAL ACTION 
Introduction 
To sufficiently untangle enough of the relationship between intentional activity and 
moral responsibility so that a necessary relationship between the two can be 
identified, it is, as I have mentioned in the Introduction, necessary to have a firm 
grasp of both central notions in the relationship. Sarah Paul makes a similar point 
when, in writing the entry on intention in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics 
(2013: 2658), she says the following: 
The investigation of what we are morally permitted to do is integrally bound up 
with the puzzle of what it is to act. Intentional actions are paradigm objects of 
moral evaluation; therefore, grasping what it is to act is part of understanding 
and justifying such evaluation. In turn, the study of intentional action is 
integrally bound up with the notion of intention. What is done intentionally 
stands in some relation to the intention with which one acts: the very same 
physical event of an arm rising might on one hand be an unintentional spasm, 
and on the other any of the intentional actions of hailing a taxi, voting, 
stretching, or signalling for the revolution to begin. And in addition to 
contributing to the determination of what is done, the intention with which an 
action was performed may influence our moral assessment of that action. An 
account of the nature of intention and its relation to intentional action is thus 
highly relevant for moral philosophy. 
The integral relationship between moral evaluation and intentional action that Paul 
has identified in this passage is what I called in my introductory chapter the 
conceptual knot of moral responsibility and intentional activity. She has also correctly 
identified that any account of intentional action will be inextricable from some 
account of the nature of intention. 
Attempts to provide such accounts have been one of the philosophy of action’s 
longest standing goals. The focus has been on attempting to ascertain the necessary 
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conditions of that sort of behaviour that is “the fruit and flower of the human will” 
(Ford 2011: 76). Such behaviour has – at least since Anscombe’s seminal discussion 
of the topic – usually been taken to be intentional action. For this reason, the attempt 
to develop an account of intentional action is well-trodden ground, as it is an enduring 
aim of contemporary action theory to provide a theoretically sound basis for 
distinguishing intentional action from the rest of human behaviour (Anscombe, 1963; 
Davidson, 2001; Mele and Moser, 1994; Seebaß, Schmitz, and Gollwitzer, 2013).2 As 
should be expected, pursuing this aim immediately raises a host of questions: what is 
an intentional action? How should we understand the concept this term refers to? And 
how should we understand the relationship between intentional action and a host of 
related terms: intended, intention, intentionally, etc.? These are the questions anyone 
must answer if they are to present a convincing account of intentional action. An 
account, in other words, that is sufficiently grounded in our common language 
intuitions and usage to be relevant, as well as being philosophically rigorous enough 
to allow for the evaluation of these very intuitions and usages. This is a bit of a 
balancing act to be sure, and at some stages I will be favouring one side over the 
other. However, I will seek to show that there are good reasons to support my position 
in these cases, rather than it merely being a lack of balance on my part. 
My aim in this chapter is to unpack and understand intentional agency by critically 
examining three influential approaches to making sense of intentional action. I 
categorized these approaches by what they take to be the characteristic feature of 
                                               
2 Depending on interpretation, this has plausibly been an aim of thinkers tackling questions about 
human action since at least Book III of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Throughout the early parts of 
Book III, Aristotle sets out to “distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary”, with an eye to the role 
this distinction plays in questions of moral responsibility. Though the voluntary/involuntary pair do not 
align perfectly with intentional/unintentional, it is worth noting that there is not a clear corollary for the 
English term “intention” – in its modern usage – present in Ancient Greek. Indeed, the current use of 
intention is a comparatively recent development, possibly developing from Locke’s use of the term in 
Section 1, Chapter XIX, of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, where, in the process of 
listing and describing modes of thinking, he states that: “our language has scarce a name for it: when 
the ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will 
always be a train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, 
registered in the memory, it is attention: when the mind with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its 
view on any idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of 
other ideas, it is that we call intention”. However, even this description is not quite a match for the 
contemporary use of the term, which is something of a partial amalgam of what Locke would have 
called “attention” and “intention”. This said, it is striking in reading Aristotle’s discussion in Book III 
how the dichotomy he sketches between voluntary and involuntary actions aligns enticingly with that 
commonly drawn between intentional and unintentional actions, particularly with regards to the role 
played by knowledge about one’s actions in determining voluntariness. 
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intentional action, i.e. that which chiefly determines an action as being performed 
intentionally. Each of these accounts proffers a different option for this central role, 
namely: reasons (understood as rationalizing explanations or judgements), intentions, 
and self-knowledge (usually understood as a special type of belief). I have labelled 
these three approaches reason-backed, intention-backed, and knowledge-backed 
accounts respectively. Importantly, I take all three these types of approaches to be 
examples of control accounts of intentional action insofar as they all hold that actions 
are only intentional if they are under some appropriate control, even if this is not 
intentional action’s characteristic feature. As may be anticipated however, these 
accounts disagree on how this control is best understood. 
I will begin my critical examination by first outlining some basic insights about 
intentional action and its relationship to reasons, beliefs, and the notion of control. 
This groundwork laid down, I then briefly introduce the three approaches to 
understanding intentional action. Having completed the expository part of the chapter, 
I then spend the rest of it in critique of the three approaches. First I see how they fare 
in accounting for a variety of fringe cases – instances of action where the intentional 
status might be difficult to discern, and where many accounts of intentional action 
give implausible answers. In particular, I will be looking at automatic actions, 
Expressive actions, and “lucky” actions. After reviewing the different approaches’ 
report cards, I then present individual criticism against each one: the problem of 
accounting for akrasia for reason-backed accounts, the problem of mutually exclusive 
intentions for intention-backed accounts, and the problem of cases where belief seems 
to be lacking for knowledge-backed accounts. 
1. Control, reasons, and beliefs 
The starting point for a control account of intentional action is the idea that what is 
characteristic and unique about intentional action is that it is action over which the 
agent has a certain kind of control or guidance. Let us call this certain kind of control 
intention-unique control.3 This term serves as a theoretical placeholder, to be filled by 
                                               
3 This is not meant to imply that this kind of control is unique to only intentional action, there may be 
other things over which an agent could have this kind of control – such as judgements, perhaps, or 
certain second-order attitudes. However, intentional actions are uniquely those actions over which the 
agent has such control. 
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the correct conception of control once it is identified. The easiest way to see the initial 
appeal of this approach is to consider that the denial of control on the part of the agent 
usually serves to disqualify attributions of positive intentional status to her action: if I 
ask, “Why did you crash into that tree?” and your response is, “I lost control of the 
vehicle” it would be puzzling for me to conclude that you intentionally crashed into 
the tree.  Similarly, though perhaps more controversially, if I ask, “Why did you steal 
that book?” and you (truthfully) reply, “I couldn’t control myself, I’m a 
kleptomaniac” it also seems that I would be in error to conclude that you intentionally 
stole the book. In these cases, the lack of control seems to be the result of some 
intervening factor preventing the agent from guiding her actions in the way necessary 
for intention-unique control. However, there are also cases of loss of control which 
results from an agent’s inability to guide their actions because of some epistemic 
shortfall: if I do not know that there is a vase on the table behind the door, and then 
open that door, striking the vase and causing it to fall, it would be peculiar to 
conclude that I intentionally knocked over the vase. 
What is more, it seems reasonable to think that the presence of intention-unique 
control over some action is not merely necessary, but sufficient for it to be an 
intentional action. Showing this to be the case is much trickier than showing that 
intention-unique control is necessary for intentional action. After all, the provision of 
any number of cases where the agent has control and the relevant action is intentional 
does not yet secure sufficiency. However, it seems implausible to think of any case 
where an agent performs an action but declares, “though I had control over what I was 
doing, I didn’t do so intentionally.” Indeed, this looks a lot like a contradiction. If one 
attempts to flesh out what such a case may look like, it will probably be something 
such as the following:  I was walking down the street and someone threw a ball at me, 
which I then, before realising what was happening, caught in my hand. The catching 
of the ball in this case seems to be within the agent’s control in at least some 
important sense. However, in any case like this we can question whether such actions 
are in fact intentional: consider if catching the ball leads to some bad consequence, 
say that the ball is wired such that upon being caught it detonates and takes off the 
agent’s hand. In this case, if the agent knew that the ball had this feature, and we 
asked the agent why she caught it, it would be perfectly intelligible for her to say, “I 
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didn’t intentionally catch it, it happened before I realised what I was doing!” Is this 
not then a case of control without intentionality? 
Against this possibility I will argue that though a certain type of control may be 
present in cases such as this, it is not the kind of control necessary for the action to be 
intentional. I explore what the right kind of control might be below. However, even if 
I am persuasive in my argument that the control present in such cases is the wrong 
kind of control, countering this single case can of course not establish sufficiency (nor 
indeed could any number of such cases), but I do present it as something of a 
challenge to those who think that there can be actions that are under an appropriate 
kind of intention-unique control without these actions being intentional, namely: to 
provide a case of action under such control but with absent intentionality. 
The proponent of control accounts thus puts forward the following rough and 
provisional principle: 
Intentional Status Transmission (IST): An agent’s action is intentional iff the 
agent possessed the right kind of control over it. 
The immediate follow-up question to this starting point is then: what is meant by “the 
right kind of control” here? Clearly not any kind of control will do. After all, even 
unintentional actions could be considered as being under an agent’s causal control, in 
that the agent was causally necessary for the action to take place.4 Consider, for 
example, a sleepwalker who is pouring in bathwater. Clearly some causal control is 
being exerted here, but at the same time the agent could, if made aware of her 
behaviour, compellingly claim that she had no intention-unique control over it, and 
that it was not intentional. This is what I argue is at work in a case such as the ball 
catching given earlier. When the catcher is asked why we should think of her action 
as unintentional, she is likely to respond with something along the lines of, “I couldn’t 
stop myself!” This denial of control can take a variety of forms depending on the 
case: a denial of knowledge (“I didn’t know the vase was there!”), a denial of 
intention (“I didn’t intend to do that!”), or a denial of responsiveness to reasons (“It 
                                               
4 I will not be taking a stand on the causalist/anticausalist debate within this piece, as I take my account 
of intentional action to be neutral in this dispute. 
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didn’t matter what I thought best, I was carried away by the wind!”). It might be 
thought that a denial of responsiveness to reasons must go hand in hand with a denial 
of intention, but this is not in fact the case. To see how this is possible, consider the 
following example based on one employed by Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley (2006): 
Two couples, Bill and Betty, and Max and Mary, are vacationing together at a resort. 
While there, Bill discovers that Betty and Max have been conducting an affair, and is 
greatly angered by this. On the flight back, the airplane is hijacked by a group of 
terrorists. These terrorists then experiment with a newly developed drug which, once 
applied, renders the target utterly physically obedient to the terrorist’s commands. The 
target’s thoughts and mind remain his or her own, but her or his body will respond in 
such a way as to obey the instructions of the terrorist. Bill is given the drug, and the 
terrorist orders him to kill Max. Now Bill in this situation knows that “he” is going to 
kill Max, and so cannot deny knowledge. We can also say, to make the point, that 
before the terrorists attacked the plane Bill had formed the intention to kill Max when 
the opportunity presented itself, and he has retained that intention. This means that he 
cannot deny having the intention to kill Max either. However, despite this, it would be 
wholly implausible to call his killing of Max intentional. What is missing is that Bill 
had no ability to modify his behaviour in response to reasons in this situation. This is 
the denial that makes it so that Bill’s killing of Max is not intentional. 
On the other side, intention-unique control cannot be something as stringent as 
conscious, reflective control – such as when an agent consciously deliberates about a 
course of action, decides upon it and then consciously implements it – as it is not 
difficult to think up cases of intentional action of which the agent is neither conscious 
nor reflective: such as absent-mindedly drumming on a table, or catching a cricket 
ball in the slips before the mind is able to consciously process having done so. 
So, if this is what intention-unique control isn’t, how should we understand what it is? 
To answer this, we must first take a moment to consider some crucial insights about 
intentional action. Particularly those pertaining to two important characteristics about 
intentional action that have been the most rigorously explored in the philosophical 
literature: (i) that intentional actions are characteristically related to acting for 
reasons, and (ii) that it involves some constitutive (possibly unique) epistemic 
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conditions. These clearly relate to two of the three forms of denial of positive 
intentional status that I mentioned above. 
Much of the discussion of both characteristics has been given its contemporary 
foundations by Anscombe’s (1963) discussion of intentional action. Famously, 
Anscombe said of intentional action that it is behaviour about which it is meaningful 
to “raise the question ‘Why?’ in the sense of inquiring into reasons for acting” 
(Bayne, 2010: 15). In other words, “what we do for reasons, we do intentionally” 
(Setiya, 2011: 171). Another way to state this is that an action is intentional when the 
agent, who performed the relevant action, when asked to explain why, provides a 
rational, rather than a causal explanation (Anscombe, 1963: 1-5). In addition, 
Anscombe (1963: 13-15) also claimed that intentional action is a subclass of those 
things that are “known without observation” – when they are known – by the agent, 
and that it is this special epistemic access to certain of our actions that is characteristic 
of them being intentional. The relevance of these insights for intention-unique control 
is that it indicates that such control will likely be best understood as some kind of 
ability to guide or direct actions in response to reasons, and that this control must 
either require or result in the agent having some noteworthy epistemic access to these 
actions. 
1.1. Rational explanations and action guidance in response to reasons 
Beginning with the former insight first. I take the obvious first step to be Anscombe’s 
observation that intentional actions are characteristically those actions for which the 
demand for a rational explanation has application. To understand the significance of 
this, it is first necessary to grasp the distinction between rational explanations and 
causal explanations. For her, the basis of this distinction begins with her 
consideration of a different distinction, that between expressions of intention and 
predictions. As pointed out by Driver (2011), there is some similarity between 
expressions of intention and predictions, insofar as both of them are “future-directed.” 
Both seem to require a belief that a future state of affairs will occur. The difference 
Anscombe identifies is that, whereas we justify predictions through the provision of 
causal evidence, we justify expressions of intentions through the provision of reasons, 
a fact that appears to say a great deal about what makes intentional actions, intentional 
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(Anscombe, 1963: 1-5). Hence, for Anscombe, reasons and causes are distinct and not 
always interchangeable, at least when employed as means of justification. Still, the 
link between intention and prediction is a deep one. Indeed, it is arguable – and Bayne 
(2010: 5) does so argue – that intention requires prediction on a conceptual level. If 
the formation of intention requires a belief regarding the future, as Anscombe (1963: 
5) certainly assumes it does, and prediction is the means through which we form 
beliefs about the future – or a belief we have regarding the future – then prediction is 
necessary for intention to have any content. I can scarcely form an intention if I am 
incapable of forming a belief concerning the future, since intention is always future-
directed. Bayne (2010: 5) states this point more strongly when he says “[b]ut one 
thing seems to be certain: without, at least, a belief that we can make successful 
predictions, no intention will be formed.” This does not mean that intentions are 
derived in an unmediated fashion from our predictions (two people having the same 
predictions could very well form two disparate intentions), but that the ability to form 
intentions is at least partly founded on our belief in our ability to predict the future to 
a sufficient extent that our actions could change it in a meaningful way. 
So, what is meant here by causal explanation and rational explanation? An illustrative 
example, provided by Driver, to clarify Anscombe’s meaning runs as follows: 
[W]hen someone knocks a glass off of a table he may give an explanation that 
he saw a face in the window and that made him jump. This provides a causal 
explanation for why he knocked the glass off the table, but it doesn’t give a 
reason. The knocking of the glass off the table was not intentional, though it 
was caused by his being startled. (Driver, 2011) 
A purely causal explanation of an action is one that provides no insight into the 
reasoning process of the agent causally responsible for it. This can be because no 
reasoning process took place, as in Driver’s example, or not. Even in cases where 
rational explanations are possible, causal explanations of a given behaviour can still 
be given. However, as Anscombe (1963: 10, 24) correctly stresses, what is explained 
through a rational explanation is not what is explained by a causal explanation, even if 
they are explaining the “same” behaviour. It is only rational explanations that reveal 
“something as having a significance that is dwelt on by the agent in his account, or as 
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a response surrounded with thoughts and questions” (Anscombe, 1963: 23). Rational 
explanations are explanations that employ or call for reasons – by which is meant here 
normative reasons – to explain actions. Whereas all behaviour for which there is a 
rational explanation can also be described with a casual explanation, not all behaviour 
that can be given a causal explanation can be given a rational one. Indeed, whereas all 
behaviour has a causal explanation, actions and omissions are the only types of 
behaviour that can have rational explanations, and it is precisely such actions and 
omissions that are intentional. It is also possible, in some cases, for rational 
explanations to serve as causal explanations, for example: my belief that I ought to 
tell the truth provides a reason for me to intend to tell the truth, and could5 be part of 
the causal explanation of my action if I was to act according to my intention. 
However, the point remains clear: if an action (or behaviour more generally) only has 
a causal explanation, then it cannot be considered intentional. However, this does not 
mean that in every case where the Why? question has application there is a positive 
answer. In many cases the answer, “for no reason” is perfectly intelligible. It is not 
necessary that actual reasons can be provided in answer, what matters is that a 
question seeking such reasons has legitimate application. This will become very 
relevant when we turn to talk of the role of capacity in my own control account in 
Chapter 2: Section 1.1. 
Given this relationship between reasons and intentional action, a control account can 
contend that a natural way to think about the kind of control we have over such 
actions is as the ability to guide or direct our actions in response to reasons. This 
would explain, in a straightforward manner, why intentional actions would always be 
open to the Anscombean “Why?” question, and usually have rational explanations. 
Anscombe herself did not make this argument, likely as she herself did not advance a 
reason-backed control account of intentional action, but the fact remains that such 
accounts can provide a very appealing story for why it is that rational explanations 
and reasons for acting are so intimately related to the intentional status of actions. 
                                               
5 Whether or not this will sound plausible will depend on your interpretation of the causal role of 
reasons in intentional actions, a point we can leave aside for this discussion. 
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1.2. Knowing what you’re doing and control 
All accounts of intentional action make at least some assumptions about the epistemic 
conditions associated with such action – regardless of whether arguments for these 
assumptions are advanced – even if the assumption is simply that intentional action 
has no associated epistemic conditions. That said, it seems largely undisputed that 
performing an intentional action at least entails some epistemic demands on the part 
of the agent – even if these are not conditions on intentional action. Although the 
nature, quantity and quality of these demands are a matter of contestation, what is not 
generally contested (though I am not claiming it is never contested) is that an agent 
who performs an action X without any belief (conscious or unconscious) that she has 
done so cannot be said to have intentionally performed X, or to have X’d 
intentionally. Therefore, a question that a convincing account of intentional action 
must answer – be it a control account or not – is not if there are epistemic demands 
associated with intentional action, but rather: how much (and what) does the agent 
have to believe about herself (and the external world) for her to count as having acted 
intentionally (or intentionally omitted to act)? And does this knowledge have a special 
status? While pursuing an answer to this question, it should be kept in mind that most 
thinkers who have approached this topic have focussed not on the epistemic demands 
on intentional action, but rather on the epistemic demands on intention or intending. It 
is important to note that having an intention (or intending) and acting intentionally 
might have different associated epistemic demands. 
It is also worth taking a moment to differentiate between what I have called here 
epistemic conditions, and what could be called epistemic requirements. Both are 
examples of epistemic demands associated with intending and intentional action, but 
they play different roles: the former, the epistemic conditions, must obtain in order for 
an agent to count as intending or acting intentionally. If these conditions do not 
obtain, then no positive intentional status is present. In contrast, what I am here 
calling epistemic requirements on intending and intentional action are normative 
rational requirements on intending and acting intentionally. Failure to meet one or 
more of these requirements does not entail the lack of an intention or of positive 
intentional status, but rather that the agent who fails in this way is guilty of 
criticisable irrationality as regards the intention or intentional action in question. 
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Attempts to provide accounts of the epistemic conditions on intending have tended to 
centre on discussing the relationship (or lack thereof) between intention and beliefs. 
There are three primary trains of thought: the first contends that to have an intention 
simply is to have a certain type of belief. This approach, famously taken by Harman 
in his 1976 work, “Practical Reasoning”, claims that intentions are a special species of 
beliefs.6  This is then extended to intentional actions and consequences. In a similar 
vein, Setiya argues that the epistemic conditions for intentional action are not 
necessarily knowledge, but rather “justification of confidence, which comes by 
degrees” (Setiya, 2011: 174). An action can therefore be termed intentional if the 
agent had reasons for action and had the capacity to know what she was doing, even if 
this capacity was only realised in the form of a belief regarding what she was doing.7 
The second train of thought holds that, though an intention cannot be reduced to a 
special kind of belief, such a belief forms a necessary component of intention. This 
was the kind of view espoused by Davidson (2001) – who held intentions to be a 
complex of a belief and a desire – and it was the dominant position in the 
conversation for some time. 
The final train of thought holds that intentions cannot be reduced to beliefs or to 
belief-desire pairs, since it takes intentions to be irreducible mental states on equal 
footing with beliefs and desires, and does not assume any necessary relationship 
between having any particular belief and having an intention. Consider that one of the 
signature qualities of certain types of pathological behaviour is that the apparent 
intentions upon which an agent acts, and/or some aspects of the reasoning processes 
that lead her to a given apparent intention, are not known to the agent. This raises the 
possibility that an agent might have an intention that they do not believe themselves 
                                               
6 Examples of thinkers who defend this approach include Velleman (1989) and Setiya (2007; 2010). 
Velleman does not in fact call intentions beliefs, but “self-fulfilling expectations that are motivated by 
a desire for their fulfillment and that represent themselves as such” (1989: 109), however it is not at all 
clear to me what an expectation might be other than a belief that something will come about. When I 
have an expectation that the waiter will bring my food, this seems to be a belief. When I have an 
expectation that I will successfully vault a fence, this seems like a belief. As such, and since I do not 
think that anything I argue for hinges on this, I will be grouping Velleman together with Harman and 
Setiya as the representative proponents of the view that intentions are beliefs. 
7 Setiya (2010: 174) presents this argument as part of his novel defense of what he terms “Anscombe’s 
Principle,” which claims that “If A has the capacity to act for reasons, she has the capacity to know 
what she is doing without observation or inference – in that her knowledge does not rest on sufficient 
prior evidence.” 
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to have (see Bratman, 2009a: 30). However, beliefs still play a significant role in 
accounts that follow this assumption, but due to their involvement with the rational 
requirements on intending (which I discuss below), rather than as conditions for the 
presence of intending.8 
Separate from, but not unrelated to, how one goes about answering the question of the 
epistemic conditions on intentional activity, it is widely agreed that there are certain 
rational requirements regarding the consistency of intentions to beliefs. Requirements 
that place an intending agent under some rational normativity, and that open the agent 
up to charges of criticisable irrationality if they are not adhered to. The simplest 
example of this is the requirement that for an agent to hold an intention rationally, it is 
necessary that the agent must not believe that achieving it is impossible, however, it is 
acceptable if the agent has no particular belief on the matter, one way or the other. In 
a similar vein, Bratman (2009b: 413) states the requirement as follows: “Intention 
Consistency: The following is always pro tanto irrational: intending A and intending 
B, while believing that A and B are not copossible.”9 Another important requirement 
is that of instrumental rationality (also called Means-Ends Coherence), which holds 
that it is irrational to hold an intention A, believe that B is the means to A, and then 
not either forsake the intention to A or the belief that B is a necessary means. 
However, there is strong disagreement as to how exactly these requirements should be 
understood, and how exactly they relate to intention. Whereas Bratman and Holton, 
for example, argue that the rational requirements on intention are unique to intention, 
or at least cannot be explained by rational requirements on other mental states (such 
as beliefs), Velleman and Setiya disagree. They argue that at least some of the rational 
                                               
8 Bratman (1987; 2009a; 2009b; 2013) and Holton (2009) have both put forward influential recent 
examples of accounts of this type. 
9 This is not the only formulation of Intention Consistency that Bratman has employed. In earlier work 
he presented the requirement as follows: “it should be possible for my entire plan [or intention] to be 
successfully executed given my beliefs are true. This is the demand that my plan [or intention] be 
strongly consistent relative to my beliefs” (Bratman, 1987: 31). Both formulations are meant to convey 
that any intention must endeavour to be consistent with the agent’s beliefs. To intend what I believe is 
impossible is irrational, and part of what makes a given mental entity an intention is that it should 
strive to avoid such irrationality. Of course, this does not prevent me from having irrational intentions, 
but it indicates that any intending agent must strive to meet this criterion, even if she fails. This striving 
is an essential entailment of intention. Although Bratman claims that I do not have to have a belief to A 
in order to have an intention to A, this still means I must “check” my beliefs whenever an intention is 
formed. Or, more accurately, I would run the risk of being justifiably criticisable as irrational if I did 
not. 
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requirements on intention can be explained by the rational requirements governing 
our beliefs – i.e. the requirements of theoretical reasoning – since on their accounts 
for an agent to have an intention to X is simply for that agent to have a special kind of 
belief that she will X (in the case of Velleman, 1989) or for her to have increased 
confidence that she will X (in the case of Setiya, 2007). This view, which has been 
dubbed cognitivism about intention, has become the centre of much of the discussion 
concerning intention’s relationship to practical and theoretical reasoning. Cognitivism 
can come in various forms: a strong account may argue that intention is a species of 
belief and endorse cognitivism about the demands of practical reason, arguing that 
they can be reduced to those of theoretical reason. A more moderate account might be 
one where intention is understood as a type of belief but cognitivism about practical 
reason is not adopted. And finally, weak cognitivism could be extended to include any 
account of intention that sees intention as entailing a belief (Levy, 2017: 1). For my 
purposes in this dissertation, I will be using the term “cognitivism” to refer to the 
position that intentions are beliefs. Any convincing account of intention – and given 
their intimate relationship, any convincing account of intentional action – must at the 
end of the day make a ruling on whether cognitivism is the appropriate way of 
understanding intention. 
In principle, a control account of intentional action is reconcilable with all three of the 
primary trains of thought, as well as either cognitivism or non-cognitivism about the 
requirements on intention. Whether intentions are beliefs, belief-desire pairs (or other 
composites containing beliefs as a part), or unique and irreducible mental states, each 
one makes possible the central role of control. If intentions are beliefs, or belief-desire 
pairs, then the control in question concerns how responsive our actions are to these 
beliefs and desires. In other words, we appropriately control the action when our 
intention (belief, belief-desire pair) guides our conduct appropriately. Michael Smith 
(1994, 2011, 2012) is a good example of a proponent of this variety of account. He 
argues that action is separated out from the rest of behaviour by the guiding role 
played by desire-belief complexes. On his account desires are taken to dispose an 
agent to a certain action, with beliefs as to how to accomplish the content of a given 
desire fulfilling a guiding role. He considers this combination to be the “foundation of 
agential control” (2011: 81). Interestingly, since Smith takes these desire-belief 
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complexes to also be the originating source of an agent’s reasons to act, Anscombe’s 
insight about the applicability of the Why? question is arguably captured here. 
Though this is fairly straightforward if intentions are taken to be belief-desire 
complexes, there are justifiable question marks about how an intention understood as 
a pure belief could guide conduct, given that beliefs are usually not assumed to have 
motivational power. Much of the argumentation surrounding cognitivism in fact rides 
on this point. Velleman (1989) – as already noted, a cognitivist – argues that 
intentions can guide conduct despite being only a belief because these beliefs are self-
referential, and we are motivated to make our beliefs of this sort true. So, the intention 
to X is understood as being a belief with a content something like “I am going to X in 
virtue of this very intention to X”, and we are motivated to X through a pre-existing 
motivation to make this belief true. In opposition to this, those who hold that intention 
is a unique mental state, discrete from desires or beliefs, have argued that intentions 
are intrinsically motivating, and are by their very nature conative states. Such views 
will tend to promote understanding intention-unique control as pertaining to the 
guidance of our actions by our intentions. We will return to this argument later, but 
for now it is worth noting that the conflict exists, and that a control account could fit 
with any of these views but will have to take a side. 
1.3. An example: Heuer’s Belief-Control account 
To see how this all comes together in a control account, I will briefly outline an 
example of one, namely that of Ulrike Heuer. I choose her account both because it is a 
recent example, and because I take it to be a very compelling articulation of a 
knowledge-backed control account. 
In her account, Heuer takes the type of control required to be belief-control (2014: 
297). For an agent to exercise this type of control over her actions it is necessary that 
she have a self-referential belief regarding the action taking place: that is, the agent 
must have the belief that she is in fact doing what she is doing. This belief need not be 
consciously held, but should be tokened in the agent’s belief box. Furthermore, the 
control that the agent exerts over the action in question must not merely coincide with 
this self-referential belief, but must follow “in virtue of” the belief. So, an action I 
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perform would be intentional if the control that I had over the action obtained “in 
virtue of” my having the relevant self-referential belief (Heuer, 2014: 298). So, say 
that I am typing a sentence. Heuer points out that this behaviour could be either an 
unintentional action, or an intentional action. 10  According to the belief-control 
account, this would be an unintentional action even if I was in control of my typing 
the sentence and I believed that I was doing so, but my belief played no role in my 
control of the action. To see her point, consider breathing. My breathing may be under 
my control, and I may believe at a given moment that I am breathing, but, says Heuer, 
my breathing would still not be intentional. 
Though Heuer never makes exactly clear what this “in virtue of” is meant to mean, it 
does become clear that she takes one of the virtues of her approach to be that it 
explains the role of reasons in intentional action. Her contention is that in order for an 
agent to be responsive to a reason for her to act, or not to act, she must have the belief 
that the reason in question is indeed a reason for her to act or not. In her (2014: 301) 
own words: “In order to respond to a reason (that a person believes she has), she must 
know what she is doing (or at least have a belief about it).” In other words, belief-
control is a necessary condition for reasons-responsiveness. Heuer takes this to 
explain the intentional status of cases where there may be no reason why the agent is 
performing the action, but they are intentional insofar as the agent could respond to 
reasons to stop them. So, imagine a doodler who becomes aware that her doodling is 
disrupting her class. If we grant that she takes this as a reason for her to stop, then, 
provided she has belief-control, she should be able to do so. On the other hand, a 
similar doodler who lacked belief-control would be unresponsive to reasons to stop, 
and so would not have control. This allows us to arrive at her control condition: 
Belief-control condition: an agent’s action X is under belief-control – and so 
intentional – iff (i) she has a self-referential belief that she is performing X, and 
                                               
10 It could also conceivably be mere behaviour, or a “mere event” (Ford 2011: 76). The latter would be 
the case if the movements of my hands and fingers were being caused by the direct interference of 
another agent (say someone has tied me to the chair and is moving my hands and fingers to type the 
sentence), while the former would be the case if the movements are the result of some pathological 
process, as we may say of the compulsive movements of a person with severe Tourette’s syndrome. 
However, these possibilities do not impact the thrust of Heuer’s argument. 
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(ii) she is sufficiently responsive to the reasons for and against X by virtue of 
having this belief.11 
Having presented this brief summary of Heuer’s belief-control account, I must stress 
that I take her account to be an important step in the right direction. In her paper, she 
mentions that Bratman “has pointed out to me, I am in danger of mixing two 
‘traditions’ of understanding intentional agency: some have argued that knowledge or 
belief is crucial to intentional agency; others suggest that control or guidance by 
intention is”, adding that “[b]ut I hope that I have shown that we need to go beyond 
guidance by intention to understand the unity of intentional agency. It may thus turn 
out that the two traditions are not incompatible after all” (2014: 301). I am in full 
agreement with the possibility she raises here – that the two traditions can indeed be 
shown to be compatible if unified under a control account, however I take her own 
approach to fall short of this. Whereas her account puts forward an understanding of 
control that is centered on the role played by self-referential belief in allowing for 
reasons-responsiveness, my own account reverses this relationship: it is a fact of how 
our reasons-responsive mechanisms function that they necessarily entail certain 
beliefs whenever they culminate in intentional actions. However, before discussing 
my own account in more detail in Chapter 2, I will first consider the dominant 
alternative control accounts present in the literature – including Heuer’s – and explain 
why I take them to fall short of being convincing. 
2. Introducing the alternatives 
Control accounts of intentional action primarily come in three influential flavours, 
three ways of understanding the control necessary for intentional action. These are 
what I will be calling reasons-backed, knowledge-backed, and intention-backed 
accounts. To be convincing, a control account of intentional action should not only 
outline its own approach, but also explain why it is to be preferred over these 
alternative views. With this in mind, I will briefly discuss each of these in turn, before 
presenting my arguments against them. 
                                               
11 It is worth noting that Heuer is unsure whether or not this condition will also work for non-human 
animals. She does think that non-human animals can act intentionally, but is unsure if they can be said 
to act for normative reasons. She sets the worry aside by noting that in the animal case a different 
explanation of belief-control might be called for. 
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However, before proceeding it is important to note that the thinkers who articulate the 
views that I am labelling as reasons-backed, etc., do not usually use the label 
“control” when describing their accounts, yet at the same time each of them talks in 
their own way of “agential control” (Smith, 2011, 2012), or “guidance” (Bratman, 
1984), or “motivated in the right way” (Velleman, 1989), or “caused in the right way” 
(Davidson, 2001). Heuer is an exception to this trend, speaking about control directly, 
which was in part the reason for my use of her account as an example. All these listed 
notions I take to be gesturing toward the role of control. While this may be self-
explanatory in the case of, “agential control” and “guidance”, it may be less so with 
the latter two. The key lies in the important phrase in the right way. The answer to 
which kind of actions are in fact motivated or caused in the right way line up with the 
answer to the question “which kinds of actions does the agent have appropriate 
control over?” To see this, consider why for Davidson, for example, it is important to 
stress this notion of the right kind of causation, namely: the problem of deviance. We 
can imagine a case where an agent has the appropriate desire-belief complex, and that 
this complex causes the relevant action, but that this causation is of the wrong sort. In 
a widely-employed example, consider a man who is intending to signal his confidant 
by shaking, but the fact that he has this intention causes him to become nervous and 
start shaking, which is confidant takes to be the signal. There have been many 
attempts made to resolve the problem of deviance, but these are not important to the 
discussion here, what is important is that the easiest way to explicate why it would 
seem like a problem to label the shaking in this case as intentional, is that the agent 
did not have control over it, at least not intention-unique control.12 Consider one 
influential attempt at resolving this problem put forward by Setiya (2003: 348): 
[T]he crucial concept is that of guidance. When an agent F’s intentionally, he 
wants to F and this desire not only causes but continues to guide behavior 
towards its object. [my emphasis] 
                                               
12 Similar points can be made with talk of motivating in the right way. 
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Given this, I take the explanatory lacuna gestured to by phrases like “in the right way” 
and “in virtue of” in these contexts to be best filled with some conception of control.13 
Reasons-backed accounts, the most influential of which is almost undoubtedly that of 
Donald Davidson (2001), who argues that intentional action is explained by the fact 
that all intentional actions are actions that are explained in the appropriate way by the 
agent’s reasons. Indeed, he argues that intentions are themselves a kind of rational 
judgement (2001: 39). Reason-backed accounts (roughly) argue that what makes a 
given action intentional is that the action is performed for reasons, that is: an agent’s 
action is intentional if it is the case that the agent’s “behaviour can be predicted and 
explained through the attribution to them of beliefs, desires, and rational choice [my 
emphasis]” (Millican and Wooldridge, 2014: 4). Though this choice need not be 
understood as a consciously deliberative one. 
In contrast, intention-backed accounts, of which Michael Bratman (1984; 1987; 2013) 
is a noteworthy proponent, posit a necessary relationship between any instance of 
intentional action and some intention. Intention-backed accounts contend that for a 
given action to be intentional, it must stand in some relationship to an intention. For 
reasons I will mention below, this relationship needed not be direct – as in, to 
intentionally X an agent must have an intention to X – but it is the case that this 
account argues that there cannot be cases of intentional action without the agent 
having some intention. 
Knowledge-backed accounts, which are often cognitivist accounts, usually contend 
that intentions are a certain kind of belief, though what sort of belief varies between 
                                               
13 It may be thought that anticausalist accounts of intentional action will avoid these problems entirely 
by denying that intentions are causes of intentional action, but are rather constitutive of them. 
However, though they do sidestep the issue of causal deviance, the problem of potential deviance is not 
in fact wholly avoided. On an anticausalist account it will usually be said that an agent intentionally 
X’s if they X in virtue of reasons. So, my slipping and falling to the ground is intentional only if I 
slipped and fell to the ground for some reason I took myself to have – perhaps I was performing in a 
play for example. Yet, I could take myself to have decisive reason to perform some action, and then 
that action could take place, but yet we would not describe the action as intentional. For example: I am 
driving toward my brother’s house with the intention of killing him. I take myself to have a decisive 
reason to do so. While driving I see a man in the road, yet I am so set on killing my brother that I 
simply run the man down, killing him. Unbeknownst to me though, the man in question was my 
brother. It would be implausible to say that I intentionally killed my brother here (I intentionally killed 
a man, certainly). For this reason, it is important that the action – to be intentional – must be done in 
virtue of the reason in question, not simply be co-existent with the reason, or even follow from it in the 
wrong way. I take the presence of control to fill this explanatory space as well. 
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the different approaches. What is central to these accounts, however, is that actions 
are deemed intentional if it is the case that the agent has the right sort of belief or 
knowledge about the action. For many who follow this approach, their starting 
position is Anscombe’s previously mentioned insight that a distinguishing feature of 
intentional action is that the agent performing said action has non-observational 
knowledge of what they are doing, if they have knowledge of what they are doing at 
all. 
These brief introductions are not intended to be treated as full explanations of these 
different positions, but rather to relay their basic commitments and tenets. Instead, the 
fuller scope of the arguments advanced by each of these approaches will be explored 
throughout the next section, where I test how the different accounts fare in making 
sense of difficult cases. It is my thinking that this method will more organically 
introduce not only the details of these accounts, but also how they seek to defend 
themselves against potential counterexamples and limitations. 
These accounts should not be thought of as entirely incompatible with each other. 
Consider Heuer’s belief-control, which clearly gives a necessary role to both beliefs 
and reasons. Though her account does not take intention to be a belief, she in fact 
makes no claims on the nature of intention, her self-reflective belief could be 
understood as something akin to that present in Velleman’s account of intention. And 
though she does not require that every intentional action must be backed by a reason, 
she does require a sensitivity to salient reasons. So how do we adjudicate what type of 
account is under discussion? By asking three questions and considering the answers: 
(I) Is it the case on the given account that every instance of intentional action 
demands an intention, a reason, or a belief. In the case of Heuer’s account, the answer 
is clearly a belief. It is for this reason that I take Heuer’s account to be a knowledge-
backed control account. She takes the presence of a “kind of control [that] makes it 
possible to modify one’s action in the light of reasons” (2013: 201) to be what is 
characteristically necessary for intentional action, and from this starting position 
concludes that only control that involves a self-referential belief can fulfill this role. 
All instances of belief-control involve the presence of a self-referential belief, but, 
important to note for later, not all instances of the presence of a self-referential belief 
involve belief-control. (II) If more than one of these are necessary for intentional 
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action, is there some priority involved? For example, on Anscombe’s account of 
intentional action, though the role of reasons is important and she seems to hold that 
at least openness to reasons for acting is necessary for intentional action, she gives 
priority to an agent’s privileged self-knowledge of what you are doing as the key 
characteristic of intentional action. For this reason, I think it appropriate to take her 
account to be an example of a knowledge-backed account of intentional action. One 
clear way in which such priority can be discerned, is if one of these features follows 
from another. If X is necessary for intentional action, and X always results in Y, then 
Y will also necessarily be present in all cases of intentional action. Y may even play 
its own necessary role, rather than being only correlated with the intentional action. 
Even so, in this case I will take feature X to have pro tanto priority over feature Y. Or 
(III) if one of the features is necessary and sufficient, rather than merely necessary, 
while the other feature is only necessary, then I will treat the former feature as central. 
This sets the table for us: to support a particular control account of intentional action 
against its competitors, it is necessary to either show that what they take to be the 
characteristic feature of intentional action is not in fact necessary, or that it is 
subordinate to some other feature, or that it is merely necessary whilst some other 
feature is necessary and sufficient. 
3. Accounting for the fringes 
Most accounts of intentional action (Anscombe, 1963; Davidson, 2001; Velleman, 
1989; Harman, 1997; Setiya, 2007; Bratman, 1984, 2013) – indeed I have not found 
an exception – attempt to first account for clear and paradigmatic cases of intentional 
action, and then after this has been accomplished, set out to make sense of cases at the 
fringes. So, whereas all the primary contenders can give a fairly satisfactory 
explanation for why my typing this sentence is intentional, they differ on cases such 
as aimless and absentminded doodling. Of course, part of the difficulty in accounting 
for the cases at the periphery is that it is not always clear if these should be considered 
cases of intentional action at all. I mentioned in the introduction that there is a 
balancing act to be undertaken between what reconciles best with the facts of how we 
employ these terms, and the aim of theoretical consistency. Though the former must 
be considered carefully and not disregarded lest we lose sight of the very phenomenon 
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we are trying to explain, it is also the case that common usage can be in error, or in 
need of correction. For the purposes of my arguments then, I will take it as a theoretic 
virtue of an account if it captures more of the common usages than its competitors, 
and wherever a usage is excluded (i.e. our labelling of a given instance of action as 
intentional action is taken to be an error in our use of the term) a compelling reason 
should be provided for it. In what follows I will test how the three primary alternative 
control accounts fare in accounting for the fringes. 
The three types of fringe cases I will be discussing are: (1) cases of automatic action 
(which can come by degrees), (2) cases of Expressive Action, and (3) cases of 
unskilled or lucky action. 
3.1. Automatic actions 
Cases of automaticity in actions are usually directly contrasted with actions 
undertaken under conscious or deliberative control (Schlosser, 2013; Moors and De 
Houwer, 2007; Norman and Shallice, 1986). These actions are said to be automatic, 
and an agent can often be unconscious of the details of the performance of the action, 
the underlying mechanism or process resulting in the action, or (more rarely) of the 
entire action itself. There are many flavours of automatic action, Schlosser (2013: 
215) gives “over-learned motor skills, automatic stereotype activation, and automatic 
imitation” as examples, to which can be added actions such as absentmindedly 
drumming one’s fingers, or so-called “slips of action” or action slips (Norman and 
Shallice, 1986: 13). Along with this variety of type, automaticity in action is also 
thought to come by degrees. By this is meant that conscious or deliberative control is 
not an all or nothing feature of an action. This is quite vividly exemplified in the 
process of over-learning a motor skill: when I first begin playing tennis I exert a lot of 
conscious control over my shots, as I improve and practice, I cede more and more of 
the control to unconscious processes. Eventually, if I over-learn the motor skill 
sufficiently, these processes may even kick in without any conscious control on my 
part at all. 
On the face of it, automaticity is worrying for all the competing accounts of 
intentional action: if the process guiding the action are unconscious, does it make 
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sense to think of them as responsive to reasons? It is normally thought that agents are 
responsive to reasons, not sub-agential processes – particularly unconscious ones. 
There is also the problem about degrees. Automaticity comes by degrees, but the 
presence of reasons backing an action does not. Though we can speak of actions that 
have more or fewer reasons in favour of it, this does not coincide with degrees of 
intentionality at all. An agent can act clearly and unequivocally intentionally, and do 
so for only one reason. Alternatively, it can be noted that reasons can come in 
different degrees of strength, with some reasons favouring an action more strongly 
than others. Yet this again does not coincide with the degrees of automaticity: as I 
continue to over-learn some skill, X, the strength of my reasons to X need not change 
at all, yet over time the degree of automaticity involved may increase, and my degree 
of control diminish. On a straightforward reason-backed view then, an action is either 
backed by a reason and so is intentional, or is not backed by a reason and is not 
intentional, there cannot be degrees of intentionality as required in the automaticity 
examples. 
If an action is sufficiently automatic, then it also seems as if no intention is likely to 
back the action. Certainly, when I automatically switch my grip on my tennis ratchet 
prior to making a shot, it would seem odd to say that I have an intention to do so. 
However, intention-backed accounts can respond to this by following Bratman in 
jettisoning the “assumption of tight fit” (1984: 394) concerning the relationship 
between intention and intentional action. He describes this assumption as follows: 
They both [the Simple View and the Volitional Thesis14] assume that if there is 
a distinctive pro-attitude involved in intentionally A-ing, it will be a pro-attitude 
specifically in favor of A - that there must be a tight fit between what is done 
intentionally and what is intended (willed). 
By jettisoning this assumption, it becomes possible for an agent to intentionally X 
while not requiring an intention to X. In his own words: 
                                               
14 The Simple View is Bratman’s (1984: 377) coverall term for accounts of intention that endorse the 
assumption of tight fit. The Volitional Thesis is another attempt at providing a convincing account of 
intention that Bratman criticises in “Two Faces of Intention” (1984). I will not be examining the 
Volitional Thesis in my arguments here, as I take Bratman’s criticisms of this kind of account of 
intention to be accurate, and as such I take the Volitional Thesis to have already been shown to be 
unconvincing. 
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I propose to give up the assumption of tight fit and to distinguish between what 
is intended, and the sorts of intentional activity in which an intention may issue. 
Making this distinction, we can say that when I A intentionally I intend 
something, but I may not specifically intend to A [my emphasis]. Our notion of 
intentional action embodies a complex scheme for the classification of actions 
(or, perhaps, actions ‘under a description’). To understand the relation between 
intention and intentional action we must recognize that the factors that 
determine what is intended do not completely coincide with the factors that, on 
this scheme, determine what is done intentionally. (Bratman, 1984: 394) 
This is not to say that if an agent has some intention then any action they take is 
necessarily intentional. It is not enough to have the temporal conjunction of intention 
and action. Bratman’s idea is that there will be some set of criteria that specify which 
actions would count as intentional given the presence of a certain intention, though he 
never spells out what exactly he takes this set of criteria to be. To understand how this 
works, consider a case where an agent is playing cricket and standing in the slips. She 
has the intention of catching the ball if it comes by her, which will involve stretching 
to the left or to the right. Of course, if the ball goes left and she stretches right she will 
fail to catch it, and vice versa. The ball is nicked by the batsmen and flies past her left 
side, at this moment stretching to the left is a means to fulfil her intention, and if she 
was to stretch left and catch the ball this would be an intentional action. Yet, at no 
point need she have formed the intention to stretch left – indeed given the speed of 
cricket balls off the bat, there may not have been sufficient time to do so.15 
Another way of understanding this relation is to consider Bratman’s (1984: 395) 
notion of the “motivational potential” of an intention. He defines this notion as 
follows:  
The notion of motivational potential is intended to mark the fact that my 
intention to B may issue in my intentionally A-ing, not to explain it [the account 
of how this issuing occurs]. It is a theoretical placeholder: it allows us to retain 
theoretical room for a more complex account of the relation between intention 
                                               
15 See McCann (2005) for an example of a proponent of an intention-backed approach who defends the 
ability of the Simple View to account for problematic cases such as these. 
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and intentional action while leaving unsettled the details of such an account. 
Such an account would not itself use the notion of motivational potential but 
would, rather, replace it with detailed specifications of various sufficient 
conditions for intentional conduct. (Bratman, 1984: 369) 
Bratman goes on to provide a deeper explanation of how he envisages these “various 
sufficient conditions” to work in his 1987 Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. 
Finkelstein (2005: 588) provides a good summary of the solution offered up in this 
book as follows: “Only those effects that lie within the “motivational potential” of 
one’s action should be thought of as done intentionally, meaning that a person must 
have consciously adverted to and actually deliberated on [my emphasis] an effect for 
it to count as something done intentionally.” 
The crucial thing is that an agent can X intentionally, even if she doesn’t have an 
intention to X, provided she has an intention to Y, and X meets the afore-mentioned 
set of criteria. I will return to both the idea of jettisoning the assumption of tight fit 
and the notion of motivational potential in Chapter 2: Section 2, as it has important 
consequences for understanding the unity of the three guises of the concept intention. 
However, for our purposes here, the benefit of taking a wide fit view is immediately 
apparent: I may not have had an intention to change my grip, but I certainly had an 
intention to make the shot, and so my changing my grip can be intentional, provided 
the relationship between making the shot and changing my grip meets the criteria 
mentioned above. Bratman’s (1987: 121) preferred example is that of a jogger 
training for a marathon, who realises that in doing so he will be wearing down his 
shoes, and decides to run anyway. In this case, he argues, the running down of the 
shoes is intentional, and this can be made more apparent if we think of the shoes as 
having some sentimental value to the jogger. 
However, there are still cases of automatic action that are problematic for even wide 
fit intention-backed accounts. These are cases of action undertaken automatically that 
are normally thought to be intentional, but seem to involve no intentions whatsoever. 
Heuer (2014: 264-265) provides an example of a case like this which she employs as 
a counterexample to reasons- and intention- (though not knowledge-)backed accounts: 
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Doodling: Finally, certain things we do when passing the time are intentional, 
but not done for reasons. Doodling while listening to a philosophy paper is 
intentional behaviour, but we don’t normally doodle for a reason…There is no 
intention to doodle, and presumably no other intention either — certainly no 
intention to try. 
Consider also a case such as an agent who, while walking down the street, 
thoughtlessly kicks a stone down the road. In this case as well, there is seemingly no 
intention at all. 
Knowledge-backed accounts are somewhat shielded from most of these problems, as 
such accounts usually claim that the belief necessary for intentional action need not be 
a consciously held one, and need merely be accessible to the agent under certain 
conditions – such as on reflection, or to meet the demands of theoretical reasoning. 
This accessibility can also come by degrees, which allows such accounts to make 
sense of the degrees of automaticity. This makes sense of cases such as over-learned 
skills, as well as doodling and stone-kicking. However, on this view, behaviour 
during action slips would not count as intentional. An action slip is a situation where 
an agent sets out with an intention to perform some task X, but falls into undertaking 
some alternative action Y without conscious awareness of having done so. In most 
cases the action Y will be some habitual action often undertaken. To illustrate this, 
consider the example of a man who plans to go to the store, and as part of doing so 
intends to go to his shed in order to pick up his shopping bags. However, this man is a 
fervent gardener who frequently goes to his shed to don his gardening gloves, and 
when he arrives in the shed he falls into this routine and begins donning the gloves. 
When the man realizes what he is doing, he is startled and surprised, he had not 
realized what he was doing.16 What is noteworthy about this case is that the agent did 
not possess a belief about what he was doing that could be reflexively recalled – he 
did not have knowledge of what he was doing. 
However, it is not at all clear whether an agent’s behaviour in these action slips 
should be considered intentional. It is plausible that cases such as these should simply 
                                               
16 I owe this example to Berys Gaut, though he would likely disagree with my verdict as to the 
intentional status of such action slip behaviours. 
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not be deemed to be intentional actions. This certainly seems like it would have been 
Anscombe’s response. After all, any knowledge that an agent might gain of these 
action slips would be achieved through observation. Consider for example a case 
where the action slip results in some harm being caused: a barber is very used to 
delivering a certain cut for a certain client, to the point where this has become 
habitual. Yet one day this client enters the shop and asks for a different cut. 
Unfortunately, in this case, the barber falls into an action slip, and delivers the regular 
cut. In the face of the client’s angry accusations – let us imagine that his new haircut 
threatens his chances in a job interview – it is not at all implausible that the barber 
might honestly declare, “I didn’t do it intentionally!” Thus, it appears that knowledge-
backed accounts can provide at least sufficiently convincing responses to automatic 
cases. 
3.2. Expressive Actions 
An action is an Expressive Action when the agent in question expresses emotion 
through the action, but not in order to do so. Hursthouse (1991: 58) provides a number 
of examples where an agent expresses some emotion through an action: such as 
throwing an “uncooperative” tin-opener on the ground or kicking doors that refuse to 
shut or cars that refuse to start. Of course, it is often the case that agents express their 
emotions through far more thought out and considered action: a dancer might practice 
for weeks or months in order to perfect a routine that, when properly executed, is a 
means through which he expresses some emotion. Or the writing of a poem, or buying 
a loved one some flowers. What is meant to make Expressive Actions different is that 
the action not only expresses emotion, but that this expression is unreflectively direct, 
and that the action is not undertaken in order to express the emotion. It is not a 
metaphorical or planned expression of the emotion, but a visceral and emotional 
response. 
As with the automaticity cases, it seems that the reasons-backed approach is once 
again on the ropes. It is implausible to say in all these cases that the agent acted how 
she did for a reason, given that “reason” is understood as a normative reason. It may, 
of course, be the case that the individual’s actions are in line with normative reasons 
that are present in the area, but this is not the same as acting for a reason. Consider: it 
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may be the case that kicking the non-starting car may somehow (as seen in so many 
films) cause the engine to start. If the agent kicked the car in order to bring this about, 
then this would not be an example of Expressive Action as understood here. 
An intention-backed account is in a better position, since at least some, if not all, 
Expressive Actions may well meet a wide fit account’s criteria for positive intentional 
status. In other words, it may be the case that the agent has the intention to throw the 
tin-opener on the floor, even if she does not have an intention to thereby express any 
emotion. Provided that the action in question is appropriately related to this intention, 
then a wide fit account could explain its intentionality. 
Heuer, though conceding these cases, argues that there remain some instances of 
Expressive Action that are not amenable to this treatment. The example she puts 
forward is that of “banging the table in frustration” (2014: 265). It seems that she 
must contend that an agent cannot bang the table in frustration while having an 
intention to strike the table but no intention to express emotion by doing so. It is 
puzzling to think why this must be the case. What makes the instance of table banging 
different to that of, say, throwing the tin-opener? In both cases the emotion in 
question could be understood as frustration, and it does not seem more implausible for 
an agent to have an intention to strike the table than it is for her to have the intention 
to throw the tin-opener. Perhaps Heuer thinks the point of difference lies in the fact 
that the throwing of the tin-opener seems to be more goal-directed than the striking of 
the table. Yet, I would argue that this appearance is deceiving. Striking the table is no 
more or less an aim than throwing the tin-opener. A defender of Bratman’s account 
could easily point out that both agents are more than likely to answer yes to the 
question, “did you intend to X?” It is usually thought that to intend to X means to 
have an intention to X.17 Though much does depend on the criteria for determining 
which actions count as intentional given the agent’s possession of a given intention, it 
seems at least plausible that intention-backed accounts can explain the positive 
intentional status of Expressive Actions such as these. 
                                               
17 To see the persuasiveness of this, consider how absurd it would be to say of an agent that she intends 
to kick the ball, but has no intention to do so. Or that she has an intention to pick the flower, but she 
does not intend to pick it. 
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Knowledge-backed accounts are again less concerned by these fringe cases. In all the 
Hursthouse examples, as well as those put forward by Heuer, it is unproblematic to 
think that the agent in question has the belief that she is in fact doing X. The tin-
opener thrower, the table banger, the car kicker, etc., all likely believe that they are 
undertaking the given action. At least insofar, it would seem, as these actions can be 
called intentional. Indeed, an advocate of such an account could compellingly argue 
that it is precisely the presence of the correct type of belief that allows us to 
discriminate between those Expressive Actions that are intentional and those that are 
not. Consider, the advocate might say, that there are surely some cases of Expressive 
Action that we would not want to call intentional: the curling of a lip in disgust, 
staring angrily, clenching a fist in rage. In these cases, it seems that at least sometimes 
the action is not intentional. But how to tell them apart? One possible answer would 
be that in the cases that are intentional the agent has the belief that she is undertaking 
the action, even if this belief is not consciously held (but is sufficiently accessible). 
This may be best illustrated by comparing the following two vignettes: 
No Belief: Matthew is a strongly politically active Democrat in the United States, and 
is watching the results of the 2016 Presidential Election as the final tallies in 
Michigan are coming in. As he realises that his preferred candidate has lost, he is 
filled with anger, and unthinkingly clenches his fist. His wife, Miriam, enters the 
room and asks him why he has clenched his fist so tightly. Upon hearing the question, 
he looks down and realises he clenched his hand. He replies, “I didn’t realise I was 
doing it, I am just so angry about the result, I guess my rage got the better of me.” 
Belief: The case unfolds in the same manner up till the point where Matthew hears the 
results. In this scenario, he again clenches his fist, and believes he is doing so, even if 
he does not consciously entertain the belief at the moment. Miriam again enters and 
asks her question. This time Matthew does not have to look down to realise that he 
was clenching his hand, he knows that he was. His answer would likely be, “because 
the news has just made me so mad!” 
While Matthew (Belief) seems to have clenched his fist intentionally, it would be 
implausible to say the same of Matthew (No Belief). This is at least pro tanto evidence 
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in favour of the knowledge-backed approach to understanding intention-unique 
control. 
3.3. Unskilled and/or “lucky” action 
Unskilled and/or lucky actions are those where an agent brings about an outcome, but 
does so despite a very low probability of success. Examples include: entering and 
winning a lottery, randomly pressing numbers on a keypad and striking the correct 
combination to open a door, or a terrible marksman taking aim at a difficult to strike 
target and successfully doing so. Though not all such cases are ones where the agent 
in question is unskilled, we are generally inclined to call these actions “lucky”, though 
not in the sense of fortunate: it could be the case that an agent bring about some end 
in a “lucky” way but that this end turns out to be a bad one (for the agent in question 
or others). The trouble with these actions – the reason they are often located at the 
periphery of intentional actions – stems from the strong intuition that if a given 
outcome being brought about is sufficiently lucky, then this undermines its positive 
intentional status, or from the fact that many of the features usual of intentional action 
seems to be present, yet it seems implausible that the action in question is intentional 
The examples for this final type of peripheral case that I will mostly be employing are 
drawn from the work of Mele and Moser (1994), though they deployed these 
examples to a different effect than I will be.18 It appears to me that this variety of 
                                               
18 The aim of their use of the examples was to serve as evidence for their particular account of 
intentional action, which they give as the following (Mele and Moser, 1994: 63): 
 
Necessarily, an agent, S, intentionally performs an action, A, at a time, t, if and only if: 
(i) at t, S A-s and her A-ing is an action; 
(ii) at t, S suitably follows – hence, is suitably guided by – an intention-embedded plan, P, 
of hers in A-ing; 
(iii) (a) at the time of S's actual involvement in A-ing at t, the process indicated with 
significantly preponderant probability by S's on balance evidence at t as being at least 
partly constitutive of her A-ing at t does not diverge significantly from the process that 
is in fact constitutive of her A-ing at t; or (b) S's A-ing at t manifests a suitably reliable 
skill of S's in A-ing in the way S A-s at t; and 
(iv) the route to A-ing that S follows in executing her action plan, P, at t is, under S's    
current circumstances, a suitably predictively reliable means of S's A-ing at t, and the 
predictive reliability of that means depends appropriately on S's having suitably 
reliable control over whether, given that she acts with A-ing as a goal, she succeeds in 
A-ing at t. 
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fringe cases can be broken down into three rough categories: (I) those where the agent 
has correct beliefs about the means to their end, but success is statistically unlikely, 
(II) where the agent has incorrect beliefs about the means to achieve their end but 
through attempting what they take to be the correct means they in fact perform the 
actual means and the end is achieved, and (III) the agent has incomplete beliefs about 
the means to achieve their end, or inadequate ability to meet these ends reliably, but 
through attempting what they take to be the correct means they in fact perform the 
actual means and the end is achieved. 
Each of these can be associated with an example: (I) Brandon is a basketball player. 
In a particular match, he finds himself in a position to take a very difficult shot, with a 
very low likelihood of success. Brandon knows that his odds of making the shot are 
faint, but takes it anyway. In fact, he makes the shot. (II) Aaron has been diligently 
trained at Assassin School to believe that he can only kill his target by shooting him 
through the heart, and believes this to be so. During an assassination, Aaron fires on 
his target, intending to strike him in the heart and kill him, but misses and strikes him 
in the head, killing him. (III) Nick works at a nuclear power plant. One day, some 
malfunction threatens to result in a radiation leak from the main reactor. Nick knows 
that to avert the crisis, he needs to input a ten-digit code on a keypad on the first try. 
Unfortunately, Nick did not have clearance to know the code, and so takes a guess 
and inputs ten numbers hoping to strike on the correct combination. As it turns out, 
Nick gets lucky and inputs the correct code, preventing the leak. 
Another way of considering these cases, is that they represent situations of partial 
control, where the reasons for the control being partial differs in some details, but 
always involves some gap in the relationship between the agent and the means they 
are undertaking toward an end. For Brandon the lack of control follows directly from 
the unlikelihood of success, or more fundamentally, from his lack of control over the 
chances of success. The more capable an agent is of insuring the success of an action, 
other things being equal, the greater the agent’s control over it. If we say, for instance, 
that if Brandon were to practice hard for ten years then he would be capable of 
                                                                                                                                      
I take (i) to be clearly correct, (ii) and (iv) to be on the right track – though (ii) is problematic in that it 
demands that there be some related intention in play – and (iii) to be unnecessary once the role of 
intention-unique control is properly accounted for. 
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making the shot in question easily, then we would also say that after this practice he 
now has greater control over the outcome of the action. Aaron seems to be lacking 
control because his striking the target in the head represented a failure to achieve what 
he incorrectly believed to be a necessary subordinate goal toward killing the target: 
hitting him in the heart. Finally, Nick lacks control because he has less than complete 
knowledge of how to insure his action’s success. The overarching theme is that the 
more the agents must rely on the co-operation of variables outside their control for the 
success of their actions – either because of the difficulty of the action itself or a lack 
of sufficient knowledge – the less such success seems intentional. 
For reason-backed accounts the difficulty is not that in these cases there are no clear 
reasons present, but rather that in several instances it would seem that the actions 
undertaken are undertaken for a reason, but that they should not be considered 
intentional. In the case of Brandon, it is certainly possible to provide a rational 
explanation of his making the shot. And taken at face value it is easy to have the 
intuition that he made the shot intentional. However, if we modify the case by 
stressing the low chance of success, say by stipulating that the chances of Brandon 
making the shot was 1-in-1 million,19 then this intuition begins to seem less clear. 
And that is the point: the degree of unlikelihood seems to have an influence on 
whether we tend to think of the Brandon’s making the shot as intentional, even if all 
other facts remain unchanged. One of these unchanged facts is that the action is 
backed by a reason, which is a problem for the reason-backed account. 
When it comes to Aaron the assassin, it is plausible to say that killing the target does 
not have a rational explanation since the target’s death was an effect of Aaron 
                                               
19 Consider a comparison with a lottery case. If Brandon had entered a lottery that he had a 1-in-1 
million chance of winning, and then indeed won, there is something strange about saying that Brandon 
intentionally won the lottery. As Sliwa (2017: 129) notes: “Winning the lottery (as opposed to 
scamming it) just isn’t the kind of thing that one can do intentionally.” This said, there is an important 
disanalogy between Brandon’s case and that of a lottery, namely: in Brandon’s case, he has a greater 
opportunity to influence the outcome through his relevant skills – that is to say, he has a greater 
opportunity to exert control over the outcome – than in the case of the lottery. Even if Brandon’s skills 
are only mediocre, this will still improve his odds of success, whereas in the example of the lottery, 
there is presumably no such parallel. Does this mean that Brandon’s making the shot is intentional? I 
would argue no, since the influence of his control is simply insufficient in degree, but it is noteworthy 
here already – and will be discussed more in Chapter 2: Section 1.5. – that in the lottery case no 
amount of practice, training, or knowledge (provided that the lottery outcome is indeed random) can 
improve the agent’s odds of success, whereas this is not the case for Brandon. 
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shooting him in the head, and he did not shoot the target in the head for a reason – 
indeed he had “good” reasons, or at least reasons he took to be good, to avoid 
shooting the target in the head. If this is the case, then reasons-backed accounts 
should argue that killing the target was not intentional. This seems to be a plausible 
response, so the reason-backed account seems to handle this case. It is important, as 
Mele and Moser stress, that we not be influenced by the moral valence of Aaron’s 
behaviour. Even if we conclude that Aaron did not intentionally kill the target, this 
does not mean that he is necessarily morally off the hook for having done so.  
In the case of Nick, it is plausible to say that he did not intentionally avert the reactor 
leak, though it certainly seems correct to say that he both intentionally tried to avert 
the reactor leak and was intentionally inputting the ten-digit code. What seems in 
doubt is whether he intentionally input the correct code, since he did not know what 
the correct code was. So, can Nick’s inputting of the correct code be given a rational 
explanation? This is a difficult question to answer. On the one hand, Nick certainly 
input the correct code for a reason. But on the other, there does not seem to be any 
reason why he would have chosen the exact set of ten numbers he in fact did. It seems 
that the reason-backed account can give us a plausible answer here: that Nick did not 
intentionally input the correct code, but that he did intentionally input a ten-digit code 
that proved to be correct. 
Overall then, reason-backed accounts can do a decent job of tracking our everyday 
attributive practices concerning these cases when the lucky action involves inadequate 
beliefs (either false or incomplete ones), but provides an implausible answer in the 
case where control is diminished due to the sheer difficulty or unlikelihood of the 
outcome. 
Turning to the intention-backed account, there is a similar difficulty in dealing with 
the case of Brandon. After all, Brandon surely has the intention of making the shot, 
and this intention certainly guides his attempt in making it, as unlikely as his success 
might be. Yet we are inclined to say that Brandon, at least in the million-to-one case, 
did not make the shot intentionally, it was simply too lucky for that. This may be a 
problem for the intention-backed approach as it raises the possibility that there can be 
cases of action that follow in the appropriate fashion (there is no deviance problem in 
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this case) from an agent’s intention(s), but still be unintentional. However, wide-fit 
intention-backed accounts do have a potential solution. In discussing motivational 
potential, Bratman (1987: 121) provides us with the following rough example of 
sufficient conditions to be meet in order for an agent’s behaviour to fall within an 
intention’s motivational potential: 
S intentionally A’s if: 
(1) S wants to A and for that reason intends to try to A; and 
(2) S A’s in the course of executing his intention to try to A; and 
(3) S A’s in the way he was trying to A; and 
(4) conditions (2) and (3) depend, in an appropriate way, on S’s relevant skills 
If we plug in the variables from Brandon’s case, it can be argued that his making the 
shot does not meet condition (4). But much hinges on how “in an appropriate way” is 
to be understood. After all, making the shot did depend to some degree on Brandon’s 
skill. Were he an infant the shot would have been impossible. As I discussed at the 
beginning of Section 2, these appeals to “the appropriate way” or “the right way” are 
usually best understood in terms of control. It should also be noted that failures of 
condition (3) will also often represent failures of control. It seems then that the central 
question is whether or not Brandon had sufficient control over the outcome. His skills, 
beliefs, and desires all play a potential role in determining this. Setting these 
intricacies aside for the moment, it is at least reasonable to think that Bratman could 
give a plausible explanation of Brandon’s case.   
Turning to Aaron, the immediate question to ask is, “what intention is Aaron really 
acting on?” Is it the intention to kill the target or the intention to shoot him in the 
heart, or both? It seems uncontroversial to say that Aaron does hold both intentions, 
and that Aaron intends to shoot the target in the heart as a means to kill him. The 
intention to kill the target (in addition to Aaron’s admittedly mistaken beliefs) 
explains why Aaron intends to shoot the target in the heart. But in fact, Aaron struck 
the target in the head, and he had no intention to do this. But did killing the target by 
shooting him in the head fall within the motivational potential of Aaron’s intention to 
kill the target? If we consult the list of criteria Bratman provides, Aaron’s killing his 
target meets condition (1) and (2), but does not meet conditions (3) and (4). And the 
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failure to meet (4) follows from the failure to meet (3). Aaron did not kill his target in 
the way he was trying to. Given this, and given that (3) seems to be a reasonable 
criterion, an intention-backed account can give a compelling answer here. 
How intention-backed accounts respond to Nick’s case is similar, but importantly 
different to Aaron’s case. Again, the agent can be thought of as having an intention to 
avert the leak, and has the subordinate intention of trying to input the correct code. 
Using the list of criteria Bratman provides, Nick’s inputting of the correct code meets 
all the conditions listed. Conditions (1) and (2) follow straightforwardly, and it does 
seem correct (though less clearly so) to say that Nick input the correct code in the way 
he was trying to do so. On this account then it looks like Nick did intentionally input 
the correct code. This is less compelling than in Aaron’s case, and seems an 
implausible answer. Though it may at a stretch seem correct to say that Nick 
intentionally averted the disaster, there is something decidedly misguided in saying 
that he intentionally input the correct code. 
Knowledge-backed accounts usually argue that in order for an action to be intentional 
the agent must have a particular kind of belief pertaining to it. If the given proponent 
of such a position is a cognitivist – and so takes having an intention to purely be 
having a certain kind of belief – then in many respects her account would mirror that 
of the proponent of an intention-backed account. For instance: there is again the idea 
that in order for an action to be intentional a certain kind of mental state must be 
present, and that the action must be linked to this mental state in some appropriate 
manner. And in a somewhat analogical way to how the move to a wide-fit intention-
backed view allows for the recognition of actions as intentional that are not 
necessarily backed by an intention to perform that exact action, knowledge-backed 
proponents such as Setiya (2008) have argued that what is needed for an action to be 
intentional is not always a belief aimed at the action in question. It is sufficient if the 
agent is performing the given action by performing some other action for which the 
condition does holds. In his own words (ibid.: 319): 
If A is doing φ intentionally, A believes that he is doing it or is more confident 
of this than he would otherwise be, or else he is doing φ by doing other things 
for which that condition holds  
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Let us call this set of conditions Knowledge (Belief). A further similarity is that, when 
faced with cases like that of Aaron’s and Nick’s, Setiya appeals to a notion of things 
having to be done in the “right way” and according to the agent’s plan (2003: 363). 
This is clearly reminiscent of Bratman’s condition that the action must be brought 
about in the way that the agent planned to bring it about, and again introduces a 
central, but somewhat vague, notion of control. Setiya’s argument is that if this 
control is not present, then the reasons to act that led to the relevant intention-as-belief 
does not transfer to the action in question, and so the latter cannot be deemed 
intentional. Given these similarities, it should then probably be unsurprising that 
knowledge-backed accounts understood in this way would provide similar responses 
to lucky cases as intention-backed ones, at least in the cases where the agent has false 
or incomplete beliefs. Because of this last point, I will be working in a different order 
than usual and will first be discussing Aaron’s and Nick’s cases, before turning to 
Brandon’s. 
Looking at Aaron’s case, we can see that following Setiya’s conditions above we 
would have to conclude that his killing the target was not intentional, as it did not 
“run through [his] conception of how [he] will bring about the end” (2003: 363). In 
the case of Nick, the answer depends on what Nick’s actual beliefs are. If Nick 
believes that he will succeed in inputting the correct number (which would be very 
irrational given his lack of any evidence for this belief) then his inputting the code 
would be straightforwardly intentional. If Nick does not believe that he will succeed 
in inputting the correct code, then his action in doing so can only be intentional if he 
inputs the code by doing something that he does believe he is doing. An obvious 
option might seem to be an intention to try to input the correct code, a la Bratman’s 
method, but Setiya prefers to avoid the use of “trying” as he claims this is “not 
enough... [the agent] is and must be doing [my emphasis] specific things” (ibid.: 343). 
However, the result is the same, as what we can say is that Nick was inputting digits, 
and believed that he was doing so, and that by doing so he input the correct code. 
Following from this, Nick should count as having input the correct code intentionally. 
This is a strikingly counterintuitive result, as it was for the intention-backed account.  
Looking at the case of Brandon, there are again two possibilities: first, the situation 
where, as the ball is passing through the air, Brandon believes that he will make the 
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shot – in which case his doing so counts as intentional directly, as he is doing j and 
believes that he is doing so. And, second, the situation where Brandon does not 
believe that he will make the shot. In this latter possibility, Brandon’s action is still 
intentional since he will presumably have the appropriate belief about moving his 
arms and pushing with his fingers to satisfy Knowledge (belief). This, again, is a very 
counterintuitive answer. 
Partly in response to possibilities such as these, and partly because of his commitment 
to the view that agents have non-observational knowledge of their intentional actions, 
not only merely beliefs (which can be unjustified), more recently Setiya has made a 
move away from Knowledge (Belief) toward a different set of conditions, ones that do 
not concern an agent’s beliefs, but rather their (sometimes non-propositional) 
knowledge-how. Adjudicating the possibility of non-propositional knowledge-how is 
outside the scope of this work, and as assuming its possibility only serves to 
strengthen one of my competitor’s accounts, I will be making this assumption from 
here on. According to Setiya (2012: 287), Knowledge (Belief) is best replaced with the 
following, call it Knowledge (How): 
 If A is doing j intentionally, then A knows how to j, or else he is doing it by 
doing other things that he knows how to do 
To see if Knowledge (How) represents an improvement, let’s have a look at the cases 
again. The verdict in Aaron’s case remains unchanged, though in this case it’s 
because his killing his target did not properly follow from his knowledge of how to do 
so, rather than his beliefs only. However, things change up in the case of Nick, and 
become muddy in the case of Brandon. To understand Setiya’s view on Nick’s case, 
consider his response to a similar case: imagine that you’re trying to defuse a bomb, 
and you’ve narrowed down your options to a handful of wires. Cutting the single 
correct wire will disarm the bomb, cutting any incorrect wire will set it off. Running 
out of time you make a call and cut a certain wire. Fortunately, you guessed correctly 
and the bomb is disarmed. In this case Setiya argues that you defused the bomb 
intentionally, due to Knowledge (How), but that you did not cut the correct wire 
intentionally as you did not know that was what you were doing when you did it. 
Though I disagree with this verdict – I will argue that both Nick and the bomb-
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disarmer do not intentionally fulfil their aims – it is certainly an improved answer to 
this case, lending credence to the idea that Setiya may be right in his shift to 
knowledge-how. 
If we look at Brandon’s case again, the question now hinges on whether or not it 
would be accurate to say that Brandon knew how to make the shot. Setiya provides a 
direct answer when he writes (2012: 296): “we can equate knowledge how to j with 
being disposed to j when one so intends. This disposition may depend on 
propositional knowledge of means.” It seems that Brandon’s disposition to make the 
shot will depend on his chances of succeeding, and so we have a spectrum where 
there is presumably a threshold of likelihood below which a disposition is no longer 
present – indeed, Brandon would then have a disposition to fail – and so his action 
would not be intentional. Though this is a less jarring answer than the one that came 
before, there is a concern here that the scope of intentional actions might be 
unacceptably narrowed. It seems wrong, for example, that if Brandon’s odds were 3-
to-1 against his making the shot that if we were to make it, it would not be intentional, 
yet in this case Brandon would still be disposed to fail. This is not a reason to forsake 
the knowledge-how enterprise, but it is a reason to develop a better notion of control 
in order to make sense of cases like Brandon’s. 
3.4. Summation 
Having completed our tour of the periphery, let us consider how our three accounts 
have fared. The reason-backed approach has the poorest showing, struggling to 
account for automatic actions and Expressive Actions, though faring better with lucky 
actions. Though all these accounts agree that reasons play an important role in 
understanding intentional action, it does not seem plausible to think that the actual 
guidance of a reason to act is what is characteristic of intentional action. Not only are 
there intentional actions that do not seem to have such reasons, but there are also 
cases of agent’s X’ing for a reason which are not examples of intentionally X’ing. 
Intention-backed accounts fared somewhat better, being able to account for 
Expressive Actions and a good deal of automatic ones – though there remains a 
difficulty with actions that seem to have no related intention at all. In terms of lucky 
actions, the intention-backed approach, when enhanced with Bratman’s refinements, 
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can give a good explanation for cases where an agent brings about an intended 
outcome in a manner other than those they attempted, a plausible answer in the case 
of pure unlikelihood, and a counterintuitive answer in the case of incomplete beliefs. 
Lastly, knowledge-backed accounts give a strong showing of themselves, handling 
automatic and Expressive actions without much trouble. Lucky actions proved more 
challenging, but after considering Setiya’s updated knowledge-how account, only 
Nick and Brandon’s cases proved elusive – and even then, I would argue that in the 
former it provides an improved answer and in the latter its shortcomings result 
primarily from a flawed notion of control. It certainly appears that knowledge-backed 
accounts are positioned to be the biggest rival to my own. Turning away from the 
fringes of intentional agency, in the next section I explore what I take to be the most 
compelling general criticisms applicable to each of the alternatives. 
4. Further difficulties for the existing alternatives 
4.1. Reason-backed: accounting for akrasia 
As was highlighted in Section 1.1., it is commonly accepted that guidance by 
normative reasons for acting is an important part of understanding intentional action, 
regardless of whether it is viewed as intentional action’s characteristic feature or not. 
After all, intentional action seems to reflect something about what an agent takes to be 
a reason for action, which in turn reveals elements of the agent’s values, reasoning 
process, and attitudes. Taking the further step to a reason-backed account of 
intentional action is therefore not a surprising move. Davidson provides what is 
undoubtedly the most influential of such accounts. The crucial move in his enterprise 
is to identify intentions with all-things-considered judgements. 
These are rational judgements about what is desirable, and are based on an agent’s 
attitudes and beliefs. For Davidson, they constitute an agent’s primary reason for 
acting. This action need not in fact eventuate, but the agent’s actions must be 
explicable in terms of this judgement. In other words, an agent who claims to have an 
intention to X, but whose behaviour does not indicate that they in fact have an 
unconditional judgement toward X, does not in fact have an intention to X. On his 
view, for an action to be intentional it must be such that it is explained in the proper 
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way by such a rational judgement. Davidson argued that such a judgement emerges 
from an agent’s attitudes and beliefs, even if these are not consciously grasped at the 
time. As he says, “[the agent] must have attitudes and beliefs from which, had he been 
aware of them and had the time, he could have reasoned that his action was desirable” 
(2001: 85). For Davidson, I must be aware of my all-things-considered judgement – 
i.e. my intention – although not necessarily of what has led me to hold that rational 
judgement.20 
However, this understanding of intention as an all-things-considered judgement faces 
serious problems when confronting instances of akrasia. After all, if I must be aware 
of my judgement, but act against it, then my behaviour would not be appropriately 
explained by the judgement, and would fail to count as intentional. Yet this is an 
absurd outcome, given the existence of intentional akratic action. Recognising this 
shortcoming, Davidson argues that all-things-considered judgements, must be thought 
of as unconditional judgements. 
To grasp how Davidson thinks about this kind of judgement, consider the following: 
 Every judgement is made in the light of all the reasons in this sense, that it is 
made in the presence of, and is conditioned by, that totality. But this does not 
mean that every judgement is reasonable, or thought to be so by the agent, on 
the basis of those reasons, nor that the judgement was reached from that basis 
by a process of reasoning. There is no paradox in supposing a person sometimes 
holds that all that he believes and values supports a certain course of action, 
when at the same time those same beliefs and values cause him to reject that 
                                               
20 The reason that Davidson takes intention to be an all-things-considered judgement is because 
anything less than this opens the way toward potential contradictions. Consider the following example 
he discusses (2001: 98-99): I have a pro-attitude toward sweet foods, and this leads to a prima facie 
judgement that eating sweet foods is desirable. If we take such judgements as being sufficient to be an 
intention, then it will also be a reason for so acting. I also have a pro-attitude to avoid poisonous food, 
which gives rise to an analogous judgement and reason for acting if we assume that a prima facie 
judgement can count as an intention. However, this opens the way for a contradiction, since there are 
some foods that have both characteristic. This means that an agent would end up holding that a given 
course of action is both desirable and undesirable. Given this, Davidson (2001: 98) contends that: 
It is a reason for acting that the action is believed to have some desirable characteristic, but the 
fact that the action is performed represents a further judgement that the desirable characteristic 
was enough to act on—that other considerations did not outweigh it. The judgement that 
corresponds to, or perhaps is identical with, the action cannot, therefore, be a prima facie 
judgement; it must be an all-out or unconditional judgement which, if we were to express it in 
words, would have a form like 'This action is desirable'.  
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course of action. If r is someone's reason for holding that p, then his holding 
that r must be, I think, a cause of his holding that p…[But] his holding that r 
may cause his holding that p without r being his reason; indeed, the agent may 
even think that r is a reason to reject p. (Davidson, 2001: 40-41) 
What he is getting at here is that, although an all-things-considered judgement is a 
judgement where “all truths, moral and otherwise” are taken into account, this 
actually means only “the sum of all that seems relevant to him [the subject]” 
(Davidson, 2001: 40). This would mean that even if all the reasons I take to be 
relevant indicate a certain choice, I could still choose to act otherwise based on 
considerations (reasons or motivations) that I have not, and importantly could not 
have, consciously considered. These unconsidered considerations are opaque to me. In 
a rather delightful conclusion Davidson remarks on this: “What is special in 
incontinence [akrasia] is that the actor cannot understand himself: he recognizes, in 
his own intentional behaviour, something essentially surd” (ibid.: 42). 
Although this defence succeeds in countering the original criticism, it opens 
Davidson’s position to a different problem. This problem is that, if Davidson is 
correct, an agent can never hold an intention opposed to the balance of reasons, taken 
to include unconscious reasons. This means that an agent can never perform an 
intentional action that is irrational by her own reasoning, if we take her unconscious 
reasons into account. For example: After consideration of all the reasons I hold 
relevant I take A to be a better choice than B, but I still choose to intend B rather than 
A. According to Davidson this must be because I have an unconditional judgement 
that B is in fact better than A. This means that I may, at the time, think that I am 
acting irrationally in the sense that I intend B even though I have no reasons (that are 
transparent to me) for doing so. However, if the unconscious reasons were explicated, 
then this would no longer be a case of me acting irrationally, as in fact I did – and had 
to – act in accordance with the balance of reasons that includes my unconscious 
reasons. 
The issue is that Davidson cannot allow us to fail to intend in line with our rational 
judgement, as this would require that intention be something other than just such a 
judgement. This is not convincing, however, as it is entirely plausible that I can act in 
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opposition to the balance of reasons (which is exactly what akrasia is taken to show), 
be this balance transparent to me or not. A related issue is that Davidson’s account 
problematically widens the scope of intentional action: the behaviour of a 
kleptomaniac in grabbing an item off the shelf, an agent’s behaviour during action 
slips, an agent flinching away from an oncoming strike despite intending not to flinch, 
all of these would count as intentional under Davidson’s account. And yet in each of 
these cases the agent in question could, seemingly justifiably, declare, “I didn’t do it 
intentionally! It was involuntary!” 
Reason for the lack of persuasiveness of this outcome of Davidson’s account can be 
found in a consideration of Anscombe’s original insight concerning the applicability 
of the “Why?” question, particularly the fact that this demand for a rational 
explanation was intimately bound to the fact that such explanations revealed 
something about the agent’s reasoning process, it revealed “something as having a 
significance that is dwelt on by the agent in his account, or as a response surrounded 
with thoughts and questions” (Anscombe, 1963: 23). It is unclear how considerations 
that are entirely epistemically opaque to an agent can play this crucial role. Such 
considerations might very well be causes of action, but in order to serve the 
rationalising and revelatory role described by Anscombe at least some degree of 
epistemic accessibility is needed. 
4.2. Intention-backed: the problem of mutually exclusive intentions 
The most significant criticism of intention-backed accounts – apart from the 
possibility of cases of intentional action that have no related intention even in the 
wide sense – is the problem of mutually exclusive intentions.  The best way to 
understand the problem is probably still the gamer example provided by Bratman in 
his 1984 work, “Two Faces of Intention”. He uses the example of a gamer playing 
two games simultaneously, in each case trying to strike a target (T1 and T2 
respectively) with a missile. The games are set up so that striking either of the targets 
makes it impossible to hit the other, so although the gamer is trying to hit both the 
targets, he cannot hit both. The problem here is that it seems that the gamer cannot 
intend to hit T1 and intend to hit T2, as these are two mutually exclusive goals. In no 
way does approaching T1 bring me closer to T2 or vice versa The question then 
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becomes, how can we then make sense of the common intuition that as he is playing, 
the gamer intends to hit T1 and intends to hit T2, and that if he successfully strikes 
one then he did so intentionally, and – crucially – that in undertaking this course he is 
not being irrational? 
The problem that the gamer example highlights is that, while we would normally 
consider cases of holding mutually exclusive goals irrational, it is unlikely that we 
would call the gamer in the example irrational. If the gamer sets up the games as 
Bratman describes, and then attempts to hit T1 and T2, we would not, in everyday 
life, take such behaviour to be an example of criticisable irrationality. Yet, on an 
intention-backed account, any given intentional actions must be related to a relevant 
intention. This immediately raises the spectre of looming contradiction. In order to 
retain the intuition that the gamer is not irrational, while still embracing an intention-
backed account of intentional action, Bratman unsurprisingly argues that we should 
jettison the assumption of tight fit, which was discussed in Section 2.1. As a brief 
reminder, the assumption of tight fit held that in order for an agent to intentionally A, 
it was necessary that the agent had the intention to A. In place of this assumption 
Bratman rather argues that we should consider every intention to have a motivational 
potential – a useful theoretical placeholder for the set of criteria that should determine 
whether a given action is deemed intentional or not. This means that some action A 
could be deemed intentional not only if the agent in question had the intention to A, 
but also if the agent had the intention to B, and A fell within this intention’s 
motivational potential. 
However, this does not entirely resolve the problem. It seems that my goal of hitting 
T1 or of hitting T2 is not only something I might do intentionally, but is also a source 
of rational requirements. Most clearly, the requirements of instrumental rationality. 
My aim of hitting T1 pressures me to select the correct means toward that end, and 
just so for the aim of hitting T2. These pressures are usually associated with 
intentions. It then seems reasonable to think that, in the course of trying to bring about 
the overarching intention of striking one of the targets, the agent also develops 
subordinate intentions to strike each one individually, as these are necessary stepping 
stones that play a crucial role in guiding my intentional actions. But this again leads to 
the possibility of an agent holding an irrational combination of intentions. 
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To try to avoid this possibility, Bratman finds it necessary to introduce talk of “settled 
objectives” (Bratman, 2009a: 18-19).21 He does this to resolve what he sees as a 
continuing threat of rational contradiction in cases like the gamer example. On this 
view, in cases where I have a plan that seemingly entails two intentions that are 
mutually exclusive, such as “I intend to hit T1 and T2” where I cannot achieve both, 
each individual element should be considered to be a “settled objective” rather than an 
intention (Bratman, 2009a: 19). So, I can say that my plan entails the general 
intention-for-the-future “I intend to hit at least one target,” or even the disjunctive, “I 
intend to hit T1 or T2,” but this overall intention entails that I have a settled objective 
to hit T1 and a settled objective to hit T2. 
These settled objectives still engage the instrumental rationality requirement (or some 
similar requirement), but not the requirement of consistency that would apply to an 
intention. Since settled objectives do not have the same rational requirements that 
intentions do, the fact that these objectives are mutually exclusive is not a concern. 
Also, any subplans I might form to achieve these objectives would still count as 
intentional. For example: “I intend to press the fire button to hit target T1.” By 
distinguishing settled objectives from overall intention in this way, Bratman hopes to 
avoid the problem of rational contradiction. I contend that this is unnecessary, as well 
as both opposed to our linguistic intuitions and theoretically undesirable. I am 
reluctant to accept this line of reasoning precisely because in our everyday talk I 
would not refer to my “settled objective” to hit T1 or T2; rather, I would refer to my 
intention to hit T1 or T2. Furthermore, it hinges on the creation of a placeholder 
concept, settled objective, that seems to have no content of its own, engages precisely 
those rational requirements that are desired and none of those that are problematic, 
and is introduced purely to make a perceived contradiction go away. At the very least 
this solution should be avoided if there are other possible solutions that do not have to 
make use of introduced notions such as settled objectives. I will outline such a 
solution in Chapter 2: Section 2.3. 
                                               
21 Bratman adopts this the notion of “settled objectives” from McCann (1991: 26). 
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4.3. Knowledge-backed: the problem of the lack of belief cases 
In many cases, it seems that I do a thing intentionally, but I do not believe that I am in 
fact going to do it. Call these Lacking Belief cases. This was touched on in the case of 
lucky action, but the problem runs deeper than just in such instances. Let us begin 
with those accounts such as those put forward by Velleman and Setiya, where 
intention is taken as reducing to a certain type of belief. An important criticism of this 
reductionist project, famously raised by Davidson (2001: 92), runs as follow: in order 
to show that an agent could have an intention to A, or intentionally A, without an 
intention-unique belief22 that she would A, Davidson asks us to imagine a man 
(intentionally) writing his will with the intention of ensuring his family’s well-being. 
However, due to his current situation of financial distress, he does not believe that he 
will actually do so. Making the same point, Davidson asks us to imagine a man 
making copies with carbon paper. The man has the intention to make ten copies, but 
does not believe that he will succeed in doing so. However, if he was to produce ten 
copies we would consider all of them to have been made intentionally. If the belief 
that you will A is not necessary for intentionally A’ing, then it seems the reductionist 
project is in some danger. 
We have already encountered a typical cognitivist’s response to case such as these 
when we looked at Setiya’s response to lucky action cases in Section 3.3. Indeed, 
Davidson’s copy-maker is in many ways analogous to the case where Brandon the 
basketball player takes the shot without believing that he will succeed. To recall, on 
his initial account an action is intentional if the agent believes that she is doing it, or is 
more confident of this than she would otherwise be, or is doing this action by doing 
some other action that she does believe she is doing. When applied to the case of the 
copy-maker, Setiya’s account would deliver the intuitively plausible verdict that the 
agent did intentionally make ten copies. However, despite providing the correct result 
in the case of the copy-maker, this approach provides implausible results when 
applied to cases where the chances of the agent succeeding in an action are very 
slight. This was illustrated by the case of Brandon, where his chances of success were 
a million-to-one. 
                                               
22 Intention-unique belief is a theoretical placeholder for whatever type of belief a given account of 
intention deems as characteristic of intentional action. 
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As we saw, Setiya hopes to avoid this possibility by moving away from talk of an 
agent’s beliefs about what they are doing, to talk of an agent’s knowledge-how. He 
then holds that a given action, A, should count as intentional when the agent 
responsible for it knows how to A, or does A by doing something else that she does 
know how to do. Setiya takes knowledge-how to be best understood in terms of the 
agent’s dispositions. Without re-treading the same path discussed in the foregoing 
section, this move allows him to keep the intuitive answer to the copy-maker and will-
writer cases, and provides a better – though still not wholly satisfactory – answer to 
the very low success chance cases (such as Brandon’s). I take this to be the most 
compelling account of intentional action currently on the market, and it would be 
further improved by a better account of what it means to “know how to X” than the 
(admittedly provisional) dispositional story that Setiya provides. However, I do not 
pursue such an account here. 
This criticism generalises beyond cognitivist accounts to those like Heuer’s, as though 
intention, or intentional activity, is not reduced to belief in these accounts, it remains 
the case that the agent must have a self-referential belief that she is A’ing in virtue of 
which she controls her activity in order for the activity to qualify as intentional. Heuer 
recognises the worry revealed by Lacking Belief cases, and responds by sketching a 
parallel case to the carbon paper copier, one where the agent seeks to make only 
seven copies. In this case, she points out, if the agent was to make ten copies we 
would not think that the additional three were made unintentionally. Yet the only 
difference between the two cases lies in the respective agents’ mental states – in their 
intentions and beliefs. Indeed, she claims that: “[i]n the original case he must believe 
that he is pressing so very hard on the page that it is at least possible for him to make 
ten copies; in the revised case, he must believe that he is pressing hard enough to 
make seven copies” (2014: 300). 
However, this response is inadequate. There is a difference between believing that 
you are A’ing and believing that you are possibly A’ing. According to her account, in 
order for an action A to be intentional it must follow in virtue of a belief that the agent 
is A’ing. But in this case if the belief the agent has is that he is “possibly A’ing”, then 
we should describe the intentional action as “the agent is intentionally possibly 
making 10 copies.” This seems like a very strange thing to say. Rather we would be 
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inclined to say that the agent has the belief that he will try to A, and that he is 
intentionally trying to make 10 copies. However, this route is not open to Heuer given 
that she wishes to claim “kinship” (2014: 299) between her way of understanding 
intentional action and that of those who follow Anscombe in taking intentional action 
to involve a kind of non-inferential knowledge of what the agent is doing, she is 
committed to the idea that “[w]hen someone is acting intentionally, there must be 
something he is doing intentionally, not merely trying to do, in the belief that he is 
doing it [my emphasis]” (2014: 299). She could forsake this kinship, and I think she 
would be well-advised to do so, in which case she could endorse the solution of 
taking the relevant self-referential belief to be a belief to try. I will develop this 
insight in my own account of the role of belief in intentional action in Chapter 2: 
Section 1.3. 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have examined the features that we can expect to find in control 
accounts of intentional action: that they must reflect such action’s responsiveness to 
reasons as well as account for the epistemic conditions and requirements on intention 
and intentional action. Having provided this exposition, I then introduced the three 
broad approaches to understanding intentional action: reason-backed, intention-
backed, and knowledge-backed accounts. With the descriptive component of the 
chapter complete, I then tested the three types of accounts with a number of cases of 
intentional actions at the fringes – cases where it is difficult to determine whether or 
not positive status is indeed justified. It was shown that none of the three were able to 
provide wholly plausible answers in all cases, though knowledge-backed accounts did 
fare best. 
This done, I then presented targeted criticisms aimed at each approach in turn. For 
reason-backed accounts I argued that they struggle to provide a reasonable answer to 
cases of intentional akrasia without committing themselves to the view that it is 
impossible for an agent to act against the balance of all their reasons (be they 
epistemically transparent to the agent or not). Turning to intention-backed accounts, I 
showed how they struggle to explain the problem of mutually exclusive intentions 
without recourse to the introduction of theoretically undesirable notions such as 
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settled objectives. Finally, I discussed Lacking Belief cases, and some possible 
responses to them from knowledge-backed accounts. It was found that though 
conventional accounts of this sort struggle to accommodate them, there remains a 
strong case to be made for a knowledge-backed account that posits knowledge-how as 
the condition on intentional action. Though the knowledge-how account discussed, 
that of Setiya, still had a shortcoming in dealing with cases of actions with a very high 
likelihood of failure (such as lottery cases, or Brandon’s case) I take it to be the most 
convincing account of intentional action considered here. It captures the most of the 
relevant phenomena, while still maintaining a strong theoretical consistency. For this 
reason, I take knowledge-how knowledge-backed accounts to be the most serious 
competitor to my own account. 
In the next chapter I introduce and develop this account, which I believe can both 
make sense of the different fringes cases presented, avoid the various targeted 
criticisms applicable to the three approaches I have discussed, and prove more 
convincing than my chief competitor. 
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CHAPTER 2: MY CONTROL ACCOUNT OF INTENTIONAL 
ACTIVITY AND INTENTIONAL OUTCOMES 
Introduction 
Having examined some of the more prominent alternative accounts of intentional 
activity, as well as some of their shortcomings, in this section I lay out my own 
control account of intentional action – System 2 Oversight – which I take to evade 
these pitfalls. This account is a naturalised control account, where the control in 
question is understood as oversight by a reasons-responsive cognitive mechanism. 
Additionally, I contend that a necessary component of this form of control is the 
presence in an agent’s belief box of a belief that she will try to X, where X is the 
activity in question. I will also argue that this is primarily an account of intentional 
activity, rather than intentional action, and that there are good reasons for favouring 
this approach. 
Of the three alternatives discussed in the previous section, my own account can be 
most easily understood as a reasons-backed account, though it has a few anomalous 
features that I take to give it an advantage not only over reason-backed accounts, but 
over all other accounts of intentional action. Though most of these features have 
extant histories, and so are not wholly new contributions, what I take to be 
noteworthy about the approach I sketch here is the way in which these features are 
deployed and brought together. Some of these features originate from other discourses 
in the philosophical tradition (such as reasons-responsiveness, which is drawn from 
the moral responsibility literature) or from the field of cognitive science (such as the 
Dual Process Theory model of human reasoning, which will play a significant role in 
my account). Others are rooted in the discussion surrounding intentional agency, but 
have not been used in the way I do here (most significantly the shift from talk of 
intentional action to intentional activity). Hopefully this originality in application can 
help move us toward a more complete account of intentional action – or rather, 
intentional activity. 
It may be surprising that my own account would bear, on the surface at least, the most 
similarity to a reason-backed account. In recent years, it has been intention- and 
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knowledge-backed accounts that have tended to dominate the discussion. This is 
unsurprising, as not only do reason-backed accounts seem to fall short in regards to 
each of the varieties of fringe cases we have discussed – whereas the other accounts 
fare somewhat better – but they also open the door to issues involving the possibility 
of acting intentionally against one’s rational judgement. However, my account may be 
most similar to a reason-backed account, but it would be more accurately described as 
a reason-responsiveness-backed account, and most accurately as a control-backed 
account. What matters on my account is not the question of whether or not a given 
action was undertaken for a reason, but whether the agent had control over the action 
in question, i.e. whether a certain control condition is met, where this control 
condition does involve the capacity for guidance in the light of reasons. I will argue 
that making this move allows my account to avoid the problems of intending against 
one’s rational judgement. 
Another facet of my approach that I take it to be a matter of significance is the central 
role played by the appropriate understanding of the actual mechanism that exerts 
intention-unique control. In order to identify this mechanism, I draw on insights from 
recent work in cognitive science, specifically those pertaining to Dual Process 
Theory. This focus on the actual mechanism gives us some insight into how the 
various features that clearly play such crucial roles in intentional action (such as 
reasons and beliefs), all come together. Recall IST: 
Intentional Status Transmission (IST): An agent’s action or omission is 
intentional iff the agent possessed the right kind of control over it. 
Where the “right kind of control” is replaced by intention-unique control. My account 
is an attempt to fill this placeholder by focussing on the intention-unique control 
mechanism. 
I will explain my overall account in a series of steps: first I outline what I take to be 
the requirements that any account of the intention-unique control mechanism must 
meet to be convincing. This done, I then introduce and discuss Dual Process Theory 
(DPT), and based on insights drawn from here I put forward my own control 
condition on intentional action: System 2 Oversight. This condition will be incomplete 
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at this stage, and I will further refine it by defending the necessary role played by the 
belief to try in accounting for the epistemic component of intentional action. I then 
widen the scope of System 2 Oversight beyond solely intentional action, instead 
taking intentional activity to be the fundamental example of intentional behaviour. 
Building on this, I then discuss intentional effects and consequences, and how the 
intentional status of these can also be determined by understanding their relationship 
to System 2 Oversight. 
Having thus presented my own account, I lastly demonstrate that an additional benefit 
that it brings is that it allows us to retain the unity of the three applications of the 
concept intention famously introduced by Anscombe (1963: 1): intentional action, 
intention-with-which, and intention-for-the-future. And that given my account of this 
unity, it is possible to provide resolutions to the problem of mutually exclusive 
intentions. 
1. System 2 Oversight 
1.1. Requirements of the intention-unique control mechanism 
As has been identified in Chapter 1: Section 1.1., the intention-unique control 
mechanism must include the ability to guide activities in the light of reasons. I take 
this guidance in the light of reasons to be best understood as reasons-responsiveness, 
a notion first developed by Fischer and Ravizza (1998) in the context of their 
compatibilist account of moral responsibility. Fischer23 presents two sorts of control, 
namely: (1) “guidance control” (2007: 56), and (2) “regulative control” (Ibid.: 57). 
Fischer illustrates the difference between these two sorts of control using the example 
of an agent driving a car and pulling off to the right in order to enter the parking bay 
of a coffee house. In this example, he states: “[h]ere you have a certain distinctive 
kind of control of the car’s movements – you have ‘guidance control’ of the car’s 
going to the right.” He continues to clarify that this “distinctive” sort of control can be 
differentiated from a case where, for example, the driver has an epileptic seizure, and 
collapses on the wheel forcing the car right. Fischer (2007: 78) describes this 
                                               
23 Though Ravizza’s contribution is invaluable to this discussion, as it has been Fischer who has carried 
these arguments forward, so I will at times be speaking of these as Fischer’s ideas. 
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guidance control as having “two chief elements: the actual-sequence mechanism that 
issues in action must be the ‘agent’s own,’ and it must be appropriately ‘reasons-
responsive.’” 
Regulative control, in comparison, is a quite different animal. This is the sort of 
control that follows from the agent having robust alternative possibilities to have 
acted other than how she actually acts. As Fischer (2007: 56-57) says: 
Supposing that there are no ‘special’ factors at work – that is, no special 
psychological impairments, brain lesions, neurological disorders, causal 
determination, and so forth – and imagining (as above) that the car’s steering 
apparatus is not broken, you had it in your power (just prior to your actual 
decision to turn to the right) to continue going straight ahead, or to turn to the 
left, and so forth…you presumably (and apart from special assumptions) 
possessed freedom to choose and do otherwise: you had ‘regulative control’ 
over the car’s movements.  
Setting aside regulative control, what does it entail for a mechanism to be reasons-
responsive? In the simplest terms, it means that the mechanism is receptive enough to 
reasons to acknowledge their normative force, and reactive enough to these same 
reasons to adjust behaviour accordingly (Bratman, 2000: 454). Importantly, this does 
not mean that the agent must necessarily have the belief that a given consideration in 
favour of acting is a normative reason to act, but that the agent recognises the “call to 
action”, or the normative force of the consideration. This description still leaves open 
the task of specifying the scope of reasons to which a morally responsible agent’s 
actual-sequence mechanism must be responsive. As McKenna (2009) points out, if 
the mechanism is required to be too responsive to reasons then it would mean that an 
agent who acts immorally, and who knows that there are moral reasons not to, would 
not count as possessing guidance control – would not be considered to have acted 
freely. If the mechanism’s reasons-responsiveness is too weak, then it would allow “a 
person with only a very limited or insane pattern of sensitivity to reasons to count as 
satisfying the freedom condition.” In light of these problems, Fischer settles for 
moderate reasons-responsiveness. This kind of reasons-responsiveness requires that 
the mechanism must be receptive to a significant number of reasons (including moral 
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reasons) and must be reactive enough to adjust behaviour in light of, and in 
accordance with, at least some of these reasons (Bratman, 2000: 454). But given that 
guidance control cannot require access to alternative possibilities, how is this to be 
understood? Fischer’s response is to employ counterfactuals of a certain sort. He 
argues that guidance control does not require that the actual-sequence mechanism had 
to be adjusted in light of the actual reasons present, only that the mechanism be 
reactive to reasons to the degree where in a nearby possible world some (relevant) 
reason – though not the reason that was actually ignored – could have resulted in the 
behaviour being different from what actually happened. 
I find this best expressed though an example, and so I will paraphrase one provided 
by McKenna (2009): imagine that Matilda is dancing at a party. Matilda enjoys 
dancing very much, and it would take a considerably powerful reason for her to adjust 
her behaviour. This said, she is still moderately reasons-responsive as she would stop 
dancing if anybody offered her ten-thousand dollars or more, or if she was informed 
that if she stopped dancing twenty people’s lives would be saved. Now imagine that 
Matilda is brought news that her mother has suffered a serious accident and needs her 
help. Matilda is receptive to this being a possible moral reason for her to stop dancing, 
so she appreciates its normative force. However, imagine that she does not stop 
dancing, despite recognising by her own notion of decent conduct that she should 
stop. We can imagine her saying, “I really should stop dancing to help my mom, but 
I’m having too much fun!” Clearly then, she is unreactive to this relevant moral 
reason to do otherwise. However, according to Fischer’s argument, this does not 
absolve her of moral responsibility provided that this case of insensitivity to reasons is 
“situated” within a set of cases that demonstrate “a rich sensitivity to some rational 
and stable range of reasons.” That is, as long as Matilda’s mechanism is sufficiently 
reasons-responsive such that there are sufficient near possible worlds where she 
would adjust her behaviour in the light of relevant reasons to do so, even though her 
mom needing her help will never be one of these.24 
                                               
24As McKenna (2009) notes, there is a certain “irony” in this final point. The very moral reason for 
which we seemingly hold Matilda morally responsible for not being reactive to is the very reason that 
she could never have been reactive to. McKenna notes, however, that it is not obvious whether this 
irony forms grounds on which to criticise Fischer’s position. I would suggest that it does not. 
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Fischer’s own use of reason-responsiveness is embedded in moral concerns – 
unsurprisingly given the context for which he developed it. This means that his 
version of reason-responsiveness involves a number of considerations that serve to 
capture features of moral responsibility practices. This is most significant when 
thinking about the proper scope of receptivity and reactivity. There are, after all, 
agents capable of acting intentionally, yet are not legitimate targets for moral 
responsibility, such as young children, those suffering from certain pathological 
conditions, and perhaps even animals. Fischer excludes these cases by proposing the 
need for an ownership condition,25 which excludes many such cases, as well as 
arguing that these might represent instances of non-reason-responsive intentional 
action. Into this category he places examples such as certain kinds of insanity (or 
pathological conditions) as well as the case of a “sea captain who panics in a storm 
and is impelled to jettison his cargo by an irresistible fear” (1998: 82). This is a 
category of actions that my account cannot accommodate, and so something must be 
said about it. Fischer and Ravizza (ibid.: 83) provide the following diagram to 
illustrate the breakdown of the relationship between reason-responsiveness and 
intentional status as they see it: 
 
                                               
25 I will be discussing Fischer’s ownership condition in Chapter 3, where I discuss his account in a 
moral responsibility context. It is sufficient here to note its existence. 
Bodily	movement
Intentional
Responsive	to	reason
Responsive	to	moral	reasons
Responsive	not	under	duress Responsive,	acts	under	duress(calm	skipper)
Responsive	only	to	nonmoral	reasons(certain	psychopaths,	babies)
Intentional,	nonresponsive(panicked	skipper,	insane	persons)
Nonintentional(seizures,	tics,	etc.)
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On this classification, the problematic category is “Intentional, nonresponsive”. My 
first response to the possibility of this category is to reject the claim that the agent in 
the examples provided – that of the panicked skipper and the insane – are in fact 
wholly unresponsive to reasons, and furthermore if they are, then their actions would 
not be intentional. In the case of the panicked skipper, it is difficult to imagine that 
her fear was such that she was thoroughly unresponsive to reasons, though this 
responsiveness may be reduced (to varying levels of severity). However, if we accept 
the stipulation that the skipper’s fear is truly irresistible, such that her reason-
responsive mechanism exerted (and was capable of exerting) no guidance over the 
action, then this does not seem to be an intentional action. The skipper could 
justifiably claim, “I didn’t throw the cargo over intentionally! I was overcome by fear 
and had lost control of myself!” She would be no different to the person emerging 
from a truly blind rage for the first time and claims of the harms done, “I didn’t do 
these things intentionally! I was not in control of myself!” Crucial to note, this does 
not necessarily absolve either the skipper or the person emerging from the rage from 
moral responsibility (as will be discussed in Chapter 3: Section 4.3.). I think that most 
(if not all) resistance to recognising the justifiability of the skipper making such a 
claim results from the implausibility that such a complex action as throwing the cargo 
overboard could be irresistibly impelled by fear, without any responsiveness to 
reasons. In the case of the insane, I take the same reasoning to apply. In most cases, 
such individuals are likely to retain some (though reduced) capacity for 
responsiveness to reasons, though in those cases where such capacity is in fact absent, 
they can justifiably deny the intentionality of their behaviour, as positive intentional 
status is indeed absent. 
Where I am in agreement with Fischer, however, is that intention-unique control is 
not concerned uniquely, or indeed necessarily, with moral reasons. It is possible to 
imagine an idealised psychopath, an agent who is perfectly reasons-responsive to all 
egoistic and prudential reasons, but is pathologically – and entirely – incapable of 
responding to moral reasons qua moral reasons (they could, of course, learn to 
theoretically identify those considerations that others take to be moral reasons, but 
what they lack is the ability to recognise the special normative force of such reasons). 
Such an agent would most certainly be capable of acting intentionally, but would not 
meet Fischer’s criteria for moral responsibility as they are not “moral agents” (1998: 
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82). The final important difference is that intention-unique control does not require 
that there be a reason in the vicinity to which the agent could have responded by 
guiding her activity, but rather that the agent must have had the capacity to respond if 
such a reason were present. This is a kind of oversight, as when a driving instructor 
has oversight over his learner in a situation where he rides along with said learner and 
has the capacity to intervene if there is cause for it. 
This talk of capacity is most easily understood counterfactually, though not in quite 
the same way as Fischer envisages. To say that the agent had the capacity for 
oversight is to say that in some close possible worlds the agent, through the actual-
sequence mechanism, could have responded to reasons (moral or otherwise) 
pertaining to her activity and guided them accordingly. This responsiveness does not 
need to be consciously exercised. An agent could carry out an action and, in the 
moment, not be consciously aware of doing so, and yet the mechanism resulting in the 
action could be suitably reason-responsive. If I am driving down the road to the store 
and come to an intersection in the road, it is possible that I am so accustomed to the 
drive that I perform the turn toward the store without, in the moment, being 
consciously aware of doing so – my mind might be entertained in some speculation 
about the nature of control, and so distracted from my activities. What matters in 
determining whether the turning is under intention-unique control, and thus 
intentional, is whether or not, in that moment, I was reason-responsive such that in 
close possible worlds the mechanism that resulted in the action could have been 
adjusted in the light of salient reasons. 
Returning to talk of the scope of responsiveness, some things are readily apparent: the 
degree of sensitivity to reasons – in terms of both receptivity and reactivity – 
necessary for positive intentional status is far lower than it is for moral responsibility. 
First off, and as already mentioned, no responsiveness to moral reasons is required for 
positive intentional status. And where non-moral reasons are concerned, we often 
think of agent’s as acting intentionally who have very limited responsiveness to 
normative reasons to act – such as very young children – whereas we usually exempt 
them from moral responsibility. Consider also that if there was an agent who was 
sensitive to only one reason, then if that agent were to act upon that reason, or act in a 
context where that reason was salient, it would make sense (presuming certain further 
 61 
conditions, such as epistemic ones, are met) that this action would be described as 
intentional, whereas it seems likely that such an agent would not be responsive 
enough to count as open to moral responsibility. However, it is also important to note 
that if this same agent performed some other behaviour where this is not the case, 
then the action would not count as intentional. This leads me to say that intention-
unique control over a given action requires that the actual-sequence mechanism must 
be minimally receptive and reactive. By minimally here is meant that the mechanism 
must either have responded to a reason, or would be responsive to a reason in a 
minimally close possible world if there were such reasons present. 
Importantly, this does not mean that an action can only be intentional if there is 
normative reason in the vicinity. It must just be such that if there has been such 
reasons the agent had the capacity to have responded. Also, worth noting is that an 
agent can be very reason-receptive but if she is not also somewhat reason-reactive 
then attributing positive intentional status would be incorrect – an agent like Bill the 
drugged vacationer from Chapter 1: Section 1.1. would be an example of this. 
It can be asked, however, if this doesn’t throw the net of intentional action too widely. 
To see this, let us again consider action slips. Action slips, to remind, occur when an 
agent falls into an action or chain of actions (usually habitual ones) without realising 
they are doing so, and often in opposition to her explicit intentions, and who respond 
when made aware of this by stating things like, “I didn’t know I was doing that!” or “I 
hadn’t realised what I was doing!” These cases seem to me to be ones where it would 
be implausible to conclude that the agent is acting intentionally, yet my account on 
the face of it would count them as such, since there is likely to be at least some 
reasons which, had they been in the vicinity, would have allowed the agent to adjust, 
i.e. stop, the behaviour. We can imagine the man who went to get his shopping bags 
from the shed but fell into the action slip of putting on his gardening gloves (as is his 
habit). Presumably, had his gloves been covered in spiders he would have responded 
and stopped his behaviour. So, given the description of reason-responsiveness I have 
given above, if he had completed his action slip then we could have to conclude that it 
was intentional. 
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To avoid this outcome, we must recall the epistemic condition on intentional action. 
The agent must have some kind of epistemic relationship to the action in order for it 
to count as intentional. Let us say that this state should be some belief, and call it an 
intention-unique belief for now. I will discuss precisely how this intention-unique 
belief should be fleshed out in section 1.3., but for now the question to ask is what 
role such a belief should play in the actual-sequence mechanism. It seems most 
plausible that the role that the belief plays, and the reason that it is necessary for 
intention-unique control, is that only if the actual-sequence mechanism responds to 
reasons in the light of this belief can the action in question really have been under 
reason-responsive control. This belief does not need to be conscious to play this role, 
it need only be in the agent’s belief box, there to be accessed in the appropriate 
situations – as is the case with the vast majority of our beliefs. Usually the best way to 
identify if such a belief was present is if the agent can reflexively access it. In action 
slip cases, this is precisely what is missing. The agent has no accessible belief about 
doing the action in question, hence their surprised reactions when being made aware 
of them. The result of this is that the knowledge-backed proponents are correct on at 
least one count:  an action can only be intentional if the agent had some appropriate 
belief about undertaking it. I will argue in a latter section that this belief is best 
understood as a belief to try. 
It could be asked though, why does an actual-sequence mechanism with these features 
impart positive intentional status to an action? The answer to this is that the outcomes 
of such a mechanism reflect the agent’s rational self. This is well expressed by 
Velleman (2014) when he states: 
If a person’s constitution includes a causal mechanism that has the function of 
basing his behavior on reasons, then that mechanism is, functionally speaking, 
the locus of his agency, and its control over his behavior amounts to his self-
control, or autonomy. 
This is not to say that all there is to the self is its rational faculties, there are doubtless 
over important aspects to the self, such as desires and beliefs. However, when it 
comes to agency, we identify – and are identified – uniquely with those actions that 
we undertake for normative reasons. And this we can only do if we possess some 
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appropriate mechanism, the same way that I can only see if I possess the appropriate 
perceptual mechanism. 
This gives us our first two requirements that an intention-unique control mechanism 
must meet: (I) the results of such a mechanism must be at least minimally reason-
responsive, and (II) that the mechanism must account for the role of intention-unique 
belief. There are a further two requirements that such a mechanism must meet, 
namely: (III) it must allow the possibility that an agent act – and act intentionally – 
against the balance of reasons, and (IV) it must be able to result in both intentions and 
intentional actions, and not necessarily together. An eagle-eyed reader would have 
noticed that (III) and (IV) are necessary in order to avoid two of the pitfalls that 
plagues the accounts of intentional action discussed in the previous chapter. (III) 
Serves to ward off the criticism directed at Davidson’s account that, by requiring that 
all intentional actions are caused and rationalised by all-things-considered 
judgements, it was impossible for an agent to act against the balance of reasons (both 
those that are epistemically transparent and epistemically opaque to the agent). This is 
a very implausible way to think about human action, it certainly seems that we can act 
against the balance of reasons, and that when we do so this it is not because there 
were some opaque reasons at work. The purpose of (IV) is to avoid commitment to 
the idea that every intentional action must have some related intention (or every 
intention needing an action to eventuate), and to partly avoid the danger of holding 
mutually exclusive intentions – though even if (IV) were to be met, this would not 
rule out the possibility of mutually exclusive intentions. It is however a necessary 
piece of the solution. 
Mutually exclusive intentions would run the risk of being very frequent were it the 
case that every intentional action A had to be backed by an intention to A. To recall 
Bratman’s gamer example, we would be compelled to conclude that the gamer had 
the intention to strike T1 and the intention to strike T2, and so be in a contradiction. 
However, as we saw in the discussion in Chapter 1: Section 4.2., there may still be 
cases where an agent does hold an intention to A and an intention to B, and where A 
and B are mutually exclusive. To resolve the danger permanently, it is necessary to 
slightly rethink the rational requirements characteristic of intentions. I will discuss 
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these requirements more in the next section, however my final resolution of the 
problem of mutually exclusive intentions is presented in Section 2.3. 
This leaves us with a very fundamental question to ask: what is this mechanism? 
Fischer (2007: 78-79) purposefully avoids discussing the details of what this 
mechanism could be, keeping his own description vague: “a process or a ‘way things 
go’ along the path that leads to the behaviour in question,” and even explicitly rejects 
the identification of the mechanism with practical reason (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998: 
86). Velleman (2014), though not strictly speaking of intentional action but rather 
what he calls autonomous action, provides a more determinate answer and does 
identify it with practical reason. Without wishing to engage in a protracted debate 
concerning the nature of practical reasoning, my view here is that the intention-unique 
control mechanism must be open to oversight by practical reasoning, even if, in a 
given instance of the mechanism’s operation, no such reasoning took place.  But I 
wish to be more specific about the identity of the actual mechanism at work. The hope 
in doing so is that by properly elucidating the properties of this mechanism that plays 
this role in our lives, it may be possible to glean insights into other facets of 
intentional agency. I turn to this attempt in the succeeding section. 
1.2. Dual Process Theory and System 2 Oversight 
I take it to be a theoretic virtue for any account of intentional activity to be compatible 
and consistent with our current best theories in the natural and cognitive sciences, i.e. 
if it were naturalised. An account of intentional activity that fails to do this finds itself 
in the unenviable position of having to either provide an error theory for those 
findings in the sciences with which it is inconsistent, or to “damn the data.” Though 
the former is certainly the preferable option between the two, barring there being 
some substantial theoretic virtue that would be lost in naturalization, neither should be 
preferred over the provision of a naturalised account. 26 I take the control account I am 
                                               
26 It can justifiably be asked: “what do I mean by naturalised?” A helpful answer to this question can be 
found in Roughley (2004). In this piece, he lays out several different uses of the term “naturalist” (I 
assume that “naturalist” account is synonymous with “naturalised” account, for the purposes of this 
paper) in philosophy, labelling them N1 – N3 (2004: 51-52):  
 
(N1) A philosophical approach is naturalist iff its procedures are consistent with the assumption 
that its subject matter has come into being a result of evolutionary processes. 
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developing in this chapter to be such a naturalised account as it builds directly on 
insights drawn from some of our leading theories in the field of cognitive science. 
Whereas distinguishing intentional activity from the rest of human behaviour has been 
a central preoccupation in the philosophical discourse surrounding action, in the 
cognitive sciences the focus has tended to be more on distinguishing automatic 
activities from consciously controlled activities (Norman and Shallice, 1986; 
Kahneman, 2011; Moors and De Houwer, 2007). As was mentioned in Chapter 1: 
Section 3.2., automatic activities are distinguished from mere events (such as slipping 
on the floor, or being carried away by the wind) by the fact that they still fall under 
some kind of control, though that control is clearly different to conscious or online 
control, and presumably different (at least in some cases) from intention-unique 
control, given that such automatic actions are often characterized as unconscious and 
unintentional. This latter fact means that these theories have the obvious potential to 
have bearing on the discussion surrounding intentional activity. 
A fairly recent theory of human cognition, currently influential in cognitive science, 
and the one I will be primarily leaning on, is Dual Process Theory (DPT). The basic 
suggestion of DPT is that human cognition can be roughly divided into two sets of 
cognitive systems – System 1 and System 2 – where the operation of System 1 is 
thought to be typically fast, automatic, and energy inexpensive, and System 2 is 
typically slow, consciously controlled, energy intensive, and has the capacity to be 
responsive to the largest set of reasons in a given context (Evans and Frankish, 2009; 
Kahneman, 2011). Rather than a single unitary system, System 1 is usually 
understood as being a classification that covers a large number of individual processes 
that have the characteristics attributed above, and these processes are thought to be 
massively parallel, which facilitates the typical speed and low energy costs associated 
                                                                                                                                      
(N2) A philosophical approach is naturalist iff its procedures are compatible with those of the 
natural sciences. 
 
(N3) A philosophical approach is naturalist iff its aims and procedures are aims and procedures 
of the natural sciences. 
 
He further points out that a given philosophical approach might well count as naturalised under some 
of these uses, but not under others. I will be accepting these as formulations of the different conditions 
an account may meet to be deemed naturalist. My own account I take to meet N1 and N2, and so I hold 
that it can be justifiably labelled a naturalised account. 
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with them. At least System 2, which is taken to be unitary, is taken to be reasons-
responsive to normative reasons, and there is ongoing debate about whether or not 
System 1 processes responds to normative reasons in a merely associative and 
heuristic manner, or whether such processes might involve more goal-directed 
reasoning in their operations (for the former view see Kahneman, 2011, for the latter 
see Carruthers, 2014). What is important is that this sensitivity in System 1 is never 
taken to be a sensitivity to reasons qua normative reasons. Evans and Over, for 
example, are on one end of the spectrum in suggesting that System 1 processes can 
indeed be rational, but they differentiate between two different kinds of rationality, 
namely (1996: 8): 
Rationality1: Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting in a 
way that is generally reliable and efficient for achieving one’s goals. 
Rationality2: Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting when 
one has a reason for what one does sanctioned by a normative theory. 
System 1 processes, Evans and Over contend, can meet the demands of Rationality1, 
but not those of Rationality2. Carruthers (2014: 9) describes this distinction as one 
between “ecological” and “normative” rationality, with System 2 (or what Carruthers 
calls Reflective Reasoning)27 being uniquely capable of the latter. He attributes this 
feature to the fact that the operations of reflective reasoning are “action-based” (ibid.: 
4), meaning that it is open to guidance by things like verbal instruction and normative 
beliefs.28 By action-based is not meant that such reasoning necessarily culminates in 
                                               
27 Though Carruthers (2014) sees his dichotomy between intuitive reasoning and reflective reasoning as 
a replacement for talk of System 1 and System 2, since he takes the opposing list of features typically 
associated with each system to fail at capturing a real distinction. However, despite this, it is equally 
easy to interpret what he is doing as simply providing a different account of the two systems. And 
since, as far as I can see, nothing in my argument hangs on this, I will be treating reflective reasoning 
and intuitive reasoning as Carruthers’s versions of System 2 and System 1 respectively. 
28 Carruthers also takes the action-based nature of reflective reasoning to mean that it must be open to 
intentional control. This is plausible, after all we do sometimes intentionally think or reason through a 
problem. However, unlike Carruthers I do not think that we should say in these cases that the reflective 
reasoning process is intentionally controlled, but rather that any case of thinking or reasoning that is 
undertaken by such a process is, by definition, intentional. The reason for this difference is that I think 
Carruthers associates intentional control with full-on conscious control, which we have already 
established is too strict a control condition on intentional action. Rather, the control condition involves 
oversight by a mechanism that is reflective of the agent’s reason-responsiveness to normative reasons, 
and such a mechanism is always in oversight when we reason using a reflective reasoning process (or 
System 2), as it is just such a mechanism. Put differently: my thoughts and judgements that result from 
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overt action, though in at least some instances this will be the case. But on many 
occasions the operation of reflective reasoning will instead yield (individually or in 
combinations) mental rehearsals of action, judgements, beliefs, and/or intentions. 
However, since my interest is on the question of moral responsibility’s relationship to 
intentional activity, I will be focussing on those operations of the systems that yield 
intentions and actions. 
The fast/slow and energy inexpensive/energy expensive distinctions are simple 
enough to grasp, but it is worth taking a moment to consider the final distinction: 
automatic/consciously controlled, which has the most relevance for my arguments 
regarding intentional activity. There are various different definitions of automaticity 
when applied to cognitive processes, some requiring that these processes not be goal-
directed (Carruthers, 2014: 13), others that it be generally inaccessible (Sun, Lane, 
and Matthews, 2009: 256), and yet others claim that a process is autonomous when it 
can “control behaviour directly without need for any kind of controlled attention” 
(Evans, 2009: 42).29 For my purposes I will follow the lead of Norman and Shallice 
(1986: 1-2) in understanding an automatic process as a process that can operate, 
perhaps instigating activity, without the awareness of its performance. It is important 
to stress that what the agent is necessarily unaware of here is the cognitive process 
that results in a given activity, not necessarily the resultant activity itself. Whether or 
not the agent is aware of the actual activity is a further question (and an important 
one, as it will turn out, for determining intentional status). By contrast, a process that 
is consciously controlled is taken to be influenced by verbal instruction and normative 
beliefs, “globally broadcast” (Carruthers, 2014: 7-9), and linked to an agent’s sense of 
agency. It is also assumed that such a process is in principle available to the widest set 
of rational tools that the agent can bring to bear. It is worth noting that the activities 
that result from System 2 processes can necessarily be assumed to be under agential 
control, as such processes and the activities they result in are both open to guidance 
from beliefs, as well as modifiable in response to normative reasons. 
                                                                                                                                      
my reflective reasoning is always the result of a reason-responsive mechanism with oversight over 
these results. 
29 To get a sense for the complexity surrounding the concept of automaticity see Moors and De Houwer 
(2007) for an excellent, and comprehensive, overview. 
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In the most usual version of the DPT model, the default-interventionist version, most 
of an agent’s activities in their daily life are directed by System 1 processes, with 
System 2 only intervening or being called upon when the System 1 processes 
breakdown or new input – in the form of changes in the context that yield new 
considerations to act that may count as reasons for the agent in question – is received. 
When this occurs, System 2 can intervene to adjust the agent’s behaviour. An easy 
example is that of a man, Tom, making tea: we stipulate that his behaviour is being 
directed by System 1 processes, as he is actively thinking about something else. As 
part of the routine of making tea, Tom reaches up to a shelf where the sugar is usually 
kept. However, as it happens, Tom’s wife used the last of the sugar for her own tea, 
and had not replaced it, leaving Tom’s hand to close around empty air. When this 
occurs, Tom’s System 2 is called in to intervene and determine a solution. So, when 
the context changed, the System 1 process(es) at work, possessing only a limited 
capacity to respond, failed to provide the appropriate outcome, and System 2 – which 
had oversight over the events occurring – activated in response. Crucially, it does not 
require a failure of a System 1 process to achieve the expected result in order for 
System 2 to intervene, sometimes this occurs when new considerations enter the 
picture. This time Tom is driving to the store to pick up some more sugar. He is 
angrily thinking about his wife’s negligence in not replacing it herself, and his driving 
is being directed by System 1 processes, this being a long, straight, and boring stretch 
of road. Then, suddenly, a deer appears on the road. Suddenly Tom’s awareness snaps 
to the road and the deer and he slams the breaks and pulls the steering wheel to the 
side. The explanation for this from DPT is that System 2 intervened when a new 
reason for acting was recognised in the vicinity. 
There are two features of System 2 that need more expansive explanation: that of 
global broadcasting and of the relationship to the sense of agency. Global 
broadcasting theory is a cognitive architecture intended to explain the coincidence of 
the broadcasting of outputs of the ventral-temporal visual system with the conscious 
experience. The gist is that this global broadcasting makes the content of the 
broadcast available to a vast array (some, like Carruthers, 2014, argue the full suite) 
of unconscious processes. I take these unconscious processes to be System 1 
processes. There are then two possible stories for System 2’s relationship to global 
broadcasting: the first is that there is some particular cognitive process, called System 
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2, that once engaged has the ability to “call on” the array of System 1 process, and 
that global broadcasting is part of this ability. The second story argues that there is no 
particular process called System 2 to be identified, rather what we take to be the 
workings of System 2 are in fact the repeated cycles of the operation of otherwise 
unconscious and unreflective forms of cognition, and that these cycles require global 
broadcasting. I take my view to be compatible with either of these interpretations, 
though I do favour the latter, as it does seem more evolutionarily likely that such a 
system of broadcasted repetitions of existing processes would develop, rather than an 
entirely new one. What is important for the purposes of my account though, is that the 
operation of System 2, however understood, brings its content to consciousness. 
Turning the sense of agency. This refers to an agent’s subjective experience of 
controlling her actions and through them events in the external world. As described 
by Haggard and Tsarkis (2009: 242): 
As we perform actions in our daily lives, we have a coherent experience of a 
seemingly simple fluent flow from our thoughts, to our body movements, to the 
effects produced in the world. I want to have something to eat, I go to the 
kitchen, I eat a piece of bread. We have a single experience of agency—of 
control over these events—because our cognitive representations of the 
successive stages of sensorimotor control are tightly linked together. 
Importantly, this has to do with the subjective experience of agency, not agency itself. 
It is possible that an agent might experience agency over some outcome that was in 
fact outside of her control, and this has been borne out in a number of studies.30 The 
reason this is of interest to my account, is that the linkage mechanism that is most 
commonly assigned the role of connecting up the successive stages of sensorimotor 
control – a process called intentional binding – is action prediction. Agents 
experience an action as theirs when their prediction of the outcome matches closely 
enough with the actual outcome brought about (including temporal factors, so 
proximity in time is relevant). This action prediction must be conscious in order for 
intentional binding to take place. This is the connection with System 2: these action 
predictions are results of System 2 – indeed on one influential understanding of 
                                               
30 For examples see Farrer et al., 2003; Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Sato and Yasuda, 2005. 
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System 2, all that this system’s operation brings about is conscious action rehearsal 
that then can result in the implementation of the action by various System 1 processes 
(Carruthers, 2014), which maps on well to the role ascribed to action prediction in the 
sense of agency literature. 
Does this mean that every action over which the agent has an experience of agency is 
intentional? Certainly not. As the afore-mentioned studies have shown, our 
experience of agency can come apart from the actual presence of agency. This occurs 
because the action in question is not in fact amenable to adjustment in the light of 
reasons, i.e. is not an action that is under System 2 Oversight, but followed from some 
action that was, and which was predicted to have the given effect or consequence. 
Despite this fact, I take the relationship between the operation of System 2 and the 
sense of agency to provide circumstantial evidence for the idea that our intentional 
agency is exercised through the operation of System 2, since intentional binding is 
usually an accurate indicator for the presence of agency, and that the times that it fails 
can be adequately explained from within the Dual Process Theory account, since there 
is nothing in the DPT account that requires that an agent always has correct beliefs 
regarding the consequences of her intentional actions. 
Given this overview, I now wish to propose a control account of intentional action 
that is informed by – and is compatible with – insights into human activity drawn 
from Dual Process Theory. I will be relying primarily on the default-interventionist 
interpretation of DPT, because it remains the most common interpretation, though it 
has spawned a number of variants (Stanovich, 2009; Evans, 2009; Carruthers, 2014). 
Under my account, the type of control that unifies all cases of intentional action is 
System 2 Oversight (S2O), which at this stage can be provisionally understood as 
follows: 
System 2 Oversight: A given action31 X, undertaken at time t, is under S2O, and so 
intentional, iff: 
(1) At time t the agent X’d 
                                               
31 It is important to stress that this condition as provided here accounts only for intentional actions, and 
not yet for intentional omissions, effects, or consequences. I turn to broadening the account in the 
succeeding sections of this chapter. 
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(2) (a) X is under the guidance of the operation of System 2 or (b) is under the 
guidance of System 1 and System 2 had oversight 
(3) The agent’s System 2 operation in this case is at least minimally reason-
responsive 
(4) The agent had an intention-unique belief pertaining to X 
Condition (1) being fairly self-explanatory, I will pass it over and consider each of the 
succeeding conditions in turn. (2) captures the origination of the action from the 
agent’s “locus of agency”, as Velleman might call it. To meet (2) an action can result 
from either a System 1 process, or have followed from the operation of System 2 (or 
from a System 2 process, if this is your preferred description), or it can be partially 
the result of one and partially the result of the other. This kind of mixed action can 
easily be found if we turn back to think about automatic action, particularly over-
learned ones. When I perform a tennis shot, my action is a result of the operation of 
System 2 in so far as I consciously reasoned about the placement of the shot, and how 
this fits into my overall strategy for this point. But at the same time, I am also 
intentionally doing an entire array of things that are not being run through my System 
2, but by System 1 processes – my footwork, my grip movement, etc. It is not enough, 
however, to be the result of the workings of the two systems. What is needed is that 
the given action was under guidance, meaning that the agent would have been able to 
adjust the given action in the light of the reasons that she is responsive to. 
Having subconditions (a) and (b) ensures that this account captures the feature of 
intentional action that has been stressed by most thinkers since Anscombe, that 
intentional action must be action that can be open to demands for explanation in terms 
of the agent’s responsiveness to normative reasons. This will be unproblematically the 
case for actions that meet (a). However, as we saw, this does not mean that what is 
required is that there always be a normative reason that the agent must be acting on, 
but rather than the agent have the capacity to adjust her behaviour in the light of 
reasons. Therefore, what is required for positive intentional status is not that an action 
result from the operation of System 2, but rather that System 2 must have oversight, 
as understood in the default-interventionist picture of DPT. Ergo an action can be 
intentional if it meets (b), rather than (a). 
 72 
Condition (3) is necessary since the scope of responsiveness can be varied. The 
reasons for choosing minimal reason-responsiveness was discussed in Section 1.1. 
Finally, (4) is there to account for the epistemic condition on intentional action. It is 
not enough that an action, A, be under System 2 oversight, it is also necessary that the 
agent have at least the belief that they are trying to A. Since the content of System 2’s 
operations are globally broadcast, it follows that when such operations result in 
action, the agent will have the necessary belief. On the other hand, this will not 
always be the case for actions that are under oversight. Again, consider something 
like an action slip, which is characterised as a case where the agent does not have a 
belief as to what he’s doing until it’s brought to his attention, and even then, he has no 
belief to recall, but rather learns about his behaviour observationally. This said, there 
is not a requirement that the belief must be conscious at the time of acting – indeed, 
such a requirement would render large numbers of clearly intentional, System 1-
backed, actions unintentional. I explain and defend my use of a belief to try in Section 
1.5. 
So how does this account fare in meeting the four requirements outlined in the 
previous section? The first requirement is met at face value, since System 2 oversight 
is the cognitive mechanism that enables us to be reason-responsive. Requirement (II), 
that the intention-unique control mechanism must account for the role of intention-
unique belief, is meet by the addition of condition (4). Requirement (III) allows for 
cases where agents act intentionally against the balance of reasons. This is possible 
since oversight does not mean that System 2 will always intervene in System 1 
operations, even if there is a normative reason to do so. It seems likely that many 
System 1 processes are sensitive to an agent’s desires and attitudes toward some end, 
even ends that run counter to what the agent takes herself to have normative reason to 
pursue, and that actions that result from this might be under System 2 Oversight, but 
in any particular instance it is possible that System 2 does not intervene. So, for 
example, if I judge that smoking the next cigarette is not the right course, but my 
desires push me to an intention to smoke the next cigarette regardless, this smoking 
would still be intentional provided that the agent had the capacity to respond to 
reasons not to do so. Capacity, to recall, being understood here in a Fischer-style 
counterfactual manner. What is important to note though, is that if the agent did not 
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have the capacity to adjust the behaviour in the light of reasons, had there been salient 
ones in the vicinity, then the action would not be intentional. In this version of the 
case, the agent’s behaviour is too compulsive to count as intentional, and is more like 
the case of the kleptomaniac, or of an addict who is incapable of resisting his 
addiction – such cases may not only be unintentional, but they also seem to be 
involuntary. There is a similarity here to Heuer’s point from Chapter 1: Section 1.3., 
that what matters in determining whether or not an action counts as intentional is not 
that the action be done for a reason, but that the action be under control in such a way 
that it could be stopped, modified, or continued, in the light of salient reasons. Even 
when an action (or judgement) is the result of System 2 – not merely under oversight 
– it is still possible that this action (or judgement) could run against the balance of 
reasons. Though System 2 brings to bear the largest rational toolkit and is responsive 
to normative beliefs about reasoning, nothing in the DPT account requires that it 
always yield outcomes in line with the balance of reasons. Put another way, 
judgements resulting from System 2 need not be thought of as all-things-considered 
judgements in the Davidsonian sense, and so actions following from such judgements 
can be akratic. 
Finally, requirement (IV), that the mechanism must be able to result in both intentions 
and intentional actions and not necessarily together. To recall, this requirement is 
necessary to avoid the dangers of mutually exclusive intentions. Fortunately, though it 
does not resolve the problem entirely, System 2 Oversight can easily explain the 
possibility of intentional actions without intentions, since either can be the result of a 
System 1 process or the operation of System 2, though, being intentional, both must 
be under System 2 Oversight. This is sufficient to account for cases of intentional 
action with no intention, like the automatic actions discussed in Chapter 1: Section 
3.1. However, it is not yet enough to evade the problem of mutually exclusive 
intentions entirely. 
I take this account to be unlike reason-backed, intention-backed, and knowledge-
backed accounts, in that the presence of control itself is taken to be the characteristic 
feature of intentional action. What is more, this control is exerted through a 
mechanism. That the operation of this control mechanism might involve a role for 
reason, intentions, and beliefs, does not alter the direction of priority. In the 
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discussion of the fringe cases in Chapter 1, it was shown that there are cases of 
intentional action where there appears to be no reason or intention involved, and with 
all three of these features it is possible that an agent holds them but does not in fact 
act intentionally – they are not sufficient for positive intentional status. In contrast, 
System 2 Oversight is both necessary and sufficient. 
This then gives us what I take to be the backbone of a compelling formulation of 
intention-unique control for intentional action: System 2 Oversight. However, this is 
not yet a complete picture, as it has not yet fully defended my version of the epistemic 
condition on intentional action, and not wholly resolved the problem of mutually 
exclusive intentions. It is also not yet a full account of intentional activity, as it 
excludes omissions. Nor does it sufficiently capture the intentional effects and 
consequences of such activity. To see this easily, consider the case of Aaron the 
assassin. We do not want to say that Aaron intentionally killed his target, though he 
had the intention to, since he killed him by shooting him in the head, whereas Aaron 
believed that the only way to kill his target was by hitting him in the heart and missed. 
On the account I have laid out, Aaron’s killing of the target is clearly intentional: the 
action is the result of a proper cognitive mechanism, System 2 had oversight, System 
2 was minimally reason-responsive. My response to this is that the control condition 
for intentional actions and omissions is best understood as a single condition on 
intentional activity, whereas intentional effects, and intentional consequences have a 
differently formulated control condition – involving a different intention-unique 
belief, though the same notion of control is central to it. I will be tackling these 
remaining elements in the following order: I first unpack my approach to intention-
unique belief in Section 1.3. Secondly, I expand my account to include all intentional 
activity in Section 1.4., and intentional effects and consequences in Section 1.5. 
Finally, I provide my full solution to the problem of mutually exclusive intentions in 
Section 2.3. 
1.3. The belief to try 
In this section I argue for what Yair Levy (2017: 1) might call “Weak Intention 
Cognitivism”: the position that any intentional action requires a related belief. To 
clarify my views, I do not endorse the strong and controversial position that practical 
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reasoning generally, or the rational requirements on intention particularly, are 
reducible to the demands of theoretical reasoning. Nor do I claim that intention itself 
is best understood as a belief. What I will defend is the far more modest claim that 
whenever there is an instance of intentional action, A, the agent necessarily has an 
intention-unique belief, and this belief is best understood as a belief that she or he will 
try to A. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, knowledge-backed accounts are perhaps the strongest rivals 
to the account that I am developing here. However, one of the prominent criticisms of 
such accounts has been that agents sometimes A intentionally without believing that 
they will A. It was also suggested in that discussion that perhaps what is required is 
not a belief that the agent will A, but a belief that the agent will try to A. However, 
this move faces stiff objections. We have already been introduced to Davidson’s will 
writer and copy-maker counterexamples. I argue that in both these cases the agent in 
question can be said to have a belief that he or she will try to A, where A is that action 
in question (I will be calling this belief, a belief to try). The will writer believes that 
he is trying to secure his family’s future, the copy-maker believes that he is trying to 
make ten copies. However, more recently Holton (2009: 22), conceding that the belief 
to try approach can resolve the Davidsonian counterexamples, puts forward another 
case, the Forgetful Cyclist, which he argues cannot be resolved using a belief to try. 
He presents the case as follows 
You have some library books that are badly overdue; in fact so badly overdue 
that your borrowing privileges are about to be suspended (a major 
inconvenience) if you do not return or renew them by the end of the day. Since 
you have finished with them, the best thing would be to drop them off at the 
library on your way home; but that is after the departmental seminar, and you 
know that, once you get on your bicycle with your head full of ideas from the 
discussion, you are all too likely to cycle straight home. Alternatively, you 
could renew them online; but that would require your library password, which is 
scribbled on a piece of paper lying somewhere on your desk at home. If you 
renewed them online you would not need to take the books home with you, but 
you need to take your laptop, which you would otherwise leave at work. In the 
end you head for the seminar with your bag weighed down by both the library 
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books and your laptop, moved by the thought that you will avoid suspension 
one way or another. 
His contention is that this case is resilient against intention-unique beliefs as beliefs to 
try explanations. He takes it as obvious that if the agent described was to fail in 
retuning the books because she forgot about doing so post the departmental seminar, 
she would not have “even tried to take them back”. The idea seems to be that because 
the reason that the agent failed to fulfil her intention was due to forgetfulness, this 
means that the agent did not even try. Interestingly, Holton implies that had the agent 
doubted she would succeed in retuning the books because the library was, for 
example, “under siege,” then this would somehow change whether we could say that 
the agent had in fact tried. I think this distinction fails. Consider the thoughts of the 
agent at the beginning of the case, having packed both the books and the laptop. 
Would it not be very strange to say of this agent that she did not believe, at that 
moment, that she would try to return the books? Surely if she did not believe that she 
would even try, then her decision to take the books and laptop seems rather foolish. 
And taking these items with her surely constitutes part of trying, regardless of 
whether she fails to accomplish any further actions toward returning the books. 
Additionally, would it not seem reasonable that the agent, if she failed to return the 
books, might exclaim in frustration, “I tried so hard not to forget about the damn 
books!” It would be strange if she could claim that she tried to overcome her 
predicted forgetfulness, without having a belief that she would try to do so. For this 
reason, I find this case, as with the previous two of the will writer and the copy-
maker, fully explicable once the belief necessary for intention or intentional activity is 
understood as a belief to try.32 
                                               
32 A different potential strategy that could work in the favour of knowledge-backed accounts is that of 
Holton himself, who argues that understanding cases like the copy-maker requires us to recognise the 
role of “partial beliefs” in our reasoning. Holton (2009: 33) defines this notion as follows: 
 
Partial Belief 
One partially believes p iff one takes p as a live possibility and takes not-p as a live possibility  
 
He further contends that it is also possible to have partial intentions, understood as intentions that are 
held as one amongst a number of alternatives within a given plan of action. However, not all partial 
intentions entail partial belief, and not all examples of partial belief give rise to only partial intention. 
For example, Holton takes the case of the copy-maker as one where the agent possesses an intention 
(non-partial given that there are no alternative intentions) based on a partial belief – the belief that he 
will actually make ten copies. He holds this as a live possibility, though he holds his failure as a live 
 77 
A more serious potential worry, to my mind, is a point raised by Davidson (2001: 93-
95) when he contends the reason that claims of ellipsis cannot be used to defend the 
general thesis of intention (or intentional action) as entailing beliefs to try is because 
not all statements of intention or descriptions of intentional action can be accurately 
shown to have an elliptical form. In his words: 
The thesis that intending implies believing is sometimes defended by claiming 
that expressions of intention are generally incomplete or elliptical. Thus the man 
writing his will should be described as intending to try to secure the welfare of 
his children, not as intending to secure it, and the man with the carbon paper is 
merely intending to try to produce his copies. The phrases sound wrong: we 
should be much more apt to say he is trying, and intends to do it. But where the 
action is entirely in the future, we do sometimes allow that we intend to try, and 
we see this as more accurate than the bald statement of intention when the 
outcome is sufficiently in doubt. Nevertheless, I do not think the claim of 
ellipsis can be used to defend the general thesis. (Davidson, 2001: 92) 
He proceeds to take it for granted that formulating an intention-unique belief as a 
belief to try is equivalent to formulating an intention with conditionals. By this he 
means something like, “I intend to go to the party if the police do not arrest me (as I 
suspect they may).” Further, he argues that if all intentions would be formulated most 
accurately by clarifying all conceivable conditionals, then we would be left with the 
“nearly empty, ‘I intend to do it if nothing prevents me, if I don’t change my mind, if 
nothing untoward happens.’ This tells us almost nothing about what the agent believes 
about the future, or what he will in fact do” (Davidson, 2001: 94). For Davidson, this 
                                                                                                                                      
possibility as well. For Holton, whose interest is not in providing an account of intentional action but 
rather intention, this kind of partial belief is sufficient for meeting the epistemic conditions on 
intention. So, the copy-maker can be said to have the intention of making ten copies without violating 
the consistency of his intention with his beliefs. However, a proponent of a knowledge-backed account 
of intentional activity might go further, and argue that the presence of at least such a partial belief is 
the characteristic feature of intentional action. 
There is a clear similarity between Holton’s approach and my own. Though his account is aimed at 
intention, rather than intentional action, we both recognise that the role of uncertainty requires that the 
belief necessary for intentionality (either for intention or intentional action) cannot be a full-blown 
belief that the agent will do A. The difference is that whereas Holton requires only that the agent must 
believe that A is a live possibility, I require that the agent must believe that they will try to A. My 
reason for preferring my own approach is that I take the belief to try better reflects the nature of having 
an intention as a commitment, as an aim, then does Holton’s partial belief. This said, I take many of the 
arguments I make here to be equally sustainable with the adoption of Holton’s partial beliefs, and view 
his approach as a live possibility in the search for an account of intentional action. 
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is evidence that an accurate description of an intention does not require an explication 
of all possible conditionals, and that the explication of a conditional should be limited 
to cases where the agent considers the conditional as meaningful to the pursuit of the 
intention, e.g. “I intend to leave the party if the music is too loud” (2001: 95). It is 
worth noting that this argument would also be applicable to beliefs that it is possible 
to A, as such beliefs seem no more or less elliptical than beliefs to try. 
I think that Davidson somewhat misses the point here. Unless he is specifically 
targeting the views of cognitivists, where intentions merely are beliefs (which he does 
not explicitly claim to be doing), it is not clear how the most accurate description of 
an agent’s belief regarding an intention has any bearing on the resolve toward the 
outcome of the intention on the part of the agent. An agent can believe that she is very 
unlikely to succeed in A’ing, but be as resolved to it as anybody. Contra Davidson, 
what those defending the belief to try understanding of the intention-unique belief in 
the manner I am pursuing require is not that the agent’s actual intention be an 
intention to try, the intention itself can be full-blown. What is required is that the 
associated belief must be a belief that the agent will at least try to A, where A is the 
aim of the intention. It should also be stressed that the belief is a belief to at least try, 
meaning that some agents might well have stronger beliefs regarding their intentions. 
But such beliefs are not necessary for positive intentional status. 
Another response to Davidson is to point out that he is correct: surely, it is a more 
accurate description of the intention to say, “I intend to do it if nothing prevents me, if 
I don’t change my mind, if nothing untoward happens.” However, Davidson’s 
criticism has missed the point, since what is partly characteristic about intention is 
that they involve – even if they cannot be reduced to – trying. In this regard, I agree 
fully with Brian O’Shaughnessy (1973: 365) when he stresses that “trying is an 
essential constituent of intentional action as such” since “no event, including intended 
act-events, can be foretold as an absolute certainty”. As he points out, the oddity of 
saying of a “normal able-bodied man in a setting of rural peace” that “they tried to 
walk across the road” is analogous to the oddity of saying of the President that he is 
sober this morning. We should see intentional action as coming with the notion of 
trying in-built. Note, however, that this does not mean that an intending to A is 
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merely intending to try to A. Rather, part of what it means for an agent to have an 
intention to A is that the agent will try to A. 
Furthermore, it is not “near empty” to assert “I intend to go to the party” does not 
mean I believe I will go, or I am certain that I will go, but rather that I believe that I 
will try to go. Indeed, this formulation reflects the agent’s commitment to achieving 
the relevant intention, while allowing us to maintain the role of uncertainty in the 
agent’s ability to predict future action (which is only accurate to reality), while not 
requiring what will always be an infinite list of conditionals (which would render the 
statement empty), and retaining the role of commitment to action.33 To see this more 
clearly, consider that an even more accurate description of the intention-unique belief 
than the one put forward by Davidson would be something like: I believe I will do it if 
nothing prevents me, if I don’t change my mind, if nothing untoward happens, but I 
will try. 
So, though I agree with Davidson when he says of statements like, “I intend to try” 
that the “phrases sound wrong” (Davidson, 2001: 92), in my view, this is due to a 
different reason than the one proposed by Davidson. A word can feel “wrong” in a 
sentence for many reasons, but one of the most common is if that term makes some 
part of the statement tautological. I suggest that this is the case with “trying” and 
“intention.”  For example, it certainly sounds wrong to say, “I am an unmarried 
bachelor.” This is not evidence that the two terms (“unmarried” and “bachelor”) in 
some way defeat each other, or one renders the other meaningless. Rather, it is 
evidence that one of the terms already incorporates the other in its meaning. If we 
take the intention-unique belief related to an intention or an intentional activity to be a 
belief to try, then a statement like: 
“I have an intention to try to go to the party,” 
can be taken as entailing that the agent could also make the truthful statement: 
                                               
33 I think there is also good evidence in ordinary language usage for this point. When I fail to perform 
an intention, it is usual to say, “I tried” as a way of expressing that I did not revise my intention, but 
was thwarted in what I tried to accomplish. I think it is fairly rare for a person when asked, “Why 
didn’t you do it?”, to respond by listing conditionals and then declaring that since these conditionals 
occurred the commitment to act ceased to apply. Rather, the listed conditionals may serve to indicate 
why the agent was thwarted (the world did not co-operate sufficiently). 
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“I believe that I will at least try to go to the party.” 
To clarify the source of the wrongness here, let us substitute in the agent’s intention-
unique belief in place of her intention in the original statement. The resulting 
statement reads: 
“I have a [belief that I will least try to] try to go to the party.” 
The second “try to” is redundant. It is this redundancy, I think, that lies behind 
Davidson’s feeling that the statement “sounds wrong.” 
But, it could be asked of my solution, what about cases where we do express “try” in 
our statements of intention? Surely then these should also sound wrong, and the fact 
that they do not means that my explanation is flawed. I disagree. There are cases in 
ordinary language usage where the use of a redundant term serves the purpose of 
emphasising an aspect of the agent’s meaning, as Grice made clear in Logic and 
Conversation (1975). For example: I explain my plans to break into a house and steal 
some valuables to a novice accomplice. I am dubious about my accomplice’s abilities 
of stealth and his moral readiness to break the law, so I express part of my plan as 
follows: “I am going to stealthily sneak into the house and then illegally steal the 
jewellery off the dresser.” Now this expression clearly contains redundancies, but 
these are purposeful. They serve to emphasise aspects of some of the terms employed 
– in this case, “sneak” and “steal.” Grice (1975: 52) makes the same point when he 
states that although “patent tautologies” like “Women are women and War is war,” 
are “totally noninformative” on the level of what is said, “[t]hey are, of course 
informative at the level of what is implicated, and the hearer’s identification of their 
informative content at this level is dependent on his ability to explain the speaker’s 
selection of this PARTICULAR patent tautology.”  In the same way, we sometimes 
use “trying” when seeking to emphasise the uncertainty inherent in our intention. This 
uncertainty is always present, as is the awareness of trying, but we usually only draw 
attention to it in the “redundant” way I have just discussed in cases of sufficient 
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doubt. So, it is only when I seek to emphasise to my listener the uncertainty normally 
implicit in my intention that I will express this intention in the form “I intend to try.”34 
To summarise the takeaway point of this discussion: the belief necessarily related to 
any intention or intentional activity can at most be required to be a belief to try – it 
cannot be a belief to do. Furthermore, any account of intentional activity must be 
compatible with this insight. This leads me to a more complete formulation of System 
2 Oversight: 
System 2 Oversight*: A given action X, undertaken at time t, is under S2O, and so 
intentional, iff: 
(1) At time t the agent X’d 
(2) (a) X is under the guidance of the operation of System 2 or (b) is under the 
guidance of System 1 and System 2 had oversight 
(3) The agent’s System 2 operation in this case is at least minimally reason-
responsive 
(4) The agent has a belief that she will at least try to X 
                                               
34 Grice, for his part, may have resisted my position here. In Intention and uncertainty (1971) he argued 
that a “strict intention” to A requires that the agent be sure that they will A. He bases this claim on 
conversations of the following type, which Davidson also employs in his arguments: 
 
X. I intend to go to that concert on Tuesday. 
Y. You will enjoy that. 
X. I may not be there. 
Y. I am afraid I don’t understand. 
X. The police are going to ask me some awkward questions on Tuesday afternoon, and I may be 
in prison by Tuesday evening. 
Y. Then you should have said to begin with, ‘I intend to go to the concert if I am not in prison,’ 
or … ‘I should probably be going,’ or ‘I aim to go,’ or ‘I intend to go if I can.’ (1971: 264-265) 
 
Grice takes Y’s remarks to be reasonable, and argues that the epistemic condition on intention should 
be that the agent is “sure that he will do A” (ibid.: 266) on this basis. But as with Davidson, it seems 
that Grice here is confusing an agent’s commitment to do A, and her belief that she will do A. X may 
have every intention of making it to the concert, and yet still recognize that this could fail to occur. 
Given this recognition, it is reasonable for X to be less than sure that he will be there. But, given this 
lack of surety, we can determine that he does still intend to go to the concert if he was to say something 
like, “I will try to make it!” However, Y’s response may be reasonable if the intention’s chance of 
success is below a certain degree. Such cases are precisely those where we tend to explicate what is 
usually unspoken, that having an intention to A does not mean that I will successfully A, or that I must 
believe that I will successfully A (though the agent may well have such a belief), but rather than the 
agent is committed to A-ing, or resolved to A’ing. The belief necessarily associated with this 
commitment or resolve is at least a belief to try. 
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Despite the necessary role played by the belief to try in my account, I do not take it to 
be a knowledge-backed one. In order to see why, recall that my means of 
distinguishing between the various approaches discussed in Chapter 1 was by 
identifying what they took as the characteristic feature of intentional action. Further, 
I pointed out that few versions of any of these approaches outright deny that the 
features that the others hold as characteristic plays an important role. So, to discern 
what kind of account a given example should count as, we ask three questions: (Q1) is 
the feature identified as characteristic necessary for intentional action? (Q2) If both 
features are necessary, does one or the other have priority? And finally, (Q3) is one or 
the other sufficient for intentional action? 
My account is a control-backed account. By this I mean that it is the presence of 
control that is characteristic of intentional action rather than the presence of reasons, 
intentions, or beliefs, though those do play a role. Given the arguments that have been 
discussed up till now, I will put aside talk of reasons and intentions for the moment, 
as they are not compelling as necessary features – we have seen that intentional action 
can be done for no particular reason, and with no related intention. Belief is more 
difficult to dismiss. Turning to the three questions, I will address them slightly out of 
order, going Q1, Q3, and then Q2. Is belief necessary for intentional action? Yes. Is 
belief sufficient for intentional action? Here I have argued no, given that it is 
seemingly possible to have an intention-unique belief without ever intentionally 
acting. I could have the belief that I will A, but in fact not A, or I could A but not in 
virtue of the belief (to use Heuer’s words).35 Something must be added to the mere 
having of the belief and the occurrence of the action in order for an intentional action 
to be present. This seems to indicate that the characteristic and necessary feature of 
intentional action is not the belief, but rather this additional feature. By contrast, 
intention-unique control understood as System 2 Oversight – which includes belief – 
is sufficient for intentional action. The fact that this control involves belief does not 
cede centrality to the latter, as it involves other features as well. It is this unity that is 
both necessary and sufficient for intentional action. This final part of the answer to Q3 
indicates the answer to Q2: the reason we care about agents’ beliefs regarding their 
                                               
35 This still leaves the possibility open that an intention-unique belief is sufficient for intention. I leave 
that matter to the side here, as nothing in my account hinges on whether this is so. 
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actions, is because it is indicative of the presence of control (or lack thereof), since the 
belief is a component of such control. 
An attentive reader will likely at this point inquire about how my account fares when 
tested in this fashion against Setiya’s knowing-how version of the knowledge-backed 
approach, given that I named this approach my chief competitor. Though I do take his 
account to be an undoubted improvement over previous versions, it does not threaten 
the centrality of control: an agent can still possess the know-how to A without 
intentionally A’ing, and it is not altogether clear if knowing-how can capture the 
cases that Setiya would want it to. Recall that knowing-how is to be understood in 
terms of dispositions, and so problematically limits the kinds of actions that we can 
call intentional. We act intentionally, at least sometimes, even when we do not have a 
disposition toward succeeding in the action. There may be other ways to spell out 
what is meant by knowing-how, but it strikes me that any attempt to provide such an 
explication that can allow knowing-how to fulfil the role it needs to play moves 
perilously close to clear talk of control. However, whether or not this is the case 
remains to be seen, 
As it stands, System 2 Oversight* remains a somewhat incomplete account of 
intentional behaviour. To see this, we can recall the cases at the fringe discussed in 
Chapter 1 to see if the account yields plausible answers. Though it can deal with 
automatic and Expressive Action, this is not the case when addressing cases of lucky 
action. In these cases, S2O* seems to run the risk of overgeneration. It would appear 
to lead us to conclude that Brandon’s making the shot was intentional, Nick’s 
inputting of the correct code to thwart the meltdown would be intentional, and 
Aaron’s killing of his target would be intentional as well.  Though deeming Nick’s 
thwarting of the meltdown as intentional might be an acceptable answer, the same is 
not true in the case of Brandon and Aaron. However, I take this to be only the 
appearance of a problem. My argument for why this criticism is misplaced begins 
with the acknowledgement of an important set of distinctions that has passed under 
the radar until this point, namely: the distinction between intentional actions, 
intentional omissions, intentional effects, and intentional consequences. Roughly put 
(to be refined below), in the cases of Brandon making the shot, Nick thwarting the 
meltdown, and Aaron killing the target, these are consequences of the agent’s action 
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in each case. They are not under the direct guidance of System 2 Oversight. In these 
cases, the guidance exercised over the outcome is indirect, in that the agent did not 
have the ability to directly guide the outcome, but rather to guide some action that 
then brought about the outcome in question. So, rather than overgeneration, it might 
then seem that S2O* rules out intentionality in these three cases. But this would again 
be missing the point: the conditions for positive intentional status though sharing 
certain essential elements, are not identical between the different types of intentional 
behaviour. What it takes for an action to be intentional is different to what it takes for 
a consequence to be intentional, precisely because of the different way in which the 
agent has control over each. Thus, in order to provide a full account of intentional 
behaviour, it is necessary to unpack these distinctions in intentional behaviour. 
Developing on this is the aim of the next two sections. 
1.4. Intentional activity and the stream of behaviour 
It seems to me that an important step toward a convincing account of intentional 
action is the realisation that what we do intentionally is not in fact limited only to 
actions. There are many things that we do intentionally. We intentionally act, as I am 
doing as I type this sentence. We intentionally omit to act, as when I consider whether 
or not to water my plant and do not do so. And we bring about intentional effects and 
consequences, as when I build stamina by strengthening my cardiovascular system in 
preparation for a marathon, or stop a nuclear meltdown by inputting the correct code. 
These are examples of what I will call an intentional action, an intentional omission, 
an intentional effect, and an intentional consequence respectively. In the language I 
have been using, each has a positive intentional status. 
The first of these, intentional action, has – as the foregoing discussion in this chapter 
and Chapter 1 indicate – usually, and understandably, been taken to be the 
paradigmatic case of intentional behaviour. For this reason, a reader familiar with 
even some of the expansive literature surrounding the distinctions between so-called 
“mere events”, “mere behaviour”, and “intentional actions” (Ford, 2011: 76) may 
have been surprised at my choice to use the term intentional activity, rather than 
intentional action, in the title of this chapter. It should be made clear that this choice 
is not an accident, but reflects an important feature of my account. Insofar as we are 
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interested in developing an account of the unity of what is intentionally done, and its 
relationship to moral responsibility, I take it to be important that we should not turn a 
blind eye to omissions, and consequences. After all, it is often in the face of blame for 
omissions or consequences that an agent might profess in their defence, “but it wasn’t 
intentional!” It certainly seems that the use of the term “intentional” is expressing the 
same concept whether it is applied to an action, an omission or a consequence. If our 
interest in intentional action stems from an interest in understanding that which is “the 
fruit and flower of the human will” (Ford, 2011: 76), then there seems to be no good 
reason for excluding these other sorts of intentional behaviour. If it proves possible, 
all else equal, to provide an account of “doing intentionally`’ that retains this 
conceptual unity across all four these types of intentional behaviour, I take this to be a 
merit of the account. 
What a reader will quickly realises as I begin differentiating between actions, 
omissions, effects, and consequences, is that these have all be readily conflated under 
the banner of action – excepting perhaps omission – throughout the discussion thus 
far. That is because, for the most part, this is the way that intentional behaviour is 
discussed in the literature. There are exceptions, however, notably Setiya (2012: 287) 
who makes a point of differentiating between the conditions necessary for positive 
intentional status in basic action and those necessary for action understood more 
widely. Basic action is, of course, a familiar notion in discussions of actions. By such 
action is usually meant what the agent is doing not by doing something else. So: in a 
situation where Nick did in fact know the codes to avert the nuclear meltdown we 
could construct the following chain: 
“Nick averted the meltdown” 
by 
“inputting the correct code” 
by 
“the bodily movements of his fingers” 
According to the conventional picture, these are not three different actions, but three 
descriptions of the same action. In this chain, the bodily movement of Nick’s fingers 
would be the basic action, as he is not doing it by doing something else. Whether all 
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actions can be reduced to a basic action, and whether basic action is always identified 
with bodily movement in this way are both open debates. While I will not be diving 
into these debates, it is necessary for me to be clear on how my account is be 
positioned relative to them. I am sympathetic to Sartorio (2007: 749) when she states: 
It is natural to draw a distinction between the acts that an agent performs (his 
actions or omissions) and how things turn out in the world as a result of those 
acts (the events and states of affairs in the world – including, in some cases, acts 
by other people). Let’s call this last category of things outcomes. 
Following this, I will be referring to actions and omissions as activities, and to effects 
and consequences as outcomes. It is possible to translate this into talk of basic action: 
in which case a basic action is to be identified with a particular action or omission, 
and all the ‘actions’ done by doing this activity are non-basic and are all outcomes of 
this basic action – either effects or consequences. What marks out an activity from its 
outcomes is the degree of control that the agent has over it. To understand how this 
works, and what impact this has for understanding the control condition on positive 
intentional status, it is first necessary to introduce and expand on my use of the notion 
of activity. 
First off, like Hornsby (2012: 234), I take it that “the agent is given her due only when 
it is acknowledged that she engages in activity, where no activity is any particular” 
and that this move to talk of activity rather than action is an ontological – in addition 
to a conceptual – one. Further than Hornsby, I take it to be not only that agents engage 
in activities, but that individual and discrete human actions and omissions are 
abstractions from out of the underlying ontological reality which is the continuous 
stream of activity. This is also akin to Stout’s (2005: 137) notion that an action may 
not be an “identifiable particular” but when we use the term action we are referring to 
“processes of acting”. The story of actions is not best understood as a man 
continuously walking up to crossroad and then deciding to go down a certain path, but 
it is rather like a man at the rudder of a ship pulled along by a current, at times sedate 
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and at times tumultuous, but almost never becalmed. Taking one’s hands off the 
rudder is not a neutral or inert option, as doing so does not cease the flow of activity.36  
Despite my own approach’s similarity to these accounts, mine does differ from theirs 
in that I take omissions to be part of activity as well. So, what do I mean by activity 
exactly? Using this term, I seek to capture the idea that human life is not best 
characterised as a series of largely atomic actions and omissions taken against a 
default condition of inertness. Actual human life37 is a (near) continuous stream of 
behaviour (which I call here activity) – which can hardly ever be fully described as 
“at rest” – from out of which we might abstract intentional actions and omissions. For 
example, “standing around” is an intentional part of the stream of activity insofar as 
this standing around is under the agent’s control in the right way, as something that 
the agent is doing rather than doing anything else (note: rather than doing something 
else, not by something else – this is not a matter of identifying basic actions). On my 
view when we use the term “action” we are referring to an activity-slice, and the same 
with the term “omission.” Outcomes are somewhat different as they are indirect parts 
of the agent’s stream of activity, the former being logical consequents of some 
activity, the latter being causally or explanatorily38 dependent on the same. 
By stipulation then, throughout my work here I will be using the term “intentional 
activity” to capture all instances of intentional activity-slices, i.e. intentional actions, 
omissions, as well as the activity taken as a whole. I will further argue that intentional 
effect and intentional consequences inherit their intentional status from their 
relationship to such activity.39 I will now tackle each of these in turn, beginning with 
actions and omissions, then effects, and lastly consequences. 
                                               
36 I owe this metaphor to John Haldane. 
37 I take the points made here to also be true of non-human animal life, and possibly also the point I 
make hereafter about intentions often serving as a guide toward fitting action individuation, though this 
may be seen as more controversial as it involves the attribution of certain mental states to animals that 
some argue they cannot have (see Fodor, 1975 and Davidson, 1982), and others argue they can (see 
Bryne, Sanz, and Morgan, 2013; Plotnik, de Waal, and Reiss, 2006; Killen and de Waal, 2000). 
Though the question of the intentional status of the behaviour of non-human animals is undoubtedly an 
important one, it is a topic that I will not be exploring in this dissertation. 
38 I am purposefully neutral here between a causalist or anticausalist interpretation of this relationship. 
39 Velleman (2014) also makes a distinction between activity and action, but for him this distinction is 
between purposive behaviour caused by an agent’s beliefs and desires, and true action, which involves 
causation by reasons. I take this to be a matter of stipulation, rather than revealing some meaningful 
disagreement between our accounts. Given his descriptions of each of these forms of behaviour, on my 
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In most cases when asked the question, “what are you doing?” or even, “what was she 
doing?” we ably pick out that activity that provides a fitting answer to the question. 
This is illustrated in the following passage from Anscombe (1963: 8) in which she is 
making a point about humans being apt at identifying the description under which an 
activity may be intentional: 
I am referring to the sort of things you would say in a law court [if] you were a 
witness and were asked what a man was doing when you saw him. That is to 
say, in a very large number of cases, your selection from the immense variety of 
true statements about him which you might make would coincide with what he 
could say he was doing, perhaps even without reflection, certainly without 
adverting to observation. I am sitting in a chair writing, and anyone grown to 
the age of reason in the same world would know this as soon as he saw me, and 
in general it would be his first account of what I was doing. 
We do this with amazing alacrity, regardless of whether the activity in question is 
extended in time, or how many steps it may involve, or whether the activity is stop-
start or continuous. Indeed, two observers may well agree on what the intentional 
action taking place is, but strongly disagree about how to individuate the different 
steps involved. How and why we should be so adept at this is a matter deserving its 
own discussion. But what is pertinent for my arguments here is that, in many cases, 
under one of the available descriptions the action in question is an intentional action. 
Indeed, this will often (though by no means always) be the “first account” which we 
strike on. What is more, and leaning again on Anscombe’s insights, is that the 
presence of the positive intentional status guides the individuation process. I discern 
that when asked in a normal way, “what is your friend doing?” the fitting way to 
describe the certain slice of activity my friend is engaged in is with the description, 
“he is making tea,” rather than, “he is shunting air particles,” precisely because, 
seemingly, it is the agent’s intention to do the former, not the latter. Simply put, we 
cut some actions (as well as omissions) out of the stream of activity through the 
guidance of the possession of positive intentional status. Actions or omissions 
                                                                                                                                      
account they would translate to unintentional activity and intentional activity respectively. A reader 
should feel free to plug in whichever terminology she or he prefers.  
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individuated in this manner are, if we are accurate, intentional action or intentional 
omissions. Steward (2012: 384) makes this same point, when she says: 
Just as, in thinking of a horse, say, we lock onto a creature whose principle of 
individuation has to do with continued life and not with continuation of the very 
same matter, so in thinking of a process, we lock onto an entity which we 
conceive of as having a principle of individuation which has to do with what 
one might call norms of development – or, in the case specifically of human 
action, with such things as intentions and goals. 
On my account activities are processes, not events, and these are singled out by some 
guidance process which is directed by certain normative expectations – what Steward 
calls “norms of development”. This gives us a more robust way of speaking about 
actions that are, after all, often extended and ongoing in time and open to in medias 
res adverbial modification (i.e. the action can be performed faster, or slower, more 
vigorously or less), both aspects that the actions as events view struggles to account 
for.40 
Following from this, and my motivation not to exclude intentional omissions from the 
picture I am sketching, I take an intentional omission to be an abstraction from the 
stream of activity in a manner not relevantly different from an intentional action, and 
that like such actions, such individuation can be – indeed usually is – guided by the 
(supposed) presence of positive intentional status. One consequence of this is that I 
argue that we can distinguish a set of omissions as intentional omission and that this 
set has meaningful content. 
It is important to note that I am not claiming that all cases of action or omission 
individuation are guided by intentional status, nor that such guidance is always the 
best route to take. After all, we are fully capable of identifying unintentional actions, 
omissions or mere behaviours. There are any number of different ways to individuate 
actions and omissions, as Anscombe alludes to in the extract. To build on her point, 
the question: “What was the man doing?” can be ambiguous outside of the courtroom 
                                               
40 See Steward (2012) and Hornsby (2012) for good overviews of these shortcomings in the actions as 
events approach. 
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scenario she sketches (though even in a courtroom it may not always be unequivocal 
just what the question is aimed at). In one sense of what the man is doing he will 
likely be shunting air particles. Or say that the man in question unknowingly, and 
unintentionally, steps on another person’s foot. In this case, one answer to “what is 
the man doing” would be “stepping on the other’s foot”, and this is picked out 
regardless of intentional status. To make this last point even sharper, consider that we 
could individuate out and attribute the behaviour of “stepping on the other’s foot” to 
the agent even if it resulted from someone else pushing him, or him slipping on a 
slippery surface – in other words, it was not the result of “the fruit and flower of the 
human will”. What is true is that, in this latter case, facts about the origination of the 
behaviour – which is partly constitutive of it being an example of mere behaviour – 
do undermine the degree to which we may take the agent to be responsible for the 
behaviour, as well as the degree to which the behaviour is seen to reflect the agent’s 
character or agency. Though more pronounced in intensity, these are also common 
features of unintentional action. However, what matters for my discussion here is that 
we are (for the most part) perfectly capable of identifying the unintentional action or 
behaviour of stepping on the other’s foot, even though intentional status plays no 
guiding role in the individuation in either case. 
It is also the case that we can individuate out actions without intentional guidance 
even when the action so individuated may well be intentional when considered under 
such guidance. So, imagine a case where a doctor is examining an agent’s lifestyle to 
give them advice on healthy living. During the examination, the doctor identifies that 
the agent often begins typing at her desk at a good distance from the screen, but then 
leans her head in closer to the screen during the work period – with negative results to 
both her posture and her eyes. This leaning in could be intentional or not, however, 
the doctor can individuate out, and evaluate the health consequences of, that slice of 
activity without the need for intentional guidance. Additionally, whether that given 
activity was merely behaviour, or an unintentional action, or an intentional action, 
will depend not on the guidance used to individuate it, but rather on facts about the 
activity at that moment. My claim is only that we often do individuate actions and 
omissions through the guidance of intentional status, and that when we are accurate 
in doing so, the given activity will be an intentional one. 
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While there are numerous ways to individuate activity-slices, in certain contexts some 
seem more appropriate than others: in Anscombe’s example of a court of law, 
intentional guidance seems the most appropriate, in the case of the doctor I sketched 
above, we might say that the appropriate method was something like physiological 
guidance – where the mere physical facts about bodily movement serve to guide 
individuation in some way. The most appropriate method for individuation in any 
given scenario will depend upon various contextual features. 
As should be clear at this point, I will defend the argument that some slice of activity 
(be it an action or omission) is intentional not because it simply follows from an 
intention, was done for reasons, or the agent knew that she was doing it, but because 
that slice of activity was under a certain kind of control, namely: System 2 Oversight. 
A given agent’s activity-slice could be intentional even if the agent had no preceding 
intention or reason to act at all, provided that the correct sort of control was present. 
This is not to say that intentions or reasons to act are not important. It is true that often 
our intentional activities follow from our intentions, and that when we act under the 
(non-deviant) guidance of an intention such activity will necessarily be under System 
2 Oversight – I discuss this more in Section 2.2. And as I have already shown, reasons 
to act do play a central and often essential role in the kind of control necessary for 
positive intentional status. To reflect all the above, the provisional principle IST that 
was introduced in Section 1 must be widened to account for the inclusion of 
omissions: 
Intentional Status Transmission (activity): An agent’s action or omission is 
intentional iff the agent possessed intention-unique control over it. 
And we can go further and replace intention-unique control with System 2 Oversight, 
yielding: 
Intentional Status Transmission (activity*): An agent’s action or omission is 
intentional iff the agent possessed System 2 Oversight over it. 
IST(activity*) is also the measure against which our ascriptions of intentional status 
are to be judged. When we ascribe intentional status to a given agent’s action, or 
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omission over which the agent in question does not possess System 2 Oversight then 
we are in error – though this could, of course, be blameless error depending on the 
context. Said differently, I would be cutting up the stream of activity incorrectly if I 
failed to individuate intentional activities per the guidance of IST(activity*). 
In the majority of cases where an agent has System 2 Oversight over some activity A, 
she will also have an intention either to A, or to B where A is a means or foreseen 
effect of fulfilling this intention. Importantly, this does not mean that we first ascribe 
an intention and then set about working out what are the intentional actions, etc. 
Rather what happens is that when we encounter an agent amid activity, then we will 
usually assume (barring the agent being asleep, being carried away by an avalanche, 
i.e. in a state that undermines her agency and breaks the stream of activity) that some 
activity-slice from her stream of activity will be intentional. The assumption that 
positive intentional status is present is the default. From experience, we will have a 
fairly accurate grasp of how to slice an agent’s stream of activity in order to 
individuate out what is intentional – or in Anscombean terminology (1963: 46-47), we 
are effective at identifying the description under which the correct action or omission 
is picked out as intentional – and so will usually be guided by this expectation of 
intentional status in individuating out a given slice of intentional activity. While we 
are doing this, we will also be ascribing an intention to the agent, one that would 
stand in the appropriate relationship to the activity we have individuated out as 
intentional. We can, of course, be mistaken, but what is crucial is that the 
IST(activity*) is the bar we must measure our individuations and ascriptions against. 
This also allows us to spell out a more complete formulation of System 2 Oversight: 
System 2 Oversight**: A given action or omission X, undertaken at time t, is under 
S2O, and so intentional, iff: 
(1) At time t the agent X’d 
(2) (a) X is under the guidance of the operation of System 2 or (b) is under the 
guidance of System 1 and System 2 had oversight 
(3) The agent’s System 2 operation in this case is at least minimally reason-
responsive 
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(4) The agent has a belief that she will at least try to X 
For a given action X, the X indicates what it is the agent is doing. For a given 
omission, X, the X also indicates what the agent is doing, namely: ¬Y (where Y is 
some action). Because of this, the belief that the agent will try to X in the case of an 
omission would be a belief that the agent will try to ¬Y, where Y is what the agent is 
omitting to do. So, for example, if I decide not to water my plants, I must have the 
belief that I will at least try not to water my plants. Having dealt with intentional 
actions and omissions, I turn now to intentional effects and consequences. 
1.5. Accounting for intentional effects and consequences 
The difference between the effects and consequences of an activity is quite often 
overlooked, but it is an important distinction to keep in mind. Consequences are 
usually what we think of when we consider the outcomes of an activity, these being 
the causal results of the action or omission,41 or the results that are grounded by the 
action or omission.42 On the other hand, effects are not caused by an action or 
omission, but are rather the logical consequents by said action or omission.43 An 
example from Sartorio (2010: 576):  
Imagine that an assassin murders a child's parents. When he does, the child 
becomes an orphan. But the assassin's murder of the parents doesn't cause the 
child's orphanhood, for the fact that the child's parents were murdered entails 
the fact that the child is an orphan, and entailment is not causation. 
                                               
41 Whether or not omissions can be causes is a very debated topic, and perhaps one of the reasons 
militating in favour of the anticausalist position. For my purposes, I will be assuming that either 
omissions can be causes, or that the relationship between activities and consequences is non-causal. 
42 Since I aim to be agnostic in the causalist/anticausalist debate, I will not be adjudicating between 
these two understandings of how consequences related to activities. From this point on I will be 
employing causalist language, but this is merely a decision made for ease of writing. 
43 Another way of understanding this distinction is outlined by Gormally (2016: 305-308) in his 
discussion of Anscombe’s approach to the morality of killing human beings. Following Anscombe he 
contends that: to be doing some things is sometimes, eo ipso, to be doing some other thing. To crush an 
infant’s skull is to kill the infant. In these cases, the agent has “certainty” about the outcome if she is 
aware of it. In contrast, there are other things that are done by doing other things that do not have an eo 
ipso identity in this way. If I fire and arrow from a bow, it does not certainly (I would say necessarily) 
follow that “a man be transfixed.” 
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The first thing to note is that whereas intentional activities are directly controlled, 
intentional effects and consequences are controlled in a mediated or indirect fashion. 
Furthermore, an agent has more proximate control over the intentional effects of her 
activities than over their intentional consequences. This has important implications for 
thinking about the control condition applicable in each instance. I will discuss 
intentional effects before coming to intentional consequences, as in many ways the 
latter is more difficult to account for than the former. 
Where effects are concerned, the most obvious difference to intentional activity is that 
such an effect is the logical consequence of some intentional activity, where this 
relationship is not a causal, or grounding relationship. The fact that a given intentional 
effect is brought about is logically entailed by the fact that a given intentional activity 
took place. We do not take the effects of unintentional activity to be intentional. 
However, the transfer of positive intentional status from activity to effect is not a 
necessary transfer, nor is the fact that a given effect is brought about by an intentional 
activity sufficient for the effect to be intentional: there are many effects of an agent’s 
intentional activities that do not count as intentional. The reason for this is that 
intentional effects are not under the guidance of the System 2 Oversight mechanism in 
the same way as the action or omission is. Only those effects that are under the 
guidance of System 2 Oversight, such that they can be brought about with sufficient 
reliability are considered intentional. Recall: for an action or omission to be under the 
guidance of System 2 Oversight, it is necessary that the agent be able to adjust the 
action or omission in the light of reasons. Unlike actions and omissions, however, 
effects can only be guided by adjustments to the actions or omissions that bring them 
about. So, in order for an effect to be intentional, it must be the case that the agent had 
the capacity to respond to the available reasons to act such that she could adjust her 
action or omission in light of the effects thereof with sufficient reliability. For this to 
be possible, the agent must not only believe that she will try to bring about the effect, 
but must also have the skill and knowledge necessary to do so with a sufficient degree 
of reliability as to be responsive to the salient reasons. 
Consider Nick at the keyboard. His inputting the correct code is a logical consequence 
of his striking the correct combination of keys, yet we wish to resist the idea that he 
intentionally input the correct code. Yet, his inputting the correct code was the result 
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of the System 2 oversight mechanism – in this case a direct result of the operation of 
System 2, since his inputting digits was presumably under conscious control – this 
mechanism was suitably reason-responsive, and Nick certainly believed that he would 
at least try to input the correct code. So, is this an intentional effect? No, because 
though it is the result of the operation of System 2, being the logical consequence of 
Nick’s intentional action of typing in digits on the keypad, inputting the correct code 
was not under guidance such that he could have brought it about reliably. Inputting 
the code was not under guidance for the simple fact that Nick did not know that what 
he was doing in inputting the ten-digit sequence was in fact inputting the correct code, 
and so we would not have been appropriately responsive to reasons to adjust his 
action at the time of typing to insure his success with sufficient likelihood. Nick could 
not respond to these reasons – such as, say, the third digit of the code is 4, thus there 
is a reason to input 4 on the third input – as without knowing that the code in question 
was in fact the correct one, his System 2 Oversight mechanism would not be receptive 
to reasons to adjust his actions in favour of it. 
This gives us what I take to be the final version of System 2 Oversight, which I take 
to capture intentional actions, omissions, and effects: 
System 2 Oversight (complete): an agent’s X’ing, undertaken at time t, is under 
S2O, and so intentional, iff: 
(1) At time t the agent X’d 
(2) X is under some degree of guidance by the operation of (a) System 2 or (b) 
System 1 with System 2 oversight, such that the agent could bring it about 
with sufficient reliability through this guidance at time t 
(3) The operation of the agent’s System 2 is at least minimally reason-responsive 
(4) The agent has a belief that she will at least try to X 
From here on I will simply refer to this as System 2 Oversight (S2O). This then leaves 
us with intentional consequences. Continuing talk of the example of Nick, consider 
that just as we do not want to call his inputting of the correct code intentional, it does 
seem incorrect to say that he intentionally averted the meltdown. I take this averting 
of the meltdown not to be an intentional consequence of Nick’s intentional activity, 
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which was the inputting of the digits into the keyboard. It is often the case that the 
intentional consequence of an action or omission might be decidedly outside the 
control of the agent. Indeed, the mark of a consequence is that it usually requires the 
world to “play along” to a far greater extent than required by intentional activity. This 
is most vividly illustrated by cases where the agency of others plays a large role in 
determining the outcome: if I bowl a delivery in cricket, which the batsman nicks on 
to his own wickets, it would be said that this is an intentional consequence of my 
action in bowling the ball. Yet, it would not have occurred if it had not been for the 
batsman’s own actions. It should also be noted (as came up in the discussion of 
“lucky” action) that in these cases much seems to depend upon the intent or beliefs of 
the agent: if I bowled the ball looking to get the batsman to draw the ball on to his 
wickets, but he instead manages to catch the ball more fully and hoist it into the air to 
be caught out, it seems less obvious that we should count this as an intentional 
consequence. Yet certainly not only consequences that are intended should count as 
intentional. Bratman (1984) is surely correct in urging the abandonment of the 
assumption of tight fit. However, Bratman’s approach still leaves us with the puzzle 
of spelling out the criteria by which a given consequence (or indeed action) falls 
within a given intention’s motivational potential. And there is the further problem that 
– just as with intentional activities – not all intentional consequences necessarily 
follow from an intention. 
Again, we must turn to the role of activity. The consequences of an activity (be it an 
action or an omission) are those states of the world that follow causally from the 
activity, or that are explained by them. So how we individuate actions and omissions 
from the stream of activity will influence what we think of as the relevant 
consequences. In the case of intentional consequences, whatever else they may be, 
they must follow appropriately from an intentional action or omission. But there must 
clearly be more to the story, since many of the consequences of an intentional activity 
are certainly not intentional: if I wave my hand to greet a friend, and this waving 
results in a hurricane in Sri Lanka, it would be implausible to say that the storm was 
an intentional consequence of my action. Indeed, it seems to be a paradigmatic case of 
an unintentional consequence. Yet, if we take the same example, but this time say that 
I am the world’s greatest meteorologist, and have discerned with absolute certainty 
that my waving will indeed cause such a storm, and I wave regardless, then it seems 
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entirely plausible that bringing about the hurricane could be described as an 
intentional consequence of my action. This comparison helps to highlight that what 
appears critical here is whether I foresaw the consequence in question, and that this 
links to my having sufficient control over it. 
In terms of epistemic status, consequences can be divided into four overlapping 
categories: unforeseeable consequences, unforeseen consequences, foreseeable 
consequences and foreseen consequences. An unforeseeable consequence is one that 
it would have been impossible for the agent to foresee. An unforeseen consequence is 
one that the agent in fact did not foresee. A foreseeable consequence is a consequence 
that it is possible for the agent to foresee. And finally, a consequence is foreseen if the 
agent is aware of the possibility of it occurring as the result of her actions or 
omissions. Now clearly unforeseen and foreseen consequences are mutually 
exclusive, as are unforeseeable and foreseeable consequences. However, an 
unforeseen consequence can be either unforeseeable or foreseeable. Similarly, a 
foreseeable consequence can be either unforeseen or foreseen. An unforeseeable 
consequence is always unforeseen, and a foreseen consequence is always foreseeable. 
If a consequence is unforeseeable, then it falls outside of an agent’s control, and it is 
entirely implausible to think that it is intentional. Unforeseen but foreseeable 
consequence are equally unintentional as they again fall outside of an agent’s System 
2 Oversight, though we may be inclined to misattribute positive intentional status in 
these cases. I will be returning to this particular type of case, the unforeseen 
foreseeable, in my discussion of moral responsibility in Chapter 3: Section 5.1.2., as 
the most compelling counterexamples to the idea that such consequences can be 
intentional involve instances where the consequence is morally bad in some way. 
However, in the case of foreseen consequences, if the agent foresaw the consequence 
of her activity, provided that the activity itself was intentional, then this consequence 
was one over which the agent had some degree of discretionary control. This follows 
from the fact that if the consequence was foreseen, the agent would have had to have 
chosen to continue in undertaking the relevant activity knowing that the consequence 
could occur.  Now it is of course the case that different consequences have different 
likelihoods, and that this does seem to be a relevant consideration when determining 
whether or not a given consequence should count as intentional. After all, I know that 
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there is a (miniscule) possibility that a consequence of my next keystroke might be 
that a hurricane in fact hits Sri Lanka, through some intricate causal chain of which 
the air movement of my keystroke is a tiny part, yet it would be implausible to say 
that this would be intentional. 
Consider also the following, it is not sheer unlikelihood that undermines positive 
intentional status. To see that this is the case, take examples where the odds of success 
are equal, yet our intuitions about intentional status differ: 
Golfer: a professional golfer, Gwen, is preparing to make a very difficult putt. As it 
happens, Gwen has a 1-in-6 chance of sinking the putt. She sinks the putt. 
Dicer: a person, Dina, picks up a die as part of playing a board game. She needs to 
roll a six to win. Dina clearly had a 1-in-6 chance of rolling a six (if the die is 
perfectly balanced and Dina does not know any rolling tricks). She rolls and gets a 
six. 
Gwen seems to sink her putt intentionally, whereas Dina does not roll the six 
intentionally.44 But what is different between these two? In both cases the outcome is 
equally foreseen, and the odds are the same. The answer is the role of control. For a 
given consequence to be under sufficient control to be intentional, it must be the case 
that the agent’s skills, and beliefs played a sufficient role in determining the 
likelihood of success. In the case of Dina, her skills, beliefs, and desires play no role 
in determining which side of the die ends up facing up, whereas in the case of Gwen 
this is not so. Had Gwen been an eight-year-old trying golf for the first time her odds 
of success would have been dramatically lower than 1-in-6, so her control plays a 
sufficient role in determining the success of her putt. As we have already discussed, 
the way that an agent’s skill, and belief guides behaviour is through the guidance of 
System 2 oversight, and in the case of intentional consequences, this guidance is 
indirect. My skills and beliefs influence my chance of bringing about a given 
consequence through how receptive and reactive I am to the various reasons that 
would, were I to recognise and react to them, increase my chance of acting (or 
                                               
44 This example can be made even more vivid by replacing the die in Dicer with a perfectly weighted 
coin. Here, even though Gwen has a lower likelihood of success, it still seems that her making the put 
was intentional, whereas Dina getting any particular coin facing is not. 
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omitting) such as to bring it about. This control is indirect because it operates through 
my actions and omissions. 
It could be objected to this that one can equally well learn how to roll dice skilfully to 
land on certain facings rather than others, so it isn’t that rolling dice has no role for 
control. However, note that if Dina was such an expert at rolling, then we would 
indeed be more willing to attribute positive intentional status to her rolling a six. This 
also explains why the lottery case seems to clearly not be a case of intentionally 
winning – in this example the agent obviously and (if it is to be a truly fair lottery) 
necessarily, has no control over the outcome. 
To capture this reality, I propose the following as a transfer principle for positive 
intentional status, transferring it from the intentional activity to the consequence: 
Transfer of intentional status (TIS): a given consequence, X, of an agent’s activity, 
Y, occurring at time t, is intentional iff: 
(1) The agent has the belief that bringing about X is, given her evidence, a 
possible part of the fulfilment of an aim to Z, which involves Y’ing 
(2) X is brought about under sufficient guidance of System 2 Oversight by Y’ing, 
in line with the agent’s plan to Z 
Y and Z can be the same. Before continuing it is necessary to explain the notion of 
plan as it is used here: an agent’s plan involves some aim and a set of related beliefs 
about how to achieve the means to that aim and in turn how to achieve these means. 
Such plans can – and often do – involve intentions. Indeed, I am sympathetic to the 
view that such plans that precede intentional consequences always involve intentions 
(Mele and Moser, 1994; Bratman, 1987; Mele, 2009). However, I see no reason to 
marry my account to this position, and so will not take a stand on this question here. 
Such plans can obviously come in varying degrees of reliability. They are also the 
result of the operations of the System 2 oversight mechanism, and as such are reason-
responsive. This responsiveness is limited by the state of the agent’s beliefs. For plans 
like this (what I will sometimes call action plans, by which I do not mean that they 
are limited to actions) to be as reliable a plan as could be expected of the agent means 
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that the plan must maximize the agent’s chances of fulfilling its aim given the agent’s 
set of beliefs about means – and so the reasons that the agent could be responsive to.  
The transfer captured by this principle is that of revealed rational agency. The given 
consequence reflects and exhibits the agent’s locus of agency only when the stated 
conditions are met. Where an agent has an action plan to Z that involves a step, X, 
where the agent is incapable of exerting sufficient control, then that step – even if 
successful – will not count as intentional. The reason that the uncontrolled step fails to 
qualify as intentional is because X occurring is not sufficiently indicative of rational 
agency. So, when an agent enters the lottery, for example, her entering the lottery is 
intentional, but her choosing the winning ticket is not, since which ticket she chooses 
tells us nothing about the agent’s rational agency. It tells us nothing in this regard 
because the agent could not be responsive to the reasons for and against picking any 
particular ticket. As goes the step, so goes the plan. If a step in an agent’s plan 
succeeds, but this success is sufficiently divorced from the agent’s control, then the 
success of the plan, taken as a whole, will also fail to be under sufficient control. I 
leave the degree of control necessary for sufficiency purposefully vague, as I believe 
that there is (possibly irreducible) vagueness inherent in what we take to be a 
sufficient degree of control. Also note, there is an interplay between the odds of 
success and the degree of control, but this interplay does not stand in a simple 
relationship with positive intentional status. The odds of my success might well be 
quite good (rolling higher than one on a regular die, for instance), but if there is no 
control exerted then we would not think of a successful result as intentional. On the 
other hand, the odds might be quite poor (a long difficult putt that the putter only has 
a 1-in-50 chance of making), but the putter has control over the outcome such that 
were it not for this control the odds would be a million-to-one, and so it seems 
plausible that we would think of the successful putt as intentional. There is 
undoubtedly much fertile ground to still investigate here, but I delve no deeper into it 
in this dissertation, but rather turn to see how the TIS deals with the lucky cases, the 
by now familiar examples of Brandon, Aaron, and Nick. 
We can imagine a case where Brandon believes that he will make the million-to-one 
shot, in that case I diagnose the situation as follows: Brandon’s making of the shot 
meets condition (1), but although it is brought about in line with his plan, he has 
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insufficient control over making the shot for it to count as intentional. Brandon’s 
skills and beliefs, his receptivity and reactivity to reason, simply have too little 
influence on the outcome for it to be intentional. Were the odds to be reduced to a 
more plausible level, however, then the intentionality of making the shot would 
depend upon the level of control that Brandon exerts over its being brought about, 
relative to the odds.  
Aaron believes that killing Target is a sufficiently likely part of the fulfilment of his 
intention to kill Target, which involves shooting him. However, his shooting of Target 
is neither brought about in line with his plan nor under sufficient guidance from 
System 2 Oversight. 
Lastly, Nick will believe that inputting the correct code is a likely (indeed necessary) 
part of the fulfilment of his plan, which involves inputting digits into the console. 
However, his actual inputting of the correct code, though following in line with his 
plan, was not under sufficient guidance from System 2 Oversight, since he was 
unresponsive to the reasons salient to picking the correct code – due to the fact that he 
did not know what it was. At the same time, were he to succeed in inputting the 
correct code, his averting of the meltdown would also not be intentional, as it was 
brought about in line with an agent’s action plan which involved a step over which the 
agent had insufficient control, and so it itself was not brought about under sufficient 
control. 
Given its ability to capture plausible answers to the various cases that have been 
considered, I take TIS to provide a principle that exhaustively accounts for intentional 
consequences. Combined with S2O(complete), I take all intentional behaviour to have 
been accounted for. 
1.6. Concluding remarks 
In this section I have presented my own account of intentional activity (and 
intentional outcomes), which I call System 2 Oversight. I have argued that this is a 
control-backed and mechanism focused account, where the mechanism that exerts 
intention-unique control is best thought of as System 2 oversight, a position built on 
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insights drawn from Dual Process Theory. I have further contended that this 
understanding of the mechanism in question meets four crucial requirements: it is 
suitably reason-responsive, it accounts for the epistemic condition on intentional 
activity, it does not prevent the possibility of an agent acting against the balance of 
reasons, and finally it allows that the mechanism can result in both intentional activity 
as well as intentions and not necessarily together. In the course of doing so, I 
presented arguments defending my control account against notable objections, as well 
as indicating some of the shortcomings of my account’s competitors. Lastly, I 
presented my transfer principle for intentional consequences, TIS, whereby such 
consequences derive their positive intentional status from the relationship they must 
have to the agent’s plans, and thus by extension the agent’s intention-unique control 
mechanism. Part of understanding this transfer principle depends upon a certain 
technical understanding of the notion of plan, which I outlined. To adduce further 
evidence in support of my account, in the next section I will demonstrate how my 
control account manages to fulfill an additional criterion that I take to be necessary 
for any convincing account of intentional activity: explaining the unity of the three 
applications of the concept intention. 
2. The unity of the three applications of the concept intention 
Ever since the publication of Anscombe’s Intention (1963), there has been near 
unanimous agreement amongst philosophers that any convincing theory of intentional 
activity, or of intention, must meet at least one key criterion: it must explain the unity 
between the three seemingly irreconcilable applications of the concept intention, 
namely as “intention-for-the-future, intentional action and as the intention with which 
someone acts” (Anscombe, 1963: 1), or present convincing reasons for forsaking this 
unity.45 Call this the Unity Criterion. In this section, I attempt to meet this criterion by 
explaining the unity of the three applications as consisting in their shared relationship 
to the right sort of control, namely: System 2 Oversight. 
Additionally, there remains an important potential criticism of my account that I have 
not yet presented a complete answer to: the problem of mutually exclusive intentions. 
                                               
45 For examples of those arguing to retain the unity, see Davidson (2001), Velleman (1989), Bratman 
(1985) and Setiya (2011). For examples of those arguing that we should reject the unity, see Knobe and 
Burra (2006), Harman (1986; 2006), and Holton (2009). 
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Since this problem involves the relationship between different uses of intention, I will 
endeavour to show that my account of the unity of the three uses can resolve it 
satisfactorily. 
2.1. Introducing the three applications of the concept intention 
Right at the beginning of Intention, Anscombe observes that there are three common 
ways in which we employ the concept intention: 
1. The agent intends to G (verb) 
2. The agent G’d intentionally (adverb) 
3. The agent F’d with the intention of Ging (noun) 
The first use of the concept (1), which Anscombe defines as intention-for-the-future 
or prospective intention, refers to the fact that we commonly say “I intend to do X at 
time Y,” where Y is still to come. I can have such an intention for a very long time 
before I take any actions to bring about X; for example: as a sixteen year old I may 
intend to become president one day, and even though I take no immediate action 
towards that goal until I am considerably older, it remains the case that I intend to do 
so (become president). Conversely, prospective intentions could be only very slightly 
anterior to the performance of action, such as forming the intention to scratch my 
back and doing so (almost) immediately. As will become clear, there is much 
contestation about exactly when such an intention can be said to be present, and 
whether the presence of such intention requires that some action takes place at some 
point. For example, if I never actually take steps to become president, can I ever be 
said to have had the intention of doing so? It seems obvious that the intention entails a 
sense of commitment, but must that commitment manifest in action for it to qualify as 
such? 
The second use (2) refers to intentional action, meaning that we identify a given 
action as taking place due to human agency of a certain sort, as opposed to by 
accident or due to forces of nature external to the agent. For example: I lift my hand 
intentionally as opposed to it being lifted by somebody else, or it being lifted due to 
an involuntary reflex. It has been this use that I have focussed on, and for the reasons 
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outlined in Section 1.4. I will be speaking of intentional activity, rather than 
intentional action to refer to this use from here on. It is this use of intention that is 
most frequently rejected from the unity. That is, several thinkers argue that whether or 
not an activity is intentional is not necessarily conceptually related to whether the 
agent had an intention.46 I take the question of what exactly is required for some 
activity to count as intentional – that is, what is meant by human agency of a certain 
sort – to be the most important question that an account of intentional activity must 
answer, and I take the answer to be the presence of a certain kind of control: System 2 
Oversight. 
The third use (3) is intention-with-which, i.e. the intention I have when performing an 
action. This use of intention is often used in a teleological sense; that is, it is used to 
describe an action as directed toward the achievement of a certain goal. For example: 
I am reading an article by Donald Davidson because I want to better structure my 
analysis of his arguments. 
The problem is that these three uses seem to be “not equivocal,” and our inability to 
explain the rules underlying the use of the term “intention” in these three different 
ways reflects that “we are pretty much in the dark about the character of the concept 
which it represents” (Anscombe, 1963: 1). Until these underlying rules are understood 
– or until we are presented with good reasons to dismiss the intuition that they are 
related – a holistic theory of the concept intention that can convincingly account for 
all three uses is unachievable. For this reason, addressing the disparities in our use of 
the term remains one of the fundamental requirements of any convincing theory of 
any one of the uses of the concept intention. And thus, as my aim is to present a 
                                               
46 Much of the support for this view in recent times has stemmed from a series of experiments 
conducted by Joshua Knobe (2003; 2004) together with Arudra Burra (2006), which are commonly 
interpreted as showing that folk attributions of “intention” and “intentionally” come apart. I will not be 
presenting my arguments against Knobe and Burra’s conclusions here. However, I will briefly state 
that I do not take their experimental results to unequivocally support the conclusions that are derived 
from them, and that by adopting a wide-fit view of the relationship between intentions and intentional 
actions it is possible to account for the discrepancy that they identify in the attributions. Furthermore, 
their argument that the moral valence of an action influences attributions of positive intentional status 
to actions, but not attributions of intention, can be explained by the “pragmatic considerations” (Adams 
and Steadman 2004 and Adams 2006) – indeed, I take Jennifer Nado to present a compelling account 
of how these considerations might “unduly” influence out attributions of positive intentional status in 
her 2008 work Effects of Moral Cognition on Judgements of Intentionality. 
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convincing account of intentional activity, it behoves me to lay-out my proposal for 
such a unity. 
However, to complicate matters even further, Wilson and Shpall (2012) contend that 
there is an additional use of intention for which Anscombe had failed to account. 
They state this use to be the following: (1) “in Fing (by Fing), the agent intended to 
G”, which they argue is related to but distinct from intention-with-which. Given that 
the most basic expression of intention-with-which is: “the agent Fed with the 
intention of Ging,” they employ the following example to illustrate their point: 
[A]lthough it may be true that 
(8) Veronica mopped the kitchen then with the intention of feeding her flamingo 
afterwards, 
it normally won't be true that 
(8’) In (by) mopping the kitchen, Veronica intended to feed her flamingo 
afterwards. 
The irreconcilable nature of these two statements is meant to show that the latter use 
of intention must be considered distinct from the first, and so should be added to 
Anscombe’s list of uses. However, this would be a mistake. In both examples the two 
intentions – mopping the floor and feeding the flamingo – are separate intentions, and 
so what is at stake here is not some new use that seems close to a case of intention-
with-which, but rather a statement that includes an intention-for-the-future and an 
intentional action. The action of mopping the floor does not bring about or aid the 
progress of the action of feeding the flamingo, or if it does then the statement (8’) 
would not be problematic in the sense Wilson and Shpall take it to be. The problem 
centres around the word “with” as it is used in the first statement, which seems to 
indicate a relation to intention-with-which, but this misses the fact that there is a 
difference between doing an action with an intention in the sense of “I have another 
intention while I am separately and intentionally performing my current action” and 
doing an action with an intention is the sense that “I am performing my current action 
with the intention of performing another.” The first type does not imply a connection 
between the two actions, the latter does. Assume a case where the flamingo cannot be 
fed until the floor is clean. In that case, it would be perfectly correct to say that, “in 
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mopping the floor, Veronica intended to feed her flamingos afterwards,” precisely 
because here the two actions are linked, and the intention to feed the flamingos is the 
intention with which Veronica mops the floor. Let us call this case (8’’). Assuming, as 
Wilson and Shpall do, that no such necessary connection as in (8’’) exists between 
Veronica’s actions, we are left with not one new use of intention, but a statement that 
expresses two different applications of the concept intention, each application relating 
to a given intention. The mopping of the floor is a case of intentional action: “I am 
(intentionally) doing X,” and the feeding of the flamingo is a case of intention-for-
the-future: “I intend to do X.” In the case of (8’), intention-for-the-future has simply 
been given in a reported form: “she intends to do X.” 
What this analysis shows us is twofold. First, it reinforces Anscombe’s position 
concerning the three – and only three – applications of the concept intention. Second, 
and more importantly, it raises the fact that we can, and commonly do, hold multiple 
intentions. Statements such as (8’) are complexes in the sense that they refer to 
multiple intentions. The statement as a whole is not an example of any one use of the 
concept of intention, but each intention in the statement is itself an example of one 
use of the concept. This is a concern that Anscombe herself does not address directly. 
It is likely that there are rules governing the relationships between multiple intentions 
(such as are present in (8) and (8’)) that we ought to try to explicate. This question is 
best addressed not under the criterion of the unity of the three uses, but as part of a 
consideration of the relationship between intention and practical reason. I will not be 
investigating this question here, and at this point, it is enough merely to note the 
existence of these complexes, as this supports the view that there are only three 
applications of the concept intention. 
2.2. Unity through control 
I start my attempt at developing a unity of the three applications of the concept 
intention that can satisfy the Unity Criterion, by rejecting the idea that the unity is to 
be found by the reduction of the three uses to one use. It is not the case that every 
intention-for-the-future requires an intention-with-which or an intentional action, nor 
that every intentional action requires an intention-for-the-future. That said, I will 
argue that intention-with-which does stand in such a necessary relationship, as this 
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use of intention amounts to the explanation of an intentional action in terms of its 
related intention-for-the-future. Overall though, rather than a reduction to a single use, 
my argument is that the shared notion of “intention” at work in all three these uses is 
best explained in terms of each use’s relationship to System 2 Oversight. Given that I 
have already unpacked this relationship for intentional activity (which included 
intentional action), I will proceed by first discussing intention-for-the-future, and its 
relationship to System 2 Oversight and to intentional activity, and then move on to 
intention-with-which. 
In our daily life, intentions-for-the-future (from here on simply intentions) are an 
indispensable tool for achieving our practical goals, particularly as regards cross-
temporal planning. When I describe my commitment to performing an action it is 
commonly in the form, “I intend to do it.” My plans for the future invariably take the 
form of a series of intentions, which though open to revision, guide actions. Whatever 
else it may be, intention seems to clearly be a practical or optative attitude, one that is 
inextricably linked to my actions and to my practical reasoning. Given this reality, I 
take an intention to be a unique optative mental state built up of a conduct-controlling 
pro-attitude and a related belief, where the belief can be described as: the belief that I 
should at least try to fulfil [what the relevant pro-attitude aims at]. What marks this 
mental state out as an intention is its relationship to the agent’s rational agency, which 
is to say: the mental state is the result of a System 2 oversight mechanism. 
Furthermore, intentions are, as Bratman (2009a) has argued, our means of rationally 
controlling our conduct in so far as they are open to certain rational requirements (or 
regularities). This implies that what separates an intention from other pro-attitudes is 
not, as it is for Davidson (2001), that it is identified with an all-things-considered 
judgement, nor as Velleman (1989) thinks, that the intention be identified with a 
particular belief. Rather, what is characteristic about those conduct-controlling pro-
attitudes we call intentions is that the agent possesses a certain type of control over it, 
and that they in turn play a crucial role in controlling and guiding our conduct. 
Of these rational requirements, I will only address what I take to be the most 
important two, both of which have already been introduced briefly in foregoing 
sections. The formulation of the first requirement presented here is taken from 
Broome (2013: 159-170), while the second is from Bratman (2009b: 413): 
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Instrumental rationality: Rationality requires of N that, if, 
(1) N intends at t that e, and if 
(2) N believes at t that, if m were not so, because of that e would not be so, and 
if 
(3) N believes at t that, if she herself were not then to intend m, because of that 
m would not be so, then 
(4) N intends at t that m. 
Intention Consistency: The following is always pro tanto irrational: intending A and 
intending B, while believing that A and B are not copossible.47 
As with intentional activity, the kind of control we have over our intentions is not 
always conscious control. There are undoubtedly many cases where an agent might 
form an intention without being consciously aware at that time of having done so. 
That said, I do take it to be the case that any intention must have the possibility of 
being brought to consciousness. As with intentional activity, I take intentions to be 
one of the possible outputs of an agent’s dual cognitive systems, System 1 and System 
2. Also in line with my arguments pertaining to intentional activity – as well as 
Broome’s (2013) view that intentions either result from automatic process demanded 
by rationality, or as the conclusion to a practical reasoning process – I take intention 
to only ever be a possible output when System 2 oversight is present. The intimacy of 
intention’s relationship to System 2 is apparent if we consider System 2’s role in long 
term planning and holistic decision-making, both qualities that are central to the role 
of intentions. If an intention is to serve its role in diachronic reasoning, it must be 
possible for it to be incorporated into an agent’s general plans, it must be available for 
comparison with the agent’s other intentions, her beliefs, and her desires. Without 
System 2 oversight these functions would be impossible. 
How then to understand how intentions relate to intentional activities? The first step is 
to recognise that it is often the case that intentional activities do follow from 
intentions. Indeed, this may be the norm. Our System 2 oversight mechanism yields 
an intention, which then serves as the basis for the guidance of the intentional 
                                               
47 Bratman emphasises the pro tanto nature of this requirement because he does not wish to rule out the 
possibility that there may be instances where this requirement may be overturned by some more 
significant requirement. He does not discuss what such a requirement might be. 
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activities that follow. 48  This, of course, sounds like Bratman’s notion of the 
motivational potential of an intention determining which activities count as 
intentional, and it should. I take Bratman to be entirely correct in urging the 
abandonment of the assumption of tight fit, and adopting a wide-fit view of the 
relationship between intentions and intentional actions. In effect, whenever an 
intentional activity has a related intention, the conditions for positive intentional 
status can be simplified to: 
Intentional status transfer: an agent’s X’ing, undertaken at time t, is intentional if: 
(1) At time t the agent X’d 
(2) X follows, while under System 2 Oversight, from the agent’s intention to Y 
(3) The agent has a belief that X’ing is part of the fulfilment of Y 
Importantly, X and Y can be the same, but need not be. This point is best illustrated 
by an example: I have the intention to run a marathon. I then run the marathon guided 
by this intention and with the belief that it is in fulfilment of my intention to do so. As 
such, this action can be said to fulfil the motivational potential of my intention to run 
the marathon. Therefore, I ran the marathon intentionally. On my view, the purpose of 
an intentional activity in these cases is explained with reference to the intention, 
which shares positive intentional status with the relevant action. So, in the statement: 
“I am typing this sentence with the intention of finishing my thesis,” the action 
described (typing the sentence) is an intentional action, while the intention described 
(finishing my thesis) is the intention that circumscribes the action. Importantly, it is 
not necessary that my intentional activity to X be related to some intention to X, it 
must simply be related – through the mechanisms I have described – to an intention. 
So, for example, say I take a drink of water, and that I do so intentionally. My account 
does not require that I must have had an intention to drink the water, but it is 
necessary that I must have an intention toward something or other, of which I believe 
drinking the water is a means to its fulfilment. In this case, quenching my thirst for 
example. 
                                               
48 Worth noting again is the fact that this relationship between intention and intentional activity need 
not be thought of as a causal one. 
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However, contra Bratman, in at least some cases an intentional activity can take place 
without any intention having been formed, as was seen when we considered the fringe 
cases in Chapter 1: Section 3. This usually happens when the activity is very brief, 
sudden, and uncomplicated – as in the case of certain automatic actions. My account’s 
explanation for such cases is that the operation of the System 2 oversight mechanism 
is able to bring about an activity without going through the process of first bringing 
about an intention. In these instances, there may be insufficient time for an intention 
to form, and so the agent’s reasons-responsive mechanism results in an action with an 
intentional content determined by the desired aim and the reasons responded to by the 
mechanism, but without the mental state of intention (be it conscious or not) or the 
activation of the related rational requirements. 
Without intending to provide a full account of intention, it is worth noting that this is 
not to say that intentions are only formed by the operation of System 2. Intentions can 
be the results of System 1 processes, but unlike with intentional actions, not only must 
System 2 oversight be present – i.e. it must be the case that System 2 had the capacity 
to intervene or guide the process resulting in the intention – but it must also be the 
case that this intention be available to the operation of System 2 on demand at the 
time of acting.49 Further, for an intention-for-the-future to play its expected role in 
                                               
49 What this requirement rules out are the kinds of unconscious intentions that Mele (2009: 98-103) 
discusses when considering an example of table-turning. In this example, a group of individuals are 
gathered around a table, all of whom believe that the table will move due to spiritual intervention. As it 
turns out the table does move. As it turns out: 
 
[n]aturally, the people gathered at the table are moving it. But apparently, at least some of them 
are contributing to its motion without having any idea that this is so. Imagine that one of them, 
Tab, begins to feel some clockwise motion of the table. His hands move in the direction of the 
motion, as he notices, and he thinks he is merely allowing them to be dragged along by the 
table. In fact, however, he is pushing the table in that direction ever so slightly. (ibid.: 98-99) 
 
Mele takes this to be a case where Tab intentionally pushes the table, and furthermore that it makes 
sense to say that Tab has an intention to push the table. I disagree that this is the case. Consider that if 
there was some consequence of pushing the table that would later inconvenience Tab – that he be 
accused of being a charlatan for example – he would seem entirely justified and correct, even after 
being told the details of the case, in declaring, “but I didn’t move the table intentionally! I had no 
intention of doing so! 
This does not mean that intentions must always be conscious, after all I do not lose my intentions when 
I sleep, but the intentions must be available to my consciousness on demand at the time of acting. Had 
Tab had an intention to push the table but forgot about it until he was in the middle of pushing the table 
his pushing would then count as intentional if he continued to maintain his pushing, but if he stopped 
upon this realization then his pushing up till that point would not be intentional. In contrast, if Tab did 
not forget about this intention of his, but it was simply not “before his mind” at the time, and he could 
call it to mind on command, then the pushing would be intentional – if the actual pushing did follow 
appropriately from this intention, of course. 
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coordinating further intentions and behaviours, it is necessary that it precede the 
actual further intentions and intentional action in question, and it is also the case that 
once such an intention is arrived at it immediately evokes the related rational 
requirements. It is this step that can at times be “skipped” – both due to time 
constraints, as mentioned before, but also due to increasing degrees of automaticity. 
In the case of an over-learned action, for example, the intention is not necessarily 
skipped due to temporal concerns, but because the agent has “ceded” control directly 
to the System 1 processes resulting in the actions. This is usually unproblematic, as 
the intention-for-the-future’s coordinating role is often no longer necessary in this 
case, though it can lead to some difficulties: consider a case where a professional 
tennis player is teaching a new student. The student delivers a weak shot. In terms of 
the professional’s overall intentions and beliefs, she would want to strike the ball so 
as to make it easy for the student to return it again. However, the professional has 
been rigorously trained and frequently practiced smashing weak deliveries such as the 
one she has just received, and proceeds to do so. Presuming that in this case System 2 
still had oversight – it was not a wholly automatic action – then this smashing of the 
ball is intentional. Had there first been an intention-for-the-future, System 2 
intervention to prevent the smashing of the ball would have been more likely. 
An easier way to understand this may be to adopt Searle’s solution to this messy 
tangle, which is to argue that intention-for-the-future can be divided into two types, 
prior intention and intention in action. Prior intentions are not always present in cases 
of intentional action. Intentions in action, on the other hand, are. Searle (1980: 52) 
distinguishes the two as follows: 
The characteristic linguistic form of expression of a prior intention is “I will do 
A” or “I am going to do A”. The characteristic form of expression of an 
intention in action is “I am doing A”. We say of a prior intention that the agent 
acts on his intention, or that he carries out his intention, or that he tries to carry 
it out. But in general we can’t say such things of intentions in action, because 
the intention in action just is the Intentional content of the action; the action and 
the intention are inseparable. 
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Though I take Searle’s explanation to be generally accurate, I disagree that intention 
in action is a type of intention-for-the-future. Instead I take it to be the aim that the 
System 2 oversight mechanism was orientated towards. To understand this, consider 
the following: I am climbing a mountain and suddenly lose my grip and begin to fall, 
as I do so I grab the climbing rope that I had set up earlier, ending my fall. In this 
case, there is insufficient time to develop a full-blown intention-for-the-future, instead 
the aim of grabbing the rope – the intention in action – guided my action in grabbing 
the rope – without engaging all of the rational apparatus that the formation of a prior 
intention would have called for. This then accounts for the unity of intention-for-the-
future and intentional action. 
I take explaining intention-with-which to be simple matter of explaining an 
intentional activity by referring to the intention-for-the-future to which it is related. 
When I state: “I am typing this sentence with the intention of finishing this chapter,” I 
am relaying to the listener that I am performing an intentional action (typing the 
sentence) as part of the fulfilment of an intention-for-the-future (finishing the 
chapter). This method seems to apply to all uses of intention-with-which that I can 
presently imagine. 
This then gives us the unity of the three uses: both intention and intentional activity 
are the direct results of an appropriate control mechanism, sometimes together and 
sometimes not. When there is an intention to A this intention can transfer positive 
intentional status to a given activity B (where A and B can be the same) if this activity 
takes place under the intention’s guidance (which bottoms out as System 2 Oversight) 
and with the appropriate belief. In cases of intentional activity where there is no such 
intention present, we can still think of their being a Searlean intention in action at 
work, where this intention in action is constitutive of the activity and is identical to its 
“intentional content” or aim. Finally, intention-with-which is understood to be an 
explanation of an agent’s intentional activity in light of her intention-for-the-future. 
Let us now examine how this conception of the unity of the three uses fares in 
resolving a key difficulty that have plagued previous attempts to reduce the three uses 
to intention-for-the-future, resolving the problem of mutually exclusive intentions. 
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2.3. Making sense of mutually exclusive intentions 
If we say that there is often a direct link between an intentional action and an 
intention it aims to fulfil, then we must again confront the possibility of mutually 
exclusive intentions. On the other hand, if we make the link too tenuous, then we run 
into a different difficulty: explaining the rational relation between intention-for-the-
future and intentional action. I believe that the key to plotting a course between these 
two pitfalls is to give a greater role to uncertainty, by again making use of the notion 
of trying.50 As I defended in Section 1.3., I take the belief necessary for intentional 
action to not be a belief that the agent will A, but rather that the agent will at least try 
to A.51 The value of this is that it recognises the inherent uncertainty entailed by a 
future-directed commitment. I will now see how this approach fares in resolving the 
problem of mutually exclusive intentions. 
Tackling Bratman’s much-discussed case of the gamer attempting to strike two 
targets, with the incorporation of the notion of trying we can say that the gamer had 
the intention-for-the-future to hit one of the targets. This means that the agent has a 
conduct-controlling pro-attitude toward hitting one of the targets, as well as the belief 
that she will at least try to fulfil this aim. Does the agent have an intention-for-the-
future to hit T1 (or T2)? I argue yes, the agent does. One of the rational requirements 
applicable to my intention to hit one of the targets is that I should intend those means 
that would be necessary for trying to successfully fulfil my end. When the gamer 
decides to set out the two targets simultaneously, she does not know which one she 
will hit. Even as she is playing, she cannot be certain as to which target she will 
strike, if any. It could actually increase her chances of fulfilling her overall intention-
for-the-future of striking one of the targets if she were to try to strike both 
simultaneously. In this case, it could be argued that the gamer is following the most 
rational path, as she is maximising the chances of fulfilling her end. At the very least, 
by aiming to strike both targets she does not reduce the likelihood of fulfilling her 
                                               
50 For a different approach to mine that also employs the notion of trying, see Thompson (2008: 91–92, 
133–146). 
51 It might be worried that incorporating the belief to try as a constitutive part of an intentional action 
commits me, as Hornsby (1980) has argued, to the view that all basic actions necessarily occur inside 
the body. Whether this is so does not undermine my account, but I do take Hornsby’s conclusion to be 
premature for reasons presented by Steward (2000) in her compelling criticism of Hornsby’s argument. 
I will merely direct the reader to her work on this point. 
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overall intention. However, it would be irrational to act as the gamer in the example 
acts if playing the two games simultaneously makes it impossible to hit either one of 
the targets (or even if it makes it less likely that the gamer will succeed in hitting one 
by trying to hit the other). And in such a case we would, I think, consider her 
behaviour to be a case of criticisable irrationality. 
Could one not claim, however, that I must still, in the process of meeting the most 
rational means to the overall intention, hold an irrational combination of subordinate 
intentions? Perhaps it could be argued that although my overall plan is not irrational, 
the individual intentions are in fact so. We have seen that Bratman takes this 
possibility seriously, and attempts to resolve it with the introduction of the notion of 
“settled objectives” (Bratman, 2009a: 18-19). According to his solution the gamer 
does not have the intention to hit T1 and the intention to hit T2, but rather has these as 
settled objectives. These settled objectives do not have the same rational requirements 
that intentions do. Most relevantly they are not required to meet intention consistency, 
the very requirement that mutually exclusive intentions violate. Because of this, the 
fact that these objectives are mutually exclusive is not a concern. Also, any subplans I 
might form to achieve these objectives would still count as intentional. For example: 
“I intend to press the fire button to hit target T1.” By distinguishing settled objectives 
from overall intention in this way, Bratman hopes to avoid the problem of rational 
contradiction 
As I stated before, I take this approach to resolving the problem of mutually exclusive 
intentions to be unnecessary. Recall that the rational requirement Bratman takes to be 
at stake here is Intention Consistency, which contends that it is always pro tanto 
irrational to intend A and intend B, while believing that A and B are not copossible. 
Notice that it would only be irrational according to this requirement to hold an 
intention-for-the-future to hit T1 while also holding one to hit T2, if by intention we 
meant that the agent will succeed, or believes he will succeed. If, on the other hand, 
we treat seriously the idea that in these cases the agent has the belief that she will try, 
then it is no longer a matter of irrationality. There is no irrationality in trying to do 
two things of which only one can succeed, provided that the agent does not know 
which one will succeed. In this case, the agent is simply “hedging her bets” so to 
speak. This does not mean that there are not cases where holding two intentions might 
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be irrational. If trying to do A would make doing B impossible, then I could not 
rationally intend A and B. In the example of the gamer, if she were to succeed in 
hitting T1, and in the aftermath still had the intention of hitting T2, then she would be 
guilty of criticisable irrationality. However, this will not occur if we correctly allow 
for the role of intention-with-which. My intention-for-the-future to hit T1 (or T2) is 
subordinate to my intention-for-the-future to hit “one of the targets.” That is, I hold 
the former intended action as means toward the latter. This is then obviously a case of 
intention-with-which. If the latter is achieved, then the reason for holding the former 
is gone. This means that if I intend to hit T1, with the intention of hitting one of the 
targets, then this intention to hit T1 only makes sense as long as I have not hit one of 
the targets. The moment I do strike a target, the intention-with-which is either fulfilled 
(if I struck that target) or unnecessary (if I struck the other target). In either case, I 
will not continue to hold the intention after the point of fulfilment, as the reason for 
holding the intention is no longer there. This solution retains a direct link between the 
relevant intention-for-the-future and the relevant intentional action and avoids having 
to introduce the notion of settled objectives. 
Another possible solution – one that does away with the idea that hitting T1 and 
hitting T2 are intentions-for-the-future – goes as follows: I have a single intention-for-
the-future, to hit one or other of the targets. I have two intentions-with-which, each 
related to either T1 or T2 respectively. The intention-with-which related to T1 would 
be, “I am trying to hit T1 with the intention of hitting one of the targets.” Obviously, 
the action of trying to hit T1 would then be an intentional action, and my intention-
for-the-future is still “hitting one or other of the targets.” This approach resolves the 
issue by avoiding us having to say that I have the intention-for-the-future of hitting T1 
(or T2) specifically, and so avoiding the risk of irrationality. It also avoids having to 
introduce the notion of settled objectives. I think either of these explanations is 
acceptable, and that adjudicating between them would require asking the gamer what 
her intentions(-for-the-future) actually are, that is to say, I think both kinds of cases 
are possible. 
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2.4. Concluding Remarks 
It has been my aim in this chapter to present a cogent and compelling account of 
intentional activity and intentional outcomes. I contended that this should be a 
control-backed account, where the presence of intention-unique control is taken to be 
the characteristic feature of intentional behaviour. I also introduced the idea that we 
should start our attempt to provide the aforementioned account by investigating the 
actual mechanism via which an agent exerts their rational agency in behaviour. In 
order to achieve this, I first presented the requirements that must necessarily be met 
by such a mechanism: that it be reason-responsive, that it explain the possibility of 
acting against the balance of reasons, and that it has the ability to result in both 
intentional activities as well as intentions. This done, I then introduced Dual Process 
Theory, and argued that the sought for mechanism is best understood as System 2 
oversight. I then showed how this understanding of the intention-unique control 
mechanism as System 2 oversight meets the three requirements I introduced. This 
lead into my presentation of my own initial formulation of the control condition on 
intentional action: System 2 Oversight. 
In the three sections succeeding this, I showed how my initial formulation was 
inadequate, first by explaining the necessary role played by a belief to try in meeting 
the epistemic condition on intentional behaviour. And secondly, by arguing that rather 
than focussing only on intentional action, a proper account of intentional behaviour 
should expand to consider intentional omissions, effects, and consequences. I then 
argue that the intentional actions and omissions can be considered together under the 
label of intentional activities, given that both are abstractions (or activity-slices) 
individuated from the stream of activity. Intentional effects and consequences I 
labelled together as intentional outcomes, though unlike with activities these two 
come apart in a significant way. Whereas intentional effects (those results of 
intentional activities that are their logical consequents) can be properly accounted for 
by a reformulation of S2O – System 2 Oversight** – intentional consequence derive 
their positive intentional status via a transfer principle: Transfer of intentional status. 
This difference, I contend, follows from the different degrees of control that an agent 
can exert of intentional effects and intentional consequences respectively. 
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With my account sketched, I then sought to bolster the case in favour if it by seeing if 
my account could meet the Unity Criterion, by explaining the relationship between 
the three uses of the concept intention famously identified by Anscombe. Having 
established my account’s compatibility with the unity of the three uses, I then 
proceeded to argue that my account has the necessary tools to resolve the problem of 
mutually exclusive intentions. This is achieved by recognising that trying is 
constitutive of intentional activity, though this does not mean that “intending to X” is 
equivalent to “trying to X”, but rather that intentionally X’ing necessarily means that 
the agent must have the belief that she will at least try to X. 
Equipped with this account of intentional activity and intentional outcomes – and 
having adduced support for this account by demonstrating its ability to account for the 
fringe cases discussed in Chapter 1, and to resolve or avoid a problem that has beset 
the various accounts of intentional action that was discussed there – the next step in 
untangling the relationship between intentional activity and moral responsibility will 
be to turn toward the latter notion. This I do in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Introduction 
Any discussion of the topic of moral responsibility finds itself embedded within a 
truly vast, complex, and ever-growing literature. Given the enormous scope of the 
work that has been devoted to just about every aspect of this topic, my discussion of it 
in this chapter will, by necessity, be a less than complete account. I will be focusing 
only on those dimensions of the discussion that I deem most relevant for my project: 
charting the relationship between moral responsibility and the intentional status of 
some activity or outcome, and only in the case of the individual agent – so excluding 
responsibility for attitudes, or considerations of collective responsibility. This will 
undoubtedly mean that several aspects of the wider discussion will be passed over in a 
manner that some will find unsatisfactorily brusque – and rightly so. However, I take 
this to be a regrettably inevitable result of wading into such densely populated and 
hotly contested waters. We must strive to untangle one knot at a time, and the knot I 
am seeking to unravel here can be understood as the question, “what is the 
relationship between the intentional status of an agent’s activities and outcomes, and 
the agent’s openness to moral responsibility for these activities and outcomes?” 
Answering this question, as I have already mentioned, involves first getting a clear 
account of both the central notions involved: intentional activities and outcomes, and 
moral responsibility. I take the foregoing two chapters to have provided an account of 
the former, and take this chapter to provide an account of the latter. Thus, this chapter 
seeks to provide a plausible, though not exhaustive, account of moral responsibility 
for the activities and outcomes of individual agents. To meet this goal, I begin by 
setting the stage. This involves situating my account relative to two ongoing debates 
in the literature: the debate between merit-based and consequentialist understandings 
of moral responsibility, and the complex debate surrounding the relationship between 
moral responsibility and determinism (and indeterminism, as we shall see). The two 
debates are not wholly unrelated, as the consequentialist understanding counts as one 
of its virtues that the truth of determinism would not undermine their position, 
whereas this is not as obviously the case for merit-based understandings. However, I 
will discuss each separately to most effectively clarify where my account stands with 
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regards to the various positions available in these debates, namely: that I am 
endorsing a merit-based understanding of moral responsibility, and that I am 
developing my account as though compatibilism where true, while maintaining 
agnosticism about the actual truth of compatibilism – and leaving it open to a non-
compatibilist to treat my account as a modular component that can fit into a wider 
account. By this I mean that it can either be treated as an account of conditions that 
are necessary but not yet sufficient for responsibility (a Libertarian for example may 
argue that a further freedom condition of some sort must be added), or maintaining 
that the conditions for responsibility in my account may be accurate but in fact are 
never met (as a hard determinist or skeptic of any stripe may argue). 
My account’s position in the discussion of moral responsibility’s wider landscape 
having been established, I will move on to argue that there is an important (and 
further: necessary) relationship between the intentional status of a behaviour and 
moral responsibility. This being the case, and since I presented a control account of 
intentional behaviour in Chapter 2, it is likely unsurprising that I will argue that it is 
through the nexus of control that these two notions interrelate. This puts the role that 
control plays in moral responsibility on center stage. This is a comfortable position 
for the role of control to occupy, as the debate surrounding it is very much a central 
part of the contemporary discussion surrounding moral responsibility. This debate can 
be understood as one between volitionists, who hold that control is necessary for 
moral responsibility, and attributivists (most relevantly for my purposes Quality of 
Will theorists), who argue that an agent is responsible for something insofar as it 
appropriately reflects some relevant quality of the agent herself (where what is meant 
by “relevant quality” is, as we will see, offered various interpretations). Crucially, 
attributivist accounts contend that the presence of agential control over some 
behaviour is not a necessary condition for that behaviour to be reflective of that 
quality of the agent that determines openness to moral responsibility. 
I will examine each of these two approaches in turn, before presenting what I take to 
be a problem that confronts both: the existence of cases that elicit ambivalent moral 
responses. This is not a new problem, but one that was raised by Watson (2004) and 
refined by Shoemaker (2015a). In brief, the problem highlights the existence of cases 
where it seems that an agent’s behaviour justifies certain moral responses but not 
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others. Importantly this is not a difference in degree, but a difference in type. It is not 
that we doubt whether an agent is morally responsible in these cases, but rather that 
we are ambivalent, often strikingly so, about the type of moral responses that we are 
legitimated to adopt. This is a difficulty for volitionist and attributivist accounts as 
they offer invariantist accounts of moral responsibility, where moral responsibility 
may come by degree, but not by type. Following Watson and Shoemaker again, I will 
be arguing that the existence of these cases should motivate us to recognize that moral 
responsibility is a plural, rather than unitary, notion. In other words: that there can be 
different senses or variants of moral responsibility, and that each of these may have 
differing conditions they must meet to obtain, and in turn that they justify different 
moral responses. In my arguments here, I will only posit two variants of moral 
responsibility: attributability and accountability. Amongst other differences that I will 
discuss, my crucial contention is that the presence of control is a necessary condition 
on the latter, but not the former. Relatedly, the presence of moral attributability 
legitimizes a different set of moral responses than does the presence of accountability. 
Having sketched these two variants, I will then argue that, to some extent, volitionists 
and attributivists have been talking past each other. They have been talking about 
different variants of moral responsibility. I take attributivist accounts to be focused on 
the notion of moral attributability, whereas the volitionists seek to limit moral 
responsibility to accountability. Each of these positions has something right and 
something wrong about them: the attributivists are correct to identify that there is a 
variant of moral responsibility that extends beyond the limits of control, but are 
wrong to think that there is not another substantive variant of moral responsibility 
applicable in those cases where appropriate control is present. Volitionists are correct 
to identify that certain of our most important moral responses are only legitimated in 
cases where control is present, but wrong to think that the kind of responsibility 
present in cases that extend beyond controlled behaviour is not also a variant of moral 
responsibility. By adopting a variantist view of moral responsibility, this tension can 
hopefully be softened, even if not resolved. 
Turning the dialectic back toward my overarching argument, I will contend that it is 
moral accountability for behaviours – due to its unique relationship to control – that 
stands in a necessary relationship to the intentional status of a given behaviour. To 
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prove this, I present what I take to be the control condition on moral accountability 
for activities and effects: normal System 2 Oversight. As the name suggests, this kind 
of control is intimately linked to, but not identical with, the control necessary for 
positive intentional status. Normal S2O is more restricted than S2O. In particular, 
normal S2O demands not only that a behaviour be under System 2 oversight, but that 
the dual system mechanism in question be functioning normally – which includes the 
requirement that the mechanism be sufficiently responsive to moral reasons. The use 
of “normally” here is not colloquial, but technical, relating to the dual system 
mechanism’s operative characteristics (Haldane, 2011), and the idea that an abnormal 
state of affairs is one that demands a special explanation (Smith, 2010: 15). As we 
will see, this restricts the scope of behaviours for which an agent can be morally 
accountable as compared to those that are intentional. In addition, agents can be 
morally accountable for intentional outcomes, even though such outcomes are not 
directly under normal System 2 oversight. To capture this, I introduce normal 
accountability transfer, whereby an agent can be accountable for a given consequence 
provided, amongst other requirements, that the consequence was sufficiently under the 
guidance of normal S2O. Having outlined the control condition on accountability, I 
will argue that an activity only meets normal S2O when S2O is met, and that because 
of this an agent is only ever morally accountable on the basis of her activities if they 
are intentional. And furthermore, that this relationship extends to outcomes as well. 
This is what I term, the nexus of control. 
I then turn to a discussion of some of the consequences of my account for cases 
involving the Doctrine of Double Effect, and finally return to the inciting example of 
Truman and Anscombe. 
1. Setting the stage: positioning my account 
1.1. Merit versus consequentialist accounts 
In this chapter I will be embracing a merit-based understanding of moral 
responsibility, as opposed to a consequentialist one. These two positions have, until 
fairly recently, dominated how the traditional discussion of moral responsibility has 
been conducted. According to the desert-based view, to hold an agent morally 
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responsible, in the sense of either moral blame or praise, would be an appropriate 
reaction toward the candidate if and only if she “merits,” or “deserves,” such a 
reaction (King, 2014: 1). The consequentialist view holds that such praise or blame 
would be appropriate if and only if a reaction of this sort would likely lead to a 
desired change in the agent and/or her behaviour (Schlosser, 2013: 226), or in the 
behaviour of others. In this case, what it is to be morally responsible depends upon 
considerations of what moral blame or praise will achieve in a given case. 
Consequentialist accounts derive not inconsiderable appeal from the fact that they 
seem more robust than merit-based accounts when confronting the dual threats of 
determinism and moral luck. Nothing in the consequentialist account necessarily 
requires that an agent that is held morally responsible for some action need have been 
able to act differently than she or he did, or have been in control of why and how she 
or he acted. Such considerations may play a role if they influence whether or not 
holding the agent responsible would bring about the desired change, but not 
otherwise. Merit-based accounts, on the other hand, must confront these potential 
threats more directly, either by denying them and arguing that they are in some way 
untrue or mistaken (in the case of Libertarians) or arguing that they do not represent a 
threat to moral responsibility (in the case of compatibilists). I will be discussing the 
incompatibilism/compatibilism debate, and where my account is positioned in relation 
to it, in more detail in the next section, for now it is sufficient to know that 
consequentialism about moral responsibility allows a proponent to sidestep this 
debate, whereas this course is not open to a supporter of the merit-based approach. 
Consequentialism is not very widely endorsed, certainly not in the current discussion. 
For most it simply seems misguided to think that an agent’s openness to moral 
responsibility should depend upon the future-directed value of holding them 
responsible. And adopting this view is radically at odds with our actual practices of 
moral responsibility. Though such considerations might deserve attention when 
asking the question of whether or not to respond in certain ways to those who are 
responsible, it is peculiar to think that this determines the actual presence of 
responsibility. This is in no way a knockdown argument against consequentialist 
accounts, and it is not my aim within this piece to provide one.52 I will, however, be 
                                               
52  For some influential arguments against consequentialism see Strawson, 1962; Wallace, 1994; 
Scanlon, 1986. 
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following the recent trend in the literature in taking a merit-based view of moral 
responsibility. 
1.2. Incompatibilism and compatibilism 
Related to, but distinct from, the contrast between merit-based and consequentialist 
accounts, is the venerable debate between incompatibilists and compatibilists about 
moral responsibility. These positions hardly need introduction, and the influence of 
this debate has been so pervasive, that any serious attempt to unpack moral 
responsibility – at least any merit-based one – must clarify its position on the matter. 
Traditionally, the central concern of this debate was the possibility or impossibility of 
free will, and what consequence this has for the possibility of moral responsibility. As 
expressed by Mason (2005: 344): 
[When considering moral responsibility i]t is impossible to ignore the issues of 
free will and determinism entirely. Moral responsibility is a problem because 
our best theories about our physical world tell us that our actions are caused by 
mechanistic processes originating outside of us. It seems that if our actions are 
ultimately caused in the same way that avalanches are caused, then ultimately 
we are no more responsible for what we do than a rock is for knocking into 
another rock. The problem has led some philosophers to argue that determinism 
is false, and that either agents are special causes (and thus morally responsible 
for what they do) or that indeterministic events can account for moral 
responsibility.53 
Of course, there are also those philosophers who conclude, based on the assumption 
of the truth of determinism, that moral responsibility (at least in the way we 
commonly conceive it) is in fact impossible, or in need of radical revisionism.54 It is 
also worth noting that even if indeterminism is granted, there remains a worry that 
this too may be incompatible with free will – and so by extension moral 
                                               
53 These approaches are often labelled as source and leeway incompatibilism respectively. Both these 
types of accounts put forward a condition on moral responsibility that is intended to capture the unique 
freedom that they take as necessary for such responsibility: In the case of source incompatibilism this 
condition is that the agent must be the ultimate source of her behaviour and in leeway incompatibilism 
the agent must have access to metaphysically robust alternate possibilities (Kane, 2002; 2007 and Haji, 
2002) 
54 Examples include Galen Strawson (1994) and Derk Pereboom (2007; 2013). 
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responsibility, as it then seems that outcomes are random, and that such randomness 
rules out responsibility. Not that this worry cannot be potentially responded to, 
perhaps by limiting and specifying the degree and type of randomness at work – as 
Levy (2011: 1-2) and Kane (1996: 2007) argue may be possible – but it remains a 
spectre haunting attempts to defend the possibility of free will and moral 
responsibility by introducing indeterminism into the picture. However, perhaps the 
most common response amongst philosophers has been to pursue compatibilist 
strategies, which hold that the truth of determinism does not threaten the possibility of 
free will, or that even if it does, it does not threaten the possibility of moral 
responsibility.55 I will drop the distinction between these two types of compatibilists 
from here on, as this distinction is not relevant to either understanding the dialectical 
position of my account of moral responsibility, or to my overarching argument. 
Compatibilists of either stripe have tended toward talk of control, or self-disclosure, 
rather than free will itself. Taking the first approach leads to the view that what is 
necessary for moral responsibility is the presence of a certain kind of agential control. 
In contrast, the second approach maintains that what is necessary for an agent to be 
open to moral responsibility for some behaviour is that that behaviour must disclose 
something morally relevant about the agent – variously argued to be the agent’s 
character, “real” or “deep” self, or the agent’s quality of will or care. It is already 
worth noting here that approaches that hold control to be a necessary condition are 
also concerned with self-disclosure in the sense that they argue that only behaviours 
that are under the appropriate kind of control can reveal facts about the agent’s 
morally relevant features (at least insofar as blame and praise are concerned). As will 
be discussed in more detail in Section 4, whether control or self-disclosure is taken to 
be the central requirements for moral responsibility is a topic of great importance in 
determining the relationship between moral responsibility and the intentional status of 
behaviours. For our purposes here, it is enough to provisionally identify these two 
types of compatibilism.  
More recently, the argument has been advanced that it is not determinism or 
indeterminism that renders free will and moral responsibility impossible, but rather 
                                               
55 Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998; 2007) account is an example of the latter view, which is why they 
identify their position as one of “semi-compatibilism.” 
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the presence (and indeed omnipresence) of luck. This view, whose most eloquent 
proponent is probably Neil Levy (2011), holds that the presence of such luck 
undermines the possibility for the kind of control necessary for moral responsibility, 
as well as problematizing self-disclosure accounts by questioning how the revealed 
morally relevant features of an agent can be a basis for moral responsibility if (i) 
which features an agent possesses, (ii) if they are able to reveal them, and (iii) 
whether any given behaviour is a reliable guide to these features, may all be a matter 
of luck. Additionally, he contends that the epistemic condition on moral responsibility 
is far more stringent than is commonly thought, and that in few, if any, cases does an 
agent meet them. For Levy’s argument to get off the ground, it is first necessary for 
him to convince us that the conditions for moral responsibility that he puts on the 
table are accurate, as whether we should agree that luck undermines these conditions 
will depend on what they are. I will directly consider these conditions in Section 3.1., 
as in that section I discuss volitionist accounts of moral responsibility, of which Levy 
provides an example (though in the end he concludes that these volitionist conditions 
are in fact never met). 
Having briefly charted over the landscape of this debate, I can position my own 
account’s place in it: I will be developing a partial and modular account of moral 
responsibility that I develop as though it was a compatibilist one. This account will be 
partial, as I do not, and do not intend to, provide a defence of compatibilism as such. 
Nothing that I present here will convince an incompatibilist (be they a skeptic or a 
Libertarian) of the truth of compatibilism. Rather I will provide what I take to be a 
plausible and compelling understanding of moral responsibility if we assume the truth 
of compatibilism. What is true is that I take my account to be amenable with these 
incompatibilist positions in the sense that it is modular enough to accommodate them: 
nothing in my account rules out the possibility that the conditions on moral 
responsibility I argue for never obtain (as a skeptic may argue), or that on top of the 
conditions I put forward there be some further demand for sourcehood or leeway (as 
Libertarians may argue for) for moral responsibility to be present. I will be agnostic 
on this matter. Hopefully this modularity and agnosticism can allow something of 
interest to be gained by incompatibilist readers. 
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2. Moral responsibility and intentional action 
In this section I give a preliminary look at the relationship between moral 
responsibility and intentional action. This will serve to demonstrate the complexities 
involved, as well as indicate to us the appropriate potential course to resolve them. 
The first step is to consider what it is I mean by moral responsibility, praise, and 
blame. 
When attempting to understand what it means for an agent to be morally responsible, 
one popular general view is that “[w]hen we talk about moral responsibility we are 
talking about a way of being related to things so as to make individuals [morally] 
blameworthy or praiseworthy for them” (King, 2014: 2). According to this general 
view, what we mean when we say that an agent is morally responsible is that the 
agent is a legitimate candidate for ascriptions of (moral) praise or blame. By the same 
lights, to hold an agent morally blameworthy or praiseworthy is to hold the agent to 
be morally responsible.56 More recently, Strawson, in his landmark paper, “Freedom 
and Resentment”, introduced the idea that what it is for us to hold an agent morally 
responsible, in the sense of blameworthy or praiseworthy, is to adopt certain reactive 
attitudes toward them, attitudes such as resentment, indignation, hatred, amongst 
others. However, I want to take a moment to consider an important distinction that 
arises from the consideration of the intimate relationship between moral responsibility 
and moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. Although it is the case that it seems 
uncontroversial to claim that to hold an agent to be morally blameworthy or 
praiseworthy is to hold her to be morally responsible, this does not yet allow us to say 
that what it is to be morally responsible, is simply to be morally blameworthy or 
praiseworthy. The reason for this, as King (2014: 2) observes, is that it can be thought 
that an agent could be morally responsible for an action but “fail to be either 
blameworthy or praiseworthy for it. Presumably this occurs when one is responsible 
for a morally neutral act.” In cases such as this it seems that an agent can be morally 
responsible even for actions for which she is neither praiseworthy or blameworthy. 
Fischer and Ravizza (1998: 8) endorse this view when they declare that: 
                                               
56 This approach has a long pedigree: Aristotle adopted it in his discussion of moral responsibility in 
Nicomachean Ethics III. 1-5. 
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[M]oral responsibility need not imply the actual application of a reactive 
attitude; it only requires that the agent be an apt candidate for such an 
application…[i]ndeed, our Strawsonian view of moral responsibility allows 
moral responsibility for “morally neutral” behaviour. For instance, one can be 
morally responsible for simply raising one’s hand (where this is not a signal or 
in any way morally significant). Thus our Strawsonian view of moral 
responsibility is a relatively broad and inclusive view. 
I am, according to this view, morally responsible for painting my garage door, but 
barring exceptional circumstances I am unlikely to be morally blameworthy or 
praiseworthy for it. It is this understanding of moral responsibility and its relationship 
to praiseworthiness and blameworthiness that I will be adopting. 
Now, it is very often the case that a denial of positive intentional status exculpates an 
agent from moral responsibility for some action. Indeed, such protestations are 
abundant in everyday life. And what is more noteworthy than the fact that these 
denials are advanced, is that they often do serve to render the relevant attributions of 
moral blame or praise unjustified.  If we imagine the following case: a man in a crowd 
treads on my foot, and I angrily blame him for this, but if he responds by removing 
his foot while truthfully stating, “that wasn’t intentional,” then it seems eminently 
plausible that we will find it to have been unjustified of me to hold the agent morally 
blameworthy for his treading on my foot.57 The same effect operates in the opposite 
direction: if an agent denies moral blameworthiness for some act, it usually counts 
against this denial to say that the agent in fact performed the action intentionally. 
These everyday practices might motivate someone to advance a strong answer to the 
question, “is there a necessary relationship between an agent’s openness to moral 
responsibility for some action and the intentional status of said action?” (call this 
question Q1), namely: 
A1: an agent is only open to moral responsibility for her or his intentional 
actions 
                                               
57Of course, the matter changes if, once made aware of my foot under his, the agent refuses to move his 
offending appendage. However, I take this to only reinforce my point: by refusing to move his foot 
after having been made aware of the situation, the agent can no longer claim to be treading on my foot 
unintentionally. 
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However, this is quite clearly too strong an answer. It attempts to capture a far more 
complex reality under an overly simple rule. 58  That said, certain adherents to 
volitionism – such as voluntarists – do endorse something like A1. As McKenna 
(2008: 31) points out, “voluntarism about moral responsibility is a thesis about control 
and its scope, which is limited to intentional actions.” However, reconciling A1 with 
our actual practices of moral responsibility introduces complexities that make such a 
straightforward answer untenable.  There are at least two good reasons to reject A1: 
(i) there are at least some cases where an agent can be morally responsible for actions 
which are not intentional and (ii) agents can be morally responsible for more than 
merely actions. 
To illustrate this, consider the following case: 
Mary is a tourist, and she is busy climbing across a snow-covered slope at a 
resort when her leg becomes stuck in a snow drift. Mary has with her a flare 
gun, which she has been instructed to fire if she becomes stuck. However, she 
has also been warned that she should avoid firing the flare when she is stuck on 
parts of the eastern slope as this could cause an avalanche. Mary is in fact on the 
eastern slope, but the warning slips her mind as she is in a panic to save her life 
– an end she values highly – and she fires her flare gun to signal for a rescue 
ignorant of this fact. This has two consequences, the first is that Mary is indeed 
rescued, the second is that an avalanche is caused which strikes a town in the 
valley below killing a dozen people. 
In this case, it seems that we would hold Mary to certainly be morally responsible in 
some sense for the deaths that resulted from her actions, yet it cannot be said that 
Mary intentionally killed the townspeople. So, in this case, the defence of “it was not 
intentional!” does not seem to be compelling. There are myriad similar examples that 
could be put forward, many of which come from everyday life: if I agree to housesit a 
friend’s dog, but have an apathetic attitude towards my duties and absentmindedly 
feed the animal chocolate, its harmful effects on dogs slipping my mind, and it dies, 
                                               
58 The observation that there are cases where an agent might be morally responsible for an action even 
if that action is unintentional can be found at least as far back as Aristotle’s discussion of the 
relationship between the voluntariness of an agent’s action and the openness of said agent to 
responsibility on account of that action in the Nicomachean Ethics. Though he discusses voluntary, 
rather than intentional actions, the insight he makes applies as readily to the latter as the former. 
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then it cannot be said that I intentionally killed the dog, however it would be strange 
to say that I was not morally responsible for it.59 That said, it is worth noting even 
here that these cases are likely to elicit deep ambivalence as to what exactly the moral 
responses applicable in these situations should be understood to be. After all, the way 
in which Mary is morally responsible for the deaths – both in terms of what it tells us 
about her agency and what responses it seems to morally legitimate – is different not 
merely in degree from a case where Mary intentionally caused these deaths. We will 
return to this point in Section 4.1. 
As regards (ii), one might simply point out that it is very common for agents to be 
held responsible for reprehensible attitudes, even if these attitudes never manifest into 
action. It is surely legitimate to hold a racist morally responsible for her racist 
attitudes, even if she never performs any harmful actions because these attitudes. 
However, I will be ignoring responsibility for attitudes in this dissertation, and focus 
only on behaviours, given that my interest is the relationship between moral 
responsibility and intentional behaviour. More relevantly then: agents can be 
responsible for inaction just as they are for actions, as is usually the case with 
omissions and negligence. 
I take negligence to be criticisable omission, though this criticisability need not be 
moral in nature. Following the arguments of John Haldane (2011: 617), I take an 
omission (by a given agent) to X, and so leading to a result Y, to be a case of that 
agent not doing X when (a) it was in her power to X, (b) to X was one of her 
operative characteristics, and (c) under normal conditions had she X’ed then Y would 
have been avoided. By operative characteristic here is meant some role or function 
(partly) constitutive of the agent. Such characteristics give rise to normative 
expectations regarding the agent’s behaviour: if the agent is a gardener, for example, 
then to water the plants would be one of his operative characteristics, and there would 
be a normative expectation on the gardener to do so (ibid.: 617-618). For an action to 
be negligent then it must be the case that Y is a criticisable outcome (again, this need 
certainly not be moral criticism), and on the basis of this the omission to X which 
                                               
59 There are also many similar, if usually more contrived, examples in the experimental philosophy 
literature that indicates that the folk are very prepared to ascribe moral responsibility to agents on the 
basis of actions (or the consequences of actions) that are not intentional, see Malle and Knobe, 1997; 
Doris et al., 2007; Woolfolk et al., 2006; Nado, 2008. 
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results in Y coming about is also criticisable. For example, the gardener could have 
the responsibility of ensuring that the grass remain cut, and so would be negligent if 
she omitted to mow the lawn, and would be criticisable in the domain of garden 
maintenance. In the domain of morality, negligence means an omission to act when 
the balance of salient moral reasons call for action. So, if an agent walks past one of 
the many drowning children that populate the works of moral philosophers, and if we 
assume (for the sake of argument) that there are compelling moral reasons to save the 
child given the low cost to the agent, then if the agent were to fail to act per these 
reasons and rescue the child, we would hold this agent to be morally blameworthy on 
the basis of her omission. I think it would be accurate to say that the agent 
demonstrated moral negligence, just as the gardener in the foregoing example 
demonstrated gardening negligence. What fixes criticisability seems to be related to 
the operative characteristics at play. In the case of the gardener, it is the agent’s 
operative characteristics in the role as a gardener that make the failure criticisable. 
What makes the moral case different (and perhaps unique) is that the role of moral 
agent is such a near universal one for human agents. 60  One of the operative 
characteristics of a moral agent is that such an agent should strive to identify salient 
moral reasons and be guided by them in behaviour, and an agent is criticisable when 
they do not. The rub of this is that is seems that we have good reason to think that 
agents can, and often are, morally responsible for omissions as well as for actions. 
Another aspect of (ii) is that we at least sometimes hold agents responsible for the 
side-effects of their actions. This was, of course, a central part of what Anscombe was 
asserting in her dissent to the Oxford committee on the question of awarding Truman 
an honorary degree. Though the question of whether an agent is as morally 
responsible for the intended consequences of her actions as for the unintended side-
effects can be set to one side for discussion later, what is uncontroversial is that at 
least sometimes an agent can be morally responsible for an unintended side-effect. 
Consider a case where a sniper lines up to shoot at his target, but notices that a 
bystander located directly behind her target will undoubtedly die if she pulls the 
                                               
60 Depending on one’s view of human agency, it may well be taken as universal. For my part I would 
say that an agent such as an ideal psychopath – who is incapable of recognizing the special normativity 
of moral reasons – still qualifies as a possessing human agency, but is not a moral agent. To identify 
and respond to moral reasons is not an operative characteristic of a human agent. But this matter is 
neither here nor there for the purposes of my arguments here, though we will return to it in Section 5.1. 
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trigger. Our sniper has no interest or desire to kill the bystander, and intends only to 
kill the target. If this sniper were to take the shot, hence killing both her target and the 
bystander, it seems reasonable to assume that she would be found morally 
blameworthy for having killed the bystander. Yet this consequence of taking the shot 
was an unintended side-effect – not even an intended consequence, let alone an 
intentional action. 
Given these complexities, it should be clear that (i) and (ii) give us good reason to 
reject the thought that the only actions on the basis of which an agent can be morally 
responsible are intentional actions, and that only actions can be the basis for moral 
responsibility. Thus, we should reject A1. What then should be our answer to Q1? 
Before presenting a straight answer to Q1, let us first have another look at the 
question again: 
Q1:  is there a necessary relationship between an agent’s openness to moral 
responsibility (of some kind) for some action and the intentional status of said 
action? 
My contention is that to present an appropriate answer to this question it is first 
necessary that we precisify the two crucial components at work in the question. In 
other words: what kind of moral responsibility is it that stands in a necessary 
relationship to the intentional status of that based on which the agent is open to 
responsibility? And the intentional status of what? In the preceding two chapters I 
have already developed my answer to the second question: the intentional status of 
activities and outcomes. In the succeeding parts of this chapter I argue that the answer 
to the first is moral accountability. Furthermore, I will argue that what grounds this 
necessary relationship is the shared role played by control in both notions – what I 
will call the nexus of control. Having already presented my account of the role of 
control in intentional activity and outcomes, I now turn to discussing the role of 
control in moral responsibility. It is through this discussion that we both come to 
understand why it is moral accountability that stands in a unique relationship to 
intentional status, as well as the exact nature of the shared nexus of control. 
 132 
3. The contested role of control: volitionist and attributivist accounts 
In Section 1.2. a distinction was introduced between two compatibilist strategies: one 
that takes the presence of some appropriate kind of control to be necessary for moral 
responsibility, and another that focusses on the revelatory nature of an agent’s 
behaviour. These two strategies have somewhat crystalized in the contemporary 
discussion into two highly influential schools of thought: that of volitionism and 
attributivism. Though there are other differences between these approaches, the most 
important one is how they differ in terms of the role given to the control principle, 
which holds that for an agent to be morally responsible for something, it must be 
under the agent’s control in the right way (Watson, 2004: 269). Volitionism holds that 
there is a necessary control condition on moral responsibility. This control condition 
is usually taken to be composed of two subconditions: the epistemic (or knowledge) 
condition and the volitional (or control) condition.61 The former of these is roughly a 
demand that the agent must know what she is doing to be responsible for it, and the 
latter is usually understood as requiring that the agent must have the capacity to adjust 
or guide her behaviour in the light of reasons. Both of these subconditions should 
sound somewhat familiar from our discussion of intention-unique control in Chapter 
2. 
By contrast, attributivist accounts argue that there is no necessary control condition 
on moral responsibility. On such accounts, an agent is morally responsible for some 
activity if it reveals facts about some morally relevant feature of the agent. This 
feature is variously understood as the agent’s “real self” or “deep self” (Watson, 
2004), or as an insufficiency or surfeit of good will (Rosen, 2014), or how much an 
agent cares about what is morally important (Björnsson, 2017a). Crucially, this can 
be true regardless of whether the agent in question’s activity was under his or her 
control in the volitionist’s sense (Radoilska, 2016). However, as we will see, this does 
not strip control of its role entirely, though it is much reduced – or so the attributivist 
claims. 
                                               
61 For the sake of clarity, I will be referring to the overall control condition as the “control condition,” 
and the subcondition as the “volitional condition.” 
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In the rest of this section I will expand on each of these approaches to understanding 
moral responsibility, highlighting some of their strengths, shortcomings, and shared 
elements. 
3.1.Volitionism 
To understand the kind of control that I argue volitionists should be concerned with, it 
is helpful to re-introduce Fischer’s two types of control: regulative control and 
guidance control. As a brief reminder, regulative control requires that the agent have 
access to actual alternative possibilities, whereas guidance control requires that the 
behaviour be guided by a reason-responsive mechanism. The relationship between the 
two types of control is well expressed by Sartorio when considering the question of 
what grounds the kind of control or freedom necessary for moral responsibility (2016: 
108): 
[T]wo models have emerged as competing answers to this question: the 
alternative-possibilities model, which is the classical model of freedom, and, 
more recently, the actual-sequence model (I shall refer to them as ‘‘the AP 
model’’ and ‘‘the AS model,’’ respectively). According to the AP model, 
freedom is grounded, at least partly, in having access to alternative possibilities 
of action. In other words, acting freely consists, at least partly, in being able to 
do otherwise (being able to do something other than what one actually did). By 
contrast, according to the AS model, freedom is exclusively grounded in facts 
about the actual sequence of events issuing in one’s behavior. On this view, 
acting freely is just a matter of one’s behavior having the right kinds of actual 
causes, and thus is not at all a matter of being able to do otherwise or having 
access to alternative possibilities of action.  
Regulative control falls in line with the AP model, whereas guidance control is an 
example of the AS model. If accepted, the truth of determinism seems to clearly rule 
out the former of these. If nobody has the power to change the course of the future, 
then nobody has access to alternative possibilities, and so can never claim to have 
regulative control as an AP account would require. A compatibilist would be wise 
then to adopt the AS model, rather than the AP one. 
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A further challenge to the idea that regulative control is necessary for moral 
responsibility can be found in the famous Frankfurt-examples.62 Over the years there 
have been any number of variations on the classic Frankfurt-example, and the one that 
Fischer (2007: 58) uses to illustrate why regulative control is seemingly not a 
necessary condition for moral responsibility is the following: 
Jones has left his political decision until the last moment…Jones goes into the 
voting booth, deliberates in the ‘normal’ way, and chooses to vote for the 
Democrat. On the basis of this choice, Jones votes for the Democrat. 
Unbeknownst to Jones, he has a chip in his brain that allows a very nice and 
highly progressive neurosurgeon (Black) to monitor his brain. The 
neurosurgeon wants Jones to vote for this Democrat, and if she sees that Jones 
is about to choose to vote for the Republican, she swings into action with her 
nifty electronic probe and stimulates Jones’ brain in such a way as to ensure that 
he chooses to vote for the Democrat.  
He continues to point out that “[g]iven this set-up, it seems that Jones exhibits 
guidance control of his vote, but he lacks regulative control over his choice and his 
vote.” Why would this be? Why does Jones seem to lack regulative control in this 
case? The reason is that it seems as though he does not have access to alternative 
possibilities. No matter what Jones may do, he would vote Democrat. He cannot, 
through any freedom or control internal to himself, shift onto some alternative branch 
of history. Indeed, it would seem as if, at least in this case, history has no branches at 
all. Yet, it seems intuitively obvious (or so compatibilists will argue) that we can hold 
Jones responsible for voting for the Democrat in the actual story (the one where the 
neurosurgeon never had to step in). The compatibilist should contend that what this 
shows is that we can hold agents moral responsible for their actions, even in cases 
where they did not have access to alternative possibilities.63 
                                               
62 Harry Frankfurt first presented examples of this type in his 1969 work, Alternate Possibilities and 
Moral Responsibility. They were intended to disprove the principle that moral responsibility requires 
that an agent have access to actual alternative possibilities, by positing a situation where the reader 
intuitively deems the agent to be morally responsible, but the agent could not have done anything other 
than what she did. 
63 Needless to say, this conclusion is not usually meet with agreement from Libertarians or skeptics, see 
Robert Kane (1996; 2007) for the former and Derk Pereboom (2007; 2009) for the latter. 
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Recalling from Chapter 2: Section 1.1. that reason-responsiveness as discussed above 
consists of two elements: reason-receptivity and reason-reactivity, it is worth 
considering a criticism advanced by Pereboom (2009) of the reactivity facet of 
reasons-responsiveness, at least as this facet is presented by Fischer. Pereboom (ibid.: 
29) uses the term “weak reasons-reactivity” to describe the position that there are at 
least some near possible worlds where the agent’s mechanism is reactive to some 
relevant reasons. He then proceeds to argue that weak reasons-reactivity is not a 
necessary condition for moral responsibility. This has primarily taken the form of 
examples which seem to show that it is possible to imagine an agent who is morally 
responsible for her actions, yet there is no near possible world in which she could 
have adjusted her behaviour in the light of relevant reasons to anything other than 
what she actually did – ergo, weak reasons-reactivity is not necessary for moral 
responsibility. One such example progresses as follows: 
So imagine that someone comes to your door and wants to know whether you 
are lodging a particular person – and in fact you are. But you are so committed 
to telling the truth that you would do so under any circumstances, even if you 
knew that the person at the door was planning to murder your guest, or even if 
you knew that he would destroy the whole world if you told the truth. You 
might be morally responsible for your truth-telling despite not being weakly 
reasons-reactive. Such cases indicate that weak reasons-reactivity is not 
necessary for moral responsibility. (Pereboom, 2009: 30) 
Pereboom does recognise that one route to defusing this example would be to say that 
the agent in question, A, is in fact not morally responsible for the behaviour, as 
clearly the kind of non-reactivity evinced from A’s behaviour is more in line with that 
of an extreme kleptomaniac, or a sufferer of agoraphobia whose psychological 
limitations are so severe that she cannot leave her house even to save lives. His 
response is that we should imagine A’s commitment to telling the truth to be “of the 
sort Kierkegaard envisions,” where the commitment is constantly re-affirmed by the 
agent, moment to moment. Yet, even given this response, it seems to me as though 
something like Fischer’s tracing example might explain the real difference at stake 
between these cases, rather than reasons-reactivity. I will discuss tracing in more 
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detail in Section 3.1., but for now we can consider that for our Kieregaardian64 to 
have originally formed her commitment freely, the reasoning that led to it would have 
had to be reason-responsive (in both the receptive and reactive sense). At this stage, if 
the agent was incapable, even counterfactually, of ever not forming her 
Kierkegaardian commitment, then perhaps it would be correct to say that she is not 
morally responsible. On the other hand, if, during this earlier process, there was a near 
possible world where she does not form the commitment for some relevant reason (or 
maybe she never reads Kierkegaard?), then this is a classic tracing example. 
Distinct from possible responses available to Fischer and Ravizza, it appears to me 
that a person who will tell the truth even if the world would be destroyed, and no 
possible reason could possibly sway them from their commitment, is insane. Such a 
person might well be responsible for their actions in some sense, but not morally. 
It is not clear to me if a commitment of the type Pereboom posits in his example is 
supposed to flow from a reason to action process (what I would call the System 2 
oversight mechanism, what Fischer simply calls the actual-sequence mechanism) that 
is unreactive or from some motivation (pro-attitude) so powerful that the agent cannot 
possibly reason against it. If the former, then I would argue that we should hold the 
agent to be morally responsible and blameworthy, whereas in the second (which 
seems to me no different from an overpowering addiction or a severe psychological 
disorder – making this case similar to that of the psychopath discussed in Chapter 2: 
Section 1.1.) they would find the agent to not be morally responsible. Not seeking to 
conflate criminal and moral responsibility, but it is worth noting – as Schlosser does 
(2013: 224) – that: 
[a] good indication that this is in line with the conditions on criminal 
responsibility is provided by the Model Penal Code’s section on ‘‘mental 
disease or defect excluding responsibility’’ (§ 4.01). This section states that an 
agent is not responsible for criminal conduct if the agent ‘‘lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law’’ (§ 4.01). Although this 
                                               
64 It may be worth noting that Kierkegaard himself would have certainly thought that in order to make 
the kind of moment to moment commitment of which Pereboom speaks, the agent must be making this 
commitment freely, with the real possibility of choosing against the commitment. 
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passage refers to ‘‘conduct as a result of mental disease or defect’’, it clearly 
highlights the underlying presupposition that one must be able to understand the 
reasons why certain acts are wrong and to adjust one’s behavior accordingly 
[my emphasis]. 
In addition to reason-responsiveness, Fischer and Ravizza also laid out an ownership 
condition on guidance control (Sartorio has no comparable condition in her account). 
The idea advanced by Fischer and Ravizza is that for an agent to have appropriate 
ownership of the actual-sequence mechanism, it must be the case that she “takes 
responsibility for the mechanisms giving rise to her actions” (McKenna, 2009). 
Bratman (2000: 454) breaks down the three ingredients of what it is to take 
responsibility for a mechanism, according to Fischer and Ravizza, as follows: (I) one 
must see oneself as the source of one’s behaviour, in the sense that one sees that our 
pro-attitudes, beliefs and intentions result in changes in the world, (II) one must 
consider oneself a legitimate target for reactive attitudes based on how one employs 
the agency described in (I), and (III) the views held in (I) and (II) must be based on 
evidence. In other words, an agent can only be said to have guidance control if that 
agent meets two different subjective requirements, to be exact: a belief (backed by 
evidence) that she is the source of her behaviour, and a belief (backed by evidence) 
that she is a legitimate target for reactive attitudes. Additionally, Fischer and Ravizza 
argue that ownership in the form of “taking responsibility” is a “historical” notion 
(Bratman, 2000: 454), as whether or not an agent can be said to meet the requirements 
for ownership depends upon a certain history. This is important, as it aims to rule out 
the seemingly counterintuitive example where an agent is held to be morally 
responsible for a given actual-sequence mechanism that, while still reasons-
responsive, was historically manipulated.65 
In defending the historical character of the ownership of guidance control, Fischer and 
Ravizza utilise two types of examples: “tracing examples” and “manipulation cases” 
                                               
65 Consider, a case where an agent is, at some stage in her life, exposed to subliminal messaging that 
results in a powerful (but not irresistible) desire to kick her cat whenever she hears the word 
“Frankfurt.”  In this case, the agent is still reasons-responsive and seems to meet requirements (I), (II) 
and (III), but according to Fischer and Ravizza, she is not morally responsible, as the actual-sequence 
mechanism does not meet the historical requirements for ownership. Their argument is that since the 
agent is unaware of the actual mechanism at work in this example, she cannot take responsibility for 
this mechanism. 
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(Bratman, 2000: 455). In tracing examples the agent acts out of a non-reasons-
responsive mechanism, yet is still morally responsible because “the non-
responsiveness of the mechanism is a predictable consequence of an earlier action that 
flowed from a reasons-responsive mechanism.” This would help in cases such as 
certain examples of drunk driving, where the moral responsibility carries over, so to 
speak, from a preceding reasons-responsive decision. 
The second type of example – manipulation cases – is trickier; here the goal is to 
capture the intuitive idea that if an agent’s actual-sequence mechanism is manipulated 
is a suitable way (such as certain cases of hypnosis, brainwashing, subliminal 
advertising and direct stimulation of the brain) then the agent does not “own” the 
results in the appropriate way for moral responsibility. To make sense of this intuition 
within the frame of their argument, Fischer and Ravizza assert that the agent cannot 
take responsibility for the actual-sequence mechanism at work, as this mechanism is 
epistemically opaque to her. As such, she does not have ownership of it, so she does 
not qualify as having guidance control. Although they do not explicate it as such, I 
think we can describe this historical requirement in terms of a specification of the 
content of (III), let us call it (III*): in order to take responsibility for an actual-
sequence mechanism, the evidence an agent uses to justify (I) and (II) must include 
awareness of the actual history of that actual-sequence mechanism. Thus, even though 
they explicitly set out to provide an account of the volitional condition while setting 
aside the epistemic one, the ownership condition introduces certain epistemic 
demands that the agent must meet to have guidance control. 
This aspect of Fischer and Ravizza’s argument – the ownership requirements for 
guidance control – is probably the aspect that has met with the most criticism. Alfred 
Mele (2006) argues that the subjective requirement makes the door for moral 
responsibility too narrow. It seems unproblematic to assume that in at least some 
cases an agent could be morally responsible even though she does not see herself as a 
legitimate target for reactive attitudes. Mele expresses this criticism using an example 
that runs like this: Imagine Sarah. Sarah is a committed hard incompatibilist, and so 
does not see herself as a legitimate target for reactive attitudes. Sarah, like most 
people, sometimes engages in telling lies to improve her own situation. Although it 
seems clear that the we would find Sarah to be morally blameworthy for her lying, 
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since Sarah does not believe herself to be a legitimate target for reactive attitudes, it 
appears that Fischer would have to conclude that Sarah is not morally responsible for 
these lies. Similar examples, where one or the other of the subjective requirements is 
absent and leading to seemingly counterintuitive results, are not difficult to imagine. 
Like Mele, Pereboom (2007) advances a criticism using an example: Imagine Susan. 
Susan has been created by neuroscientists such that they are able to modify her 
reasoning so that she reasons egoistically when they flip a switch. She remains 
reasons-responsive, and she is unaware of this manipulation and so holds the 
necessary beliefs for ownership. The manipulation is of such an art that even 
knowledge of the causal history of her actual-sequence mechanism (which is not itself 
manipulated by the neuroscientists) would not provide her with evidence to relinquish 
these beliefs. If her now egoist reasoning causes her to ignore a moral reason in 
favour of self-gain, would she be morally responsible? Fischer (2004: 158) says 
“yes,” with the important caveat that even if Susan is morally responsible in this case, 
she is not blameworthy. Using my terminology, Fischer is maintaining that Sarah is 
open to moral responsibility, but should not be held morally responsible. What makes 
this so implausible is that usually when an agent is open to moral responsibility for an 
action with moral valence, the agent can be held responsible. Indeed, this seems like a 
necessary relationship. That said, Fischer could potentially defend his position by 
arguing that although moral blame may not be legitimated, the reactive attitudes 
associated with what Williams (1976) calls agent-regret may be justified, which 
softens the implausibility. That said, this remains a shortcoming that his approach 
struggles to deal with in a wholly satisfactory fashion. 
Michael Bratman (2000: 454-458), despite agreeing that “[m]oral responsibility may 
be globally historical,” contends that the arguments presented by Fischer and Ravizza 
are insufficient to show that this is the case. He argues that the tracing examples only 
show that sometimes, in some cases, the history of behaviour can play an important 
role in determining moral responsibility. This is insufficient to show that the history is 
a necessary consideration in regard to moral responsibility. On the other hand, he 
argues that Fischer and Ravizza’s lack of exposition regarding the exact mechanism 
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by which reasons lead to actions means that their treatment of manipulation cases falls 
well short of proving what they claim it proves.66 
Overall then compatibilists are best off arguing that it is the reason-responsive 
component of guidance control (or some similar AS replacement thereof), without the 
addition of an ownership condition, that is necessary for moral responsibility, and that 
this type of control is compatible with the truth of determinism. Indeed, the influence 
of this understanding of the control condition might be best evinced from Pereboom’s 
(2007: 199) admission, despite his position as a hard incompatibilist and his criticisms 
of the ownership requirement, that: 
 I suspect I can agree with Fischer on the following claim: his theory of moral 
responsibility – guidance control spelled out in terms of reasons-responsiveness 
– provides the most promising account of what might be the most significant 
sense of moral responsibility that can be retained given the best philosophical 
arguments and the best scientific theories we have about the physical world. 
For her part, Sartorio (2016) proffers an AS replacement for Fischer and Ravizza’s 
understanding of reason-responsiveness. She argues that their understanding fails to 
capture the crucial insight of the AS model: that only facts pertaining to the actual 
sequence should be relevant to determining the presence of control, what she calls the 
“Exclusiveness thought” (ibid.: 113). She contends that their view involves the 
consideration of facts concerning merely possible worlds, rather than exclusively 
those pertaining to the actual sequence, since in their account it is necessary to 
consider certain modal properties of the actual-sequence mechanism. In contrast, on 
her account the absence of certain reasons in of themselves reflects an agent’s 
sensitivity to reasons, without any need to make claims about possible worlds. By 
absence of a reason here is meant both that the reason was not present, or that the 
agent does not take there to be such a reason. So, when an agent fails to take some 
consideration as a reason to act, this “absence” of a reason explains the agent’s 
behaviour, and reflects the agent’s sensitivity to reasons, as much as the reasons to 
which the agent did in fact respond. I consider both Fischer and Ravizza’s, and 
                                               
66 To appreciate the full scope of these challenges to Fischer’s arguments, see Bratman, 2000; 
Pereboom, 2007; Mele, 2006. 
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Sartorio’s accounts to be live options, and will not adjudicate between them in this 
dissertation. 
As mentioned already, Fischer and Ravizza take their account of guidance control to 
explain only the volitional condition, explicitly setting the epistemic condition aside. 
Starting from the opposite direction, many volitionist accounts begins with the very 
compelling claim that “morally responsible agency is (directly or indirectly) 
conscious agency” (Levy, 2008: 214).  The defenders of this claim are keen to point 
out that only that behaviour that results from conscious control can be open to moral 
responsibility, since: 
Consciousness serves the function of allowing parts of the brain that are 
otherwise relatively isolated from each other to communicate… The global 
workspace [of conscious thought] allows all the mechanisms constitutive of the 
agent, personal and subpersonal, conscious and unconscious, to contribute to the 
process of decision-making. Hence conscious deliberation is properly reflective 
of the entire person, including her consciously endorsed values. (ibid.: 220) 
This position has an obvious appeal, after all, we ourselves feel most immediately 
responsible for our conscious choices. It can also be argued that such consciousness is 
necessary to meet the epistemic condition for control: i.e. for an agent to know what 
they are doing; the agent must be consciously aware of doing so. Levy (2011: 114-
116) pushes this further, arguing that not only must the agent be consciously aware of 
the behaviour in question, but “must properly appreciate the significance of bringing 
about that state of affairs, where the significance of a state of affairs consists of the 
features which provide reasons for bringing it about (often, but not always, moral 
reasons).” On a view of this sort, moral blameworthiness would seem to be limited to 
akratic behaviour, and moral ignorance would always exculpate. 
Yet as we say in Section 2, it certainly does not seem the case that we limit the 
behaviours for which we hold ourselves and others blameworthy to those that are 
under conscious control. To illustrate this, consider these three examples: 
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Unthinking rescuer: Owen is standing in a subway station waiting for his train. 
Suddenly, another man falls onto the tracks below. Without hesitation, and without 
deliberation or thought to the consequences, Owen jumps down and pushes the other 
man flat between the tracks as the train passes over them both. By doing this Owen 
saves the other man’s life. When asked afterwards about his actions, Owen says, “I 
didn’t even realise I had jumped down until I had done it, not consciously anyway.” 
Forgetting: Mike has driven to the store with his infant child in a baby chair on the 
back seat. Having arrived at the store, Mike leaves his child in the vehicle, planning to 
only step out for a few minutes. In the store, Mike runs into an old friend who begins 
to chat with him, and Mike forgets about his child in the car. After a long 
conversation, Mike makes his way back to the car to find that the child has sadly died 
of heat exhaustion. When asked about these actions Mike replies, “I forgot about him, 
it entirely slipped my mind.” 
Unconscious bias: Greg is a lecturer at a university, and is busy grading papers. Greg 
has an unconscious bias against female students, tending to award them lower grades 
than their comparable male peers. When confronted about this discrepancy by a 
female student, and consequently made aware of his bias, Greg says, “I hadn’t 
realised that I had been influenced by this unconscious bias.” 
In all three cases it seems reasonable to say that we would find all three these agents 
to be morally responsible for their actions: Owen being praiseworthy, while Mike and 
Greg are blameworthy. There may be some doubts about the case of Mike, but even if 
this example is not compelling the cases of Owen and Greg surely are. This would 
appear to be so even though in none of these cases does the agent in question have 
conscious control over the morally pertinent behaviour, because in none of them does 
the agent have sufficient epistemic access to what they’re doing and/or the reasons 
they are doing it for or should not be doing it for. For Levy, this leads to the 
conclusion that none of these agents should be held morally responsible (disregarding 
for the moment the possibility of tracing, which will be discussed shortly), but this is 
a radical revision of our responsibility practices, and though Levy and others67 may be 
prepared to accept such a revision, I argue it should be resisted if possible. And 
                                               
67 Such as Pereboom (2007; 2013) and G. Strawson (1994) for example. 
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attributivist accounts claim to offer an alternative account of moral responsibility that 
can justify such resistance, as we will see in the next section. 
There are attempts by volitionists to put forward less revisionary responses to the 
types of cases presented here, and such attempts frequently make use of the notion of 
tracing as introduced in the discussion of guidance control. The idea here is that an 
agent could be open to responsibility for some given behaviour even though that 
behaviour was not under her control (usually, but not necessarily, due to a failure to 
meet the epistemic condition) provided that the behaviour in question can be shown to 
originate from some foregoing behaviour – what Smith (1983) calls the benighting 
act, though in this case act could include an omission or effect – that was under 
appropriate control. The paradigmatic example of this is that of the drunk driver: 
Drinker is drinking at a bar. He gets so drunk that he is no longer able to respond to 
the moral reasons not to drive while drunk. He gets in his car and drives, resulting in a 
collision with another vehicle that is Drinker’s fault. In this case, though Drinker did 
not have conscious control over his conduct, he is still open to responsibility as the 
causing of the collision can be traced back to a point in the past where Drinker had a 
moral reason not to keep drinking without planning for his trip home, but continued to 
drink. This would then be the benighting act, as Drinker had conscious control over it. 
However, this strategy of tracing has serious limitations. It does not seem that all, or 
indeed many, of the sorts of non-consciously controlled behaviours for which we seek 
to hold agents responsible can be traced back in this way. There is also the additional 
problem that such tracing explanations can be thought to misidentify the locus of 
responsibility. In other words, it seems wrong to say that Drinker is morally 
responsible only for his decision to keep drinking, rather we want to say that he is 
responsible for the collision he caused. We have not heard the last of tracing, as it 
plays a role (though a limited one) in my own account, but for now we move on to 
consider if attributivist accounts can provide a more compelling approach to 
understanding moral responsibility. 
3.2. Attributivism 
Given the limitations of volitionism, it should be no surprise that non-volitionist 
accounts have risen as competitors. The most influential such competing account is 
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that of attributivism, which comes in several flavours: character based accounts, real 
or deep self accounts, and Quality of Will (QoW) accounts. As was explained earlier, 
what unites this wide variety of approaches is that they all contend that a given 
behaviour can only be the basis for an agent being open to responsibility if that 
behaviour is genuinely revelatory of the agent who performs it. The different 
approaches are differentiated by how they answer the question: what exactly must be 
revealed? Character-based accounts (often called Neo-Humean accounts), as might be 
readily guessed, argue that what must be revealed is some aspect of the agent’s 
character. Real self accounts differ in that what must be revealed is taken to either be 
the agent’s Appetites (Frankfurt proposes a seminal example of this approach), or the 
agent’s Reason (which is the approach favoured by Watson). Finally, QoW accounts 
argue that what must be revealed is the quality of the agent’s will, which is usually 
understood in terms of the degree and quality of care exhibited by the agent. It is the 
last of these approaches to which I will be giving most of my attention – as they are, 
to my mind, the most compelling as well as the most pervasive in the recent literature 
– but before this it is worth considering some shortcomings of the alternatives. 
Straightforward character-based versions of attributivism will always have the 
difficulty of accounting for “out of character” behaviour, examples of which seem to 
be plentiful. A man may be miserly and close-fisted, but in one extraordinary – and 
perhaps personally mystifying – instance he gives out money to pay for the food, bed, 
and board of a destitute and desperate person. It seems that the man should be 
considered praiseworthy for this, even though the action does not in fact reveal his 
character, which is in fact niggardly. The same is true (even more vividly so) when 
considering blame. We could imagine an agent with a morally upright character who, 
in what is again an extraordinary instance where he himself might struggle to 
reconcile it within himself, performs some morally bad action – say, kicking his dog 
for no reason, or brutally mocking a co-worker in front of others. These out of 
character moments might often have explanations: the miserly man might have 
recently heard that his grandson was born, and unbeknownst to him been moved by 
this to act in an uncharacteristic fashion, and the morally upright man might have had 
a night of terrible insomnia that frayed his temper. Now these explanations might 
move us to reduce the degree of responsibility present, or to excuse the behaviour, but 
it seems implausible to think that the agents are not responsible at all. However, if we 
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hold that the actions for which an agent can be held morally responsible are only 
those that reveal the agent’s actual character, then these actions would simply not fit 
the bill. 
Moving away from talk of character, or at least employing a different understanding 
of what the relevant notion of character should be, so-called “real self” or “deep self” 
accounts68 contend that what an agent’s behaviour must reveal is one of either the 
agent’s Appetites or Reason. By Appetites is meant the agent’s desires, and usually 
the focus has been on the agent’s higher-order desires (Frankfurt, 1988). In contrast, 
the agent’s Reason is identified with her evaluative judgements (Scanlon, 2008), 
beliefs, or valuational system (Watson, 2004). In simple terms, both Appetite and 
Reason form important facets of the character of an agent, ones that can be revealed 
by an agent’s behaviour (and attitudes, though I do not discuss these), but different 
real self accounts disagree on which of the two reflects the genuine agent. As it turns 
out, either path leads to serious objections: Appetite views struggle in accounting for 
responsibility in cases where an agent acts against her desires, up to and including her 
higher-order ones. This is most apparent in cases where the agent acts in a 
praiseworthy fashion against her desires, such as in the example put forward by 
Arpaly and Schroeder (1999: 171) of “a person who commits a brave moral act 
despite continuous desire for escape.” Similarly, Reason views struggle with 
responsibility in cases of akrasia and inverse akrasia. By inverse akrasia is meant a 
case where an agent acts in line with the balance of reasons, but takes herself to be 
acting against it – the classic example being Hursthouse’s (1991) discussion of Huck 
Finn. In these cases, the agent’s actions are not reflecting their valuational systems or 
evaluative judgements, or their beliefs about what they should do, and so on a Reason 
view of the real self approach, they could not be morally responsible for them. 
In the face of these shortcomings, some have attempted to provide more integrated 
notions of the real self, such as the “whole self” account put forward by Arpaly and 
Schroeder (1999). On this account, 
                                               
68 Some use the term “attributivist” to refer specifically and only to proponents of the real self 
approach. Though I recognize this usage, it will not be what I mean by the term in this work. As 
mentioned before, I will be using the term to refer to a family of non-volitionists approaches. 
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other things being equal, an agent is more praiseworthy for a good action, or 
more blameworthy for a bad action, the more the morally relevant psychological 
factors underlying it are integrated with her overall personality. (ibid.: 172) 
The psychological factors in question here are desires and beliefs. And for them to be 
well-integrated they must be (i) deep, and (ii) not in opposition to other deeply held 
beliefs or desires. Depth is determined by the degree to which a psychological factor 
determines an agent’s behaviour. Beliefs oppose each other when they cannot be 
simultaneously true, desires when they cannot be simultaneously satisfied 
This combined model does give Arpaly and Schroeder leeway in tackling the 
problems that confront real self accounts that focus solely on Appetite or Reason, 
though it is not without objections.69 However, in their more recent book, In Praise of 
Desire, they have developed a more clearly desire-centered account of responsibility. 
According to this account, what must be revealed in order for an agent to be 
blameworthy or praiseworthy are facts about her intrinsic desires. To be blameworthy 
for an action is “to act out of ill will (an intrinsic desire for the wrong or bad) or 
indifference to the lure of the right or good,” (2013: 159) and vice versa in the case of 
praiseworthiness. They argue that acting for moral reasons necessarily involves acting 
from an intrinsic desire for the right or the good, and that it is behaviour caused by 
intentions backed by such reasons that form the basis for moral responsibility (2013: 
87). There remain difficulties here, particularly with how Arpaly and Schroeder deal 
with addiction and habits. In attempting to explain why addiction should serve as an 
excuse on their account – a challenge since an addict seems like a paradigmatic 
example of an agent acting from an intrinsic desire – they claim that the actions of the 
addict stems from habit rather than from desire. This is a problematic response, as it is 
unclear, and rather implausible, that actions that spring from habit are inherently less 
blameworthy than those that spring from desire – indeed, an agent for whom cruelty 
has become a habit seems in some ways more blameworthy (Holton, 2015). 
Criticisms aside, given the talk of good and ill will in Arpaly and Schroeder’s 
account, I am inclined to consider it as an example of the QoW approach, to which I 
                                               
69 See Shoemaker (2015b) for a strong critique of the Whole Self view. 
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now turn. Another compelling example of a QoW account – and the one I take to be 
the most promising attributivist account overall – is the explanatory quality of will 
account recently developed by Björnsson (2017a; 2017b). Central to this account, he 
argues for the following condition on moral responsibility (2017a: 148): 
MORAL EXPLANATORY BLAME (CREDIT): X deserves moral blame 
(credit) for Y if and only if Y is morally bad (good) and is explained in a normal 
way by X’s quality of will falling below (above) what could be properly 
morally demanded of X 
By quality of will here he means (ibid.: 149): 
[H]ow well she cares about what is morally important, where caring about 
something in the relevant sense involves being disposed to pay particular 
attention to information relevant for promoting or not obstructing the object of 
caring and to have one’s behavior be guided by such information.70 
And the blame and praise (or credit) involved can come by degrees (2017a: 148): 
DEGREE FROM DEVIATION: The degree of blame (credit) X deserves for Y 
depends on the value of the outcome and on how much of a deviation of the 
agential aspect from what can be properly demanded is required in the normal 
explanation of the object of blame (credit). 
                                               
70 This idea of caring for what is morally important is very similar to Arpaly and Schroeder’s notion of 
the good understood in terms of intrinsic desires. To care about what is morally important could be 
understood as having an intrinsic desire for the right or good. Yet there is a noteworthy difference, that 
being that for the latter pair of thinkers a good will can also be a case of indifference to the temptation 
of the intrinsic desire for the wrong or bad, and ill will can be the result not only of an indifference to 
the intrinsic desire for the good, but also an intrinsic desire for the wrong or bad. I am inclined to agree 
with Björnsson here. We can imagine an agent who is incapable of possessing the intrinsic desire for 
the right or good – we might say, incapable of care for what is morally important – but who does 
possess the intrinsic desire for the wrong or bad. Such a being, let’s call it Demon, would not seem to 
be an apt target for moral responsibility. Our moral responses would be meaningless in this case. Our 
response to such an entity would presumably be to treat them as we might treat a dangerously insane 
person. In a similar vein, to be indifferent to the intrinsic desire for the wrong or bad does not seem 
praiseworthy unless the reason for this indifference stems from the right source. It seems more accurate 
to say that acting from good will means acting from the intrinsic desire for the right or good, and acting 
from ill will means acting with insufficient responsiveness to this desire. 
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A central concern of Björnsson in developing this account is that it must explain 
under what conditions a lack of awareness excuses an agent from responsibility, as 
well as how to understand the fact that in our responsibility practices we often hold 
agents responsible for failing to respond to considerations that they should have 
known. He is most keen to reject the position of certain volitionist accounts that 
demand such a stringent epistemic condition on moral responsibility that such 
responsibility would be limited to akratic behaviours. However, he goes further than 
this rejection. He argues that there is no need for either a separate volitional or 
epistemic condition – as volitionists might claim71 – once his explanatory quality of 
will condition is suitably understood. To arrive at such a suitable understanding, two 
crucial elements need to be expanded upon: what is meant by the phrase, “explained 
in a normal way”? And what determines the degree of care that can be “properly 
demanded” of an agent. 
To the first of these we are given the following explanation (2017b: 150): 
In addition, the explanation has to be normal in some relevant sense. Suppose 
that I am just about to finish a decent kitchen cabinet in spite of my poor 
craftsmanship, when some spiteful person secretly changes the dimensions of 
some of the parts because they think that someone with my laughable skills 
doesn’t deserve a nice cabinet. Then the end result is a bad cabinet, and it is bad 
in part because of my poor craftsmanship — it is what triggered the sabotage. 
Still, since the explanation is abnormal, I am not to blame for the cabinet’s sorry 
state. 
Björnsson (2017b: note 6) also mentions that what makes an explanation a normal one 
is not merely likelihood, and that the cases that should be taken as relevant must be 
those that the practice in question is designed to track. However, he also recognizes 
that this is less than a complete account of the normalcy requirement. Despite this, if 
we take a more or less intuitive sense of normalcy (like that pointed to by the example 
                                               
71 As with the role of control generally, it should not be thought that attributivist accounts (such as 
those of Watson, Scanlon or Arpaly and Schroeder for example) reject that epistemic considerations do 
sometimes play a role in determining responsibility. However, they do reject that there is a necessary 
and determinate epistemic condition on moral responsibility. Rather, lack of awareness or appropriate 
belief only matters when this breaks the link between an agent’s behaviour and the morally relevant 
feature of the agent. In this regard, Björnsson’s account is in line with the general attributivist strategy. 
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of the kitchen cabinet-maker), we can see that it would not be abnormal to think that, 
at least sometimes, an agent’s degree of care can explain some morally valent 
behaviour, X, without the agent having conscious control over X, or perhaps even 
having the unaccessed belief that she is X’ing. However, as we will see in Section 4.3, 
I argue that the explanatory quality of will account can be improved by developing a 
more detailed understanding of the notion of normalcy at work, and combining this 
with an endorsement of pluralism about moral responsibility. 
The second element, determining what degree of care can be properly demanded of an 
agent, is directly answered by the provision of the following principle (2017a: 149): 
DEMAND FROM CAPACITY: The degree to which it can be properly 
demanded that X cares about something depends only on X’s capacity for so 
caring, not on how X came to care to the degree she does 
DEMAND FROM CAPACITY indicates a limit to the question of both how historical 
and how deep the explanatory quality of will account goes. I take this to be a virtue of 
the account, as it helps the account capture responsibility in out-of-character cases and 
so-called manipulation cases without having to posit claims about the history of the 
agent or the agent’s actual-sequence mechanism – contra Fischer and Ravizza.  So, 
for example, an agent who has been manipulated by neuroscientists into having a 
reduced capacity for care, would not be expected to demonstrate the same degree of 
care as she would have had the manipulation not taken place. And this is no different 
to the case in which this reduction was the result of something less out of the 
ordinary, such as poor formative circumstances or substance use. This is important, 
since it means that whether or not the agent in question was aware of the reduction to 
their capacity to care, and aware of the history behind it, is irrelevant for determining 
if this capacity is present. At the same time, reductions in the capacity to care will 
reduce the openness of the agent to blame, both in terms of the types of cases where 
she will count as blameworthy, and more usually the degree to which she will be 
blameworthy. It also has an advantage over Arpaly and Schroeder’s desire QoW 
account since it allows the explanatory quality of will account to makes sense of 
responsibility in cases of addiction, as in such cases it is plausible to say that the 
agent’s capacity for caring is impaired. This would explain why the presence of 
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addiction of a certain sort seems to diminish the degree of responsibility an agent 
might have for a behaviour, or indeed, if the case is extreme enough, be exculpatory. 
Turning back to the epistemic condition, it should be clear that though at times a lack 
of awareness or belief may break the explanatory link between behaviour and quality 
of care, there are many cases where it will not. And it seems plausible to think that 
those cases where it does not are precisely those cases where we would still want to 
be able to legitimately attribute responsibility, such as in Unthinking rescuer, 
Forgetting, and Unconscious bias. Admittedly, much hinges on exactly how the 
notion of normalcy at work in MORAL EXPLANATORY BLAME (CREDIT) is 
fleshed out, but overall I take this account to be the strongest attributivist option. 
3.3.Concluding remarks 
There are three important conclusions from this section. The first is an observation, 
and the remaining two are my judgements as to the most compelling contender from 
each of the two approaches discussed. 
The observation in question is that all the accounts of responsibly considered here, 
volitionist and attributivist (of all stripes), begin with the assumption that for an agent 
to be open to responsibility on the basis of some behaviour requires that this 
behaviour say something about the agent in question. The accounts differ on what this 
something should be: for the volitionists it tends to be volitional and rational agency, 
whereas for the attributivists it has been taken to be character, Appetite, Reason or 
care (which may or may not be best understood as an intrinsic desire). 
In terms of volitionist accounts, I take the volitional condition on moral responsibility 
to be best understood as reason-responsiveness, whereas a compelling account of the 
epistemic condition remains elusive. Neither the demand for conscious awareness 
endorsed by Levy, nor the ownership condition introduced by Fischer and Ravizza – 
which though not explicitly an epistemic condition does smuggle in requirements 
about what an agent must know to be open to responsibility – are promising 
candidates. And examples such as Unthinking rescuer, Forgetting, and Unconscious 
bias seem to be deeply problematic for volitionist accounts because of this. So, 
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although there remains something persuasive in the idea that some form of control is 
important for moral responsibility, it seems that the volitionist claim that this 
relationship is necessary has an uphill challenge before it. 
When it comes to attributivist accounts, character-based and real self accounts 
struggle to deal with certain counterexamples, and given that the allure of 
attributivism is not insignificantly tied to its ability to capture a wider gamut of our 
responsibility practices than volitionism, counterexamples such as these cannot be 
easily dismissed. QoW accounts, on the other hand (at least those of Arpaly and 
Schroeder, and Björnsson), take the agent’s moral concern directly – understood 
either as her intrinsic desire for the right or good (or lack thereof), or as the degree of 
care for what is morally important – as that which must be revealed in, or explanatory 
of, a behaviour in order for an agent to be morally responsible for it. Though either 
approach is in a better position to deal with the counterexamples than the accounts 
that went before, Björnsson’s explanatory account has the advantage of more 
plausibly explaining cases where the presence of addiction seems to reduce an agent’s 
fittingness for moral responsibility, thanks to DEMAND FROM CAPACITY. For 
these reasons the explanatory quality of will account strikes me as the best contender 
amongst the attributivist accounts, and I will be borrowing substantially from it in 
developing my own account of responsibility in Section 4.3. and 5. 
4. Ambivalence and pluralism 
In this section I will present what I take to be a serious objection to both volitionist 
and attributivist accounts of moral responsibility, and then propose a potential 
solution. The objection in question is that neither of these types of accounts can 
properly capture those cases of moral responsibility where we experience an abiding 
and deep ambivalence about the kind of moral response that the given case calls for. 
To explain this objection, I first describe two important assumptions that pervade 
many accounts of moral responsibility: invariantism and conservatism. The first of 
these holds that the conditions for moral responsibility should be invariant, or 
exceptionless, while the second acts as a criterion for choosing between theories of 
moral responsibility by asserting that a theory of moral responsibility is more 
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convincing than another, all else equal, if the former captures more of our 
responsibility practices. 
Having introduced these two assumptions, I then present an argument for why they 
cannot be mutually held, and furthermore, that invariantism about moral 
responsibility should be rejected. The argument I present leans on one already 
eloquently made by David Shoemaker (2015a): that there are some cases of moral 
responsibility where our experience is not one of indecision regarding whether moral 
responsibility is present, but rather ambivalence about which of our moral responses 
seem to be legitimated by the responsibility present. I will argue that no invariantist 
account of moral responsibility can hope to capture this ambivalence, and that 
capturing it would strengthen an account of moral responsibility in line with 
conservatism. As such, we should adopt a variantist or pluralist understanding of 
moral responsibility, as this is the best match for our actual responsibility practices. In 
particular, I will defend a dual model of moral responsibility based somewhat on that 
put forward by Watson (2004). On this model, there are two distinct types or variants 
of moral responsibility: attributability and accountability. Despite this, and contra 
Shoemaker, I will argue that this pluralism should not be understood disjunctively, as 
any case where moral accountability is present, moral attributability must also be 
present, though not vice versa. 
I will conclude by contending that accepting this pluralism allows us to see that in 
many cases the dispute between volitionists and attributivists rests on an equivocation 
about what is meant by an agent being open to moral responsibility. Where 
volitionists take the moral responsibility at stake to be accountability, attributivists are 
primarily concerned with attributability. 
4.1. Invariantism and Conservatism 
As I have discussed, there have been many and varied accounts of moral 
responsibility put forward over the years. However, regardless of the interpretation of 
moral responsibility being advanced, for most of this history it was almost universally 
presumed that the concept of moral responsibility is unequivocal and unitary. In other 
words, it was presumed that there is only a single “variant” of moral responsibility, 
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and that this single version covers all cases that we would refer to as cases of moral 
responsibility, cases where an agent is a legitimate target for moral praise or moral 
blame. This is obviously not meant to imply that all agents that are morally 
responsible are equally blameworthy or praiseworthy. On almost all accounts, some 
actions will presumably be deemed praiseworthy while others are counted as 
blameworthy, and both praise and blame will come by degrees. Regardless, these 
differences are not considered to be the result of differences in what it means to hold 
an agent morally responsible. Rather, the difference lies in the fact that what they are 
morally responsible for has a different moral valence. 
The most common form this kind of thinking takes runs (loosely) as follows: it is 
assumed that there are some moral principles of right action. When an agent violates 
one or more of these principles, she is potentially morally responsible for this. 
Presuming that shoplifting and murder both violate accepted moral principles of right 
action, an agent who shoplifts and an agent who murders are both morally responsible 
for their actions. We may well treat these agents differently – the murderer may be a 
legitimate target for more severe responses than the shoplifter for example, as we 
think of the murder as more blameworthy – but this difference is not because the 
agents are morally responsible in different ways. This is the case regardless of 
whether we adopt a volitionist or attributivist stance. If we adopt a volitionist view, 
then the degree of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness will depend on the moral 
valence of the behaviour in question, as well as the agent’s degree of control over it. It 
seems uncontroversial to assume that in most cases (if not all) where the two agents 
have equal control we will rule that the murderer will deserve more blame than the 
shoplifter, though if the murderer was suffering from a severe psychological condition 
that undermines control it is possible that this verdict may alter, depending on the 
question of degrees. On the other hand, if we adopt an attributivist view, then 
although the moral valence of the behaviour will still play the same role, the 
appropriate reaction will in this case be determined by the extent to which the given 
behaviour reveals whatever morally relevant feature of the agent the particular 
attributivist account we employ puts forward, and the quality of this agential feature. 
The recognition that moral blame and praise comes by degrees is proper and 
necessary for any compelling account of moral responsibility, given how this is a 
central feature of our responsibility practices, however, as we will see, there is a 
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problem that emerges from the endorsement of an understanding of moral 
responsibility that comes only by degrees. 
Turning back to the assumption that moral responsibility is unitary: even in accounts 
of moral responsibility that do not assume any pre-given moral principles of right 
action – such as Strawson’s (1962) influential account – moral responsibility is still 
treated as unambiguously unitary. To be held morally responsible always means the 
same thing, though there are differences in degree, and in the results of being held so 
responsible. Part of the motivation for this way of thinking about moral responsibility 
is not difficult to surmise. In everyday language, after all, we do not talk about 
different types of moral responsibility, though we do talk about degree. Indeed, it 
often seems that the question of whether an agent is morally responsible for a given 
activity or its outcomes can be decided in complete independence from the question 
of what would follow from this responsibility. However, even on the consequentialist 
view, on which an agent is only to be held morally responsible when doing so brings 
about desired changes in the agent or the agent’s behaviour (or in the behaviour of 
other agents), and so one cannot determine whether an agent is a legitimate target for 
moral responsibility without considering the consequences, it remains the case that 
the conditions for moral responsibility can be formulated as an invariant principle. 
In contrast to this longstanding presumption, there is a trend in a considerable amount 
of the recent work surrounding moral responsibility to move away from a view that 
takes the discussion to be concerned with a single, unitary, and invariant concept of 
moral responsibility, and towards one that takes the discussion to involve a number of 
different, but related, concepts of responsibility. This movement has found its 
contemporary impetus in the work of Gary Watson (2004), with David Shoemaker 
(2015a) as perhaps its most sophisticated proponent. Adopting this position seems to 
hold the promise of helping to dissolve some of the longstanding oppositions in the 
discussion – such as between volitionists and attributivists – by revealing that the 
opposing accounts simply have different concepts of moral responsibility as their 
objects, and that the disagreement arises from a failure to distinguish between these 
different, but related, concepts. Despite the facts of everyday language use mentioned 
above, these more recent discussions around moral responsibility have often focused 
on the question of whether the concept of moral responsibility is indeed unitary as the 
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traditional views take it to be. There seems to be a growing position that there may be 
several, co-extant and equally essential, variants of moral responsibility.72 
To understand the structure of the argument supporting this move, it is useful to start 
with the insights outlined in Doris, Knobe, and Woolfolk’s 2007 paper, “Variantism 
About Responsibility”. In this work, the authors identify what they call “two dogmas 
of responsibility” (2007: 183), namely: invariantism and conservatism. They then 
proceed to argue that, given experimental evidence drawn from a number of survey 
experiments, both these dogmas cannot be simultaneously maintained. An invariantist 
account is one that posits “exceptionlessly relevant criteria for responsibility 
attribution” and requires that the same criteria be employed in any given case (2007:  
184). Most accounts of responsibility endorse invariantism in this sense, though it 
should be noted that invariant criteria can be very complex, vague, or posit 
“paradigms or prototypes” as opposed to necessary and sufficient conditions. 
However, this added nuance does not alter the reality that these accounts aim at the 
provision of some exceptionless principle that will serve to govern our attribution of 
moral responsibility. For illustration of the widespread nature of the endorsement of 
this “dogma,” Doris et al. presents the necessary conditions for moral responsibility 
that have been advanced by a number of different thinkers, in order to display their 
tacit assumption of invariantism. These include the common conditions of source and 
leeway incompatibilist accounts, and the compatibilist accounts of Frankfurt (1988), 
Wolf (1990), and Fischer and Ravizza (1998).73 Not wishing to reproduce every 
example given in their argument, I will present only three here. In the case of source 
incompatibilism this condition is that the agent must be the ultimate source of her 
behaviour – the “ultimacy” condition – whereas in leeway incompatibilism it is the 
presence of alternate possibilities (Kane, 2002: 2007, and Haji, 2002). As an example 
from the compatibilist position, they present Frankfurt’s condition that the responsible 
agent must suitably identify with her behaviour and motives in the form of their 
higher-order attitudes. To add to this list, even free will skeptic accounts, such as that 
of Galen Strawson (1994), still posit invariant conditions for moral responsibility, 
                                               
72 See Watson, 2004, Darwall, 2006, McKenna, 2012, Arpaly and Schroeder, 2013, Scanlon, 2015, and 
Shoemaker, 2015a amongst others. 
73 It is worth noting that Fischer and Ravizza do in fact recognize that there may be other variants of 
moral responsibility, and so are not truly invariantist as Doris et al. takes them to be. 
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with the important caveat that they simply maintain that these conditions are never 
actually met. 
By conservatism is meant the view that “folk belief is a constraint on philosophical 
theorizing” (Doris et al., 2007: 185). One way to understand this constraint is to point 
out that an account of moral responsibility that falls too far afield of the actual 
practices of moral responsibility for which it is meant to account runs the risk of 
answering the wrong question. After all, we are interested in how to understand the 
moral responsibility we have. Given the strong reliance on cases, and the intuitions 
they elicit, by thinkers on all sides of the discussion of moral responsibility, it seems 
clear that some presumption of conservatism is prevalent throughout the literature. 
Even when the thinkers of a given view argue against some set of practices, as hard 
determinists may do in the case of blaming or praising practices in their entirety, they 
often precede by starting from a folk response to some case, and then generalizing this 
response in order to show that it stands in contradiction to other responses and/or 
practices.74 Doris et al. also note that a commitment to conservatism does not mean 
that the folk are assumed to be infallible. Rather the situation is more like that of 
Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium” (ibid.), as we seek a coherent balance between our 
particular judgements and our general principles. So though in some cases we can 
surely say that the folk are in error (which may demand an appropriate error theory), 
an account which conserves more of the folk responses than another, ceteris paribus, 
should be preferred. 
Doris et al. further contend that the results of recent experimental philosophy 
problematize the possibility of maintaining both invariantism and conservatism. 
These experiments have generally taken a familiar form: a group of respondents are 
provided with a case, or set of cases, involving some potentially divisive elements as 
regards the responsibility present, and are then asked to provide judgements as to the 
moral responsibility of one or more agents involved in the case. The results of these 
surveys seemingly show that folk responses are strongly variantist. It does not seem 
likely that all the disparate responses of the folk could be explained by anything 
approaching a single reasonable principle (or a small set of principles). This leaves us 
with a tension between two unsavoury options, forego conservatism about the folk 
                                               
74 A good example of this strategy is Derk Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument (2014). 
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responses, or give up invariantism. However, I will not be employing these arguments 
from the experimental literature here, partly because they are – even if true and 
compelling – only able to necessarily motivate pluralism about the conditions for the 
attribution of moral responsibility, rather than pluralism about the concept of moral 
responsibility itself. Furthermore, I think that certain attributability accounts, such as 
Björnsson’s, can in fact account for the folks’ apparently invariant responses in these 
cases, once certain confounding factors are accounted for. For these reasons, though 
the interplay between invariantism and conservatism is important, I take it to be a 
different set of cases that should convince us to adopt pluralism about moral 
responsibility. These I discuss in the next section. 
4.2. The problem of ambivalence cases and pluralist responses 
The central pillar of support for pluralism about moral responsibility is founded on 
what Shoemaker (2015a: 1-4) describes as cases of moral responsibility that engender 
in us deep ambivalence. Shoemaker provides four examples of such cases, but I will 
only consider two of them, as these are the only two that deal with responsibility for 
behaviours: 
Firstly, the example of Skip, who is a psychopath – lacking both empathy and 
conscience. He is charming, manipulative, and capable, rising to great heights in the 
company in which he works. Indeed, he makes himself so valuable to the company 
that they settle multiple lawsuits that are brought against him for sexual harassment 
and similar offenses, including one case where he broke a woman’s arm when she 
resisted his attempt to force her onto his lap. He said of this woman, “She’s insane. 
She broke her own arm. She struggled with me, the stupid bitch. Why the hell did she 
put up such a fight?” (Shoemaker, 2015a: 1). It is important to note of Skip that he is 
obtuse to calls for him to provide some moral accounting of his behaviour, as shown 
when his mother asks him shortly before his wedding to a billionaire’s daughter 
Juliette, “why he had to marry her, why he had to do this to Juliette’s life. Tempted to 
ignore her at first (as usual), Skip smiled and said, ‘We both know she’ll never know 
what hit her.’” 
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Secondly (though the fourth example Shoemaker gives), is that of Robert Harris, a 
famous serial killer. Shoemaker is not the first thinker to discuss Harris’ case, and he 
draws considerably on Watson’s (2004: 234-242, 280-281) discussion thereof. Harris 
murdered two young men and then calmly ate the fast food that they had ordered. 
Further still, he “joked” to his brothers that they should pose as police officers and 
inform the boys’ parents that their sons had been killed. Indeed, even after he was 
caught, “his loathsome personality was loathed by guards and even his fellow 
inmates” (ibid.: 3) And yet: 
Harris’s upbringing, however, was unimaginably terrible. His parents were 
alcoholics who repeatedly terrified, beat, and abused him. At 14, he was 
sentenced to a youth detention center, where he was regularly raped and beaten. 
He attempted to commit suicide twice. By the time he was 19, it is no wonder 
that he had begun killing and torturing animals. His adult criminal life had 
begun. 
What is disconcerting in these cases is that it is seems as though in some sense the 
agents can be held morally responsible: it seems right to think that Skip and Harris are 
blameworthy for their actions, certainly worthy of our disdain and contempt. Yet, it 
also seems as though in another sense they are not blameworthy: reactive attitudes 
such as angry remonstration or indignant railing seem inappropriate, and simply 
pointless in these cases. In Shoemaker’s (2015a: 3) words, when confronted with 
these cases: 
My own reaction, and the reaction of others who have written about such cases, 
is a profound unease. This is not, however, the unease of uncertainty. Rather, it 
is the unease of ambivalence. The reaction, in other words, is that these agents 
seem worthy of some responsibility responses but not others, which suggests 
that they are responsible in some ways but not in others.  
Crucially, existing theories of moral responsibility that exhibit invariantism are 
incapable of properly accounting for this. On a volitionist account such as that of 
Fischer or Levy, it seems that Skip and Harris would simply be off the hook, as for 
the former Skip would not qualify as a moral agent, and Harris is likely to fail in 
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meeting the ownership condition – not seeing himself as an apt target for reactive 
attitudes – and for the latter both Skip and Harris are incapable of meeting the 
epistemic condition on moral responsibility. Yet this conclusion strongly violates 
conservatism. An attributivist account such a Björnsson’s might find better purchase 
here, as in both cases a dearth of care seems to be the grounds for our initially 
wanting to attribute responsibility (though it may be questioned whether either of 
these agents had sufficient capacity to care). However, the explanatory quality of will 
account only comes by degrees, not type, and so without expansion it cannot explain 
why in the case of Skip and Harris it seems that some of our moral responses are 
justified, but not others. I will argue that the explanatory quality of will account can in 
fact accommodate a solution to this problem, but it requires a pluralist account of how 
to fill in “explained in a normal way” in MORAL EXPLANATORY BLAME 
(CREDIT). 
Shoemaker uses this failure of existing accounts to explain the ambivalence cases as 
support for his proposal of a tripartite theory of responsibility (2015a: 16), according 
to which there are three types of responsibility, with each conditioned by a different 
facet of the quality of an agent’s will: attributability, which is conditioned by the 
agent’s quality of character, answerability, which is conditioned by the agent’s quality 
of judgement, and finally accountability, which is conditioned by the agent’s quality 
of regard. Each of these types of responsibility also legitimate different syndromes of 
reactive attitudes toward the agent in question, namely: disdain/admiration, 
regret/pride, and anger/gratitude respectively. So, poor quality of character would 
make an agent an apt target for disdain, whereas a sufficiently good quality of regard 
would make an agent an apt target for gratitude, and so on. Importantly for my 
overarching argument, Shoemaker (2015a: 224-225) identifies accountability and the 
quality of regard as that type of responsibility and that facet of will where control 
plays a necessary role, though he understands this control differently to how the 
volitionists we’ve discussed above do – which is probably unsurprising given that 
Shoemaker’s overall strategy is still more akin to that of an attributivist. For him, the 
kind of control necessary for accountability is “empathic control”, and to have such 
control an agent must “take the facts about others’ normative perspectives as putative 
reasons or one’s responding in a simpatico emotional fashion to others is governed by 
one’s identification with them (i.e., these perceptions or responses are empathy–
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sensitive).” By his own admission, Shoemaker does not expect this control condition 
to be considered sufficiently robust by those that argue that control is necessary for 
moral accountability, but hopes to deflate this worry by stressing that even the 
harshest reactive attitudes, anger and gratitude, do not necessarily imply “harsh 
treatment”, and so “the motivation to seek out a more robust conception of control 
will just diminish.” 
Similarly, Watson argues that we should endorse pluralism to make sense of the 
ambivalence cases, but contra Shoemaker he argues for the recognition of two types 
of responsibility: aretaic and accountability. He describes how he sees the difference 
between these two variants as follows (2004: 266): 
 In one way, to blame (morally) is to attribute something to a (moral) fault in the 
agent; therefore, to call conduct shoddy is to blame the agent. But judgements 
of moral blameworthiness are also thought to involve the idea that agents 
deserve adverse treatment or “negative attitudes” in response to their faulty 
conduct. The former kinds of blaming and praising judgements are independent 
of what I am calling the practices of moral accountability. They invoke only 
attributability conditions, on which certain appraisals of the individual as an 
agent are grounded. Because many of these appraisals concern the agent’s 
excellences and faults – or virtues and vices – as manifested in thought and 
action, I shall say such judgements are made from the aretaic perspective. 
For Watson then, the primary difference in which responses the two variants of 
responsibility legitimate is that only accountability seems to justify the usual reactive 
attitudes, whereas nothing further than the attribution of moral fault is justified by 
aretaic responsibility. And in terms of the conditions necessary for each variant, he 
argues that aretaic responsibility requires the conditions usual of a Reason-based real 
self view – in this case, that the behaviour be reflective of the agent’s valuational 
system – whereas accountability (as it involves the imposition of adverse treatment to 
its target) requires that the agent meet the “control principle” or some requirement of 
avoidability (2004: 274). This further requirement is roughly understood to be some 
version of the power to have done otherwise, and Watson is skeptical that it is ever 
met. 
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What can be immediately noticed is that both accounts have certain clear similarities, 
beyond the obvious fact that they are both variantist accounts. The notion of 
attributability that Shoemaker employs is very similar to Watson’s aretaic 
responsibility, which is no accident given that Shoemaker discussed aretaic 
responsibility as an example of responsibility as attributability. They also both 
employ the notion of accountability, and both link this type of responsibility to 
control and adverse treatment. There are glaring differences as well: Shoemaker takes 
attributability to legitimate certain reactive attitudes, which Watson seemingly does 
not, Shoemaker takes quality of character to be the condition on attributability where 
Watson takes it to be the quality of the agent’s valuational system, and Shoemaker 
introduces a whole new variant of responsibility in the form of answerability.  
Despite these differences, both accounts do provide plausible answers to the problem 
posed by the ambivalence cases. It would be reasonable to think that they could 
dissolve any lingering confusion brought on by these cases: Skip and Harris are 
plausibly attributively responsible, but do not seem to be apt targets for 
accountability. And if employing Shoemaker’s framework, they would also be 
answerable. Thus, these accounts allow us to capture and conserve our practices in 
these cases. However, this does come at the cost of rejecting invariantism. It is not 
clear to me that this is any great cost however, though as we will see, this may depend 
on how the relationship between the different variants are meant to be understood. 
Confronted with the explanatory potential of variantist approaches to moral 
responsibility, a family of questions can be asked regarding how the relationship(s) 
between these variants are to be understood. Out of this family I take the two most 
significant questions to be: (1) what feature or set of features, presumably shared by 
each variant, allows us to consider the responsibility in question to be moral 
responsibility? And, (2) can the conditions for the different variants be jointly 
satisfied? 
(1) is not infrequently raised as an objection to pluralist accounts. Levy (2005) argues 
that responsibility that is not of accountability variety – that is to say, responsibility 
that does not meet a necessary control condition – is too shallow or superficial to 
count as genuine moral responsibility. These criticisms mirror and expand on those 
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presented against real self views by Wolf, who also argued that such attributability 
approaches are too shallow to be accounts of moral responsibility. On the other hand, 
it seems open to attributivists – who want to argue that control does not play a 
necessary role in determining moral responsibility – to argue that accountability is not 
a unique type of moral responsibility. It can be thought that whereas attributability 
answers the question, “is this agent morally responsible?”, accountability is concerned 
with the secondary question of “what responses does this agent being morally 
responsible legitimate?” and so is not a type of moral responsibility. Either of these is 
a likely strategy for a proponent of invariantism to employ. To be clear, even if 
successful, these strategies would require the sacrifice of a degree of conservatism, as 
the ambivalence present in these cases would be attributed to an error among the folk. 
For Levy, we are simply wrong to think that Skip or Harris merit moral responsibility, 
whereas for an invariant attributivist both agents are simply morally responsible, with 
no explanation for why these cases seem to call for different responses than would be 
the case if Skip and Harris were normally functioning human adults with normal 
formative histories who performed these same behaviours. I will not present a defense 
here of either Shoemaker or Watson’s particular variants of moral responsibility 
against this objection,75 but will discuss my defense of the variants present in my own 
pluralist account in the next section. 
Turning now to question (2). There are at least three potential answers to this 
question, all of which have been defended in the literature, namely: one can adopt the 
position of certain hard determinists – who have always claimed that the conditions 
for moral responsibility are never satisfied – and argue that these new variantist 
approaches add nothing interesting to the discussion. Alternatively, one could answer 
that these conditions can all be satisfied independently (call this the Independent 
Satisfaction position), such that the presence of any given type of responsibility is 
wholly independent of the presence of any other. Shoemaker is an example of 
someone who endorses Independent Satisfaction. Finally, one could answer that the 
conditions of one type of responsibility is partially constitutive of the conditions of 
another, such that the presence of one type of responsibility is dependent on the 
presence of another (call this the Dependent Satisfaction position). Watson is a 
                                               
75 Both thinkers provide their own defenses against these objections, see Shoemaker, 2015a, and 
Watson, 2004. 
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proponent of this position. I will be ruling out the first answer as, though it may well 
be true, I will be developing my argument as though compatibilism were true, a la my 
strategy from Section 1.2.76 
Between Independent and Dependent Satisfaction there is more of a trade-off. 
Independent Satisfaction helps to secure the intuition that the types of responsibility 
under discussion are indeed discrete (though related) variants of responsibility. On the 
other hand, if an account of this sort is understood as a brutely disjunctive one, it 
more immediately raises the concern that these variants do not share a sufficient 
foundation such that all can be considered as examples of moral responsibility – this 
is clearly related to question (1). Dependent Satisfaction, in contrast, can provide a 
clearer answer to the worry about why the different variants should be considered 
examples of moral responsibility, as these variants share at least some of the same 
conditions. Watson, for example, takes aretaic responsibility to be a condition for 
accountability: if a behaviour does not meet the attributability conditions required for 
aretaic responsibility, then that behaviour cannot be the basis for accountability. For 
Watson, the addition of a control or avoidability condition on accountability is a 
further condition. This approach also softens the objection that the account is 
disjunctive, as though one variant of responsibility, X, may be present without the 
other, Y, Y cannot be present without X. However, Dependent Satisfaction does give 
rise to the worry that the dependent variant – accountability in Watson’s case – does 
not represent a clearly distinct type of responsibility. This, of course, is a repeat of the 
invariant attributivist’s challenge from the discussion of (1). 
 Quite a bit of the plausibility of pluralism about moral responsibility depends on how 
one answers (1) and (2). As such, in the next section I lay out my own pluralist 
account, and then attempt to provide compelling answers to both questions. 
4.3. My dual-variant account of moral responsibility 
In this section I will be arguing that there are (at least) two distinct variants of moral 
responsibility, and that though these variants might share the same objects (agents), 
they have different conditions for occurrence, as well as legitimating different moral 
                                               
76 Such a hard determinist can read my arguments as speculation: “if compatibilism were true, then...” 
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responses. Although I will be employing a mix of Shoemaker and Watson’s 
terminology in labelling these variants as responsibility as attributability and 
responsibility as accountability, I will be developing revised versions of both. It is my 
hope that such revision will capture the keen insights behind both thinkers’ 
deployment of these notions, while improving upon them. As will be shown, the latter 
variant is inextricably tied to reason-responsive control whereas the former is not. It 
should be noted right off the bat that, given my overarching argument, I will not be 
giving a full account of attributability. Since my aim is to explain the relationship 
between intentional behaviour and moral responsibility, and I take intentional 
behaviour to require reason-responsive control, it is the variant of responsibility 
necessarily linked to control that I take to be key. However, to make the move to 
pluralism compelling, I will endeavor to say enough about attributability to make its 
distinction from, and relationship to, accountability palatable. 
I begin by readily admitting that my account follows that of Watson more closely than 
that of Shoemaker. I take it to be an advantage for a pluralist account to only add 
additional variants when necessary to capture some fact of moral responsibility 
practice, and so if possible we should prefer a bipartite model over a tripartite one. If 
two can get the job done, then two are as many as are needed. Another advantage to 
employing two variants of responsibility is that, once these variants are properly 
fleshed out, it becomes possible to resolve the apparent tension between volitionism 
and attributivism (which was one of Watson’s central motivations in originally 
arguing for the recognition of the two “faces” of responsibility). Simply put: each of 
these approaches is concerned with a different variant of moral responsibility. These 
are the reasons for my choice of a dual-variant account, to which I now turn.77 
4.3.1. Attributability 
My use of the notion of responsibility as attributability adopts much from 
Shoemaker’s use of the same notion, as well as Watson’s notion of aretaic 
responsibility. This is the variant of responsibility involved in cases where I judge an 
                                               
77 This opens the way for the obvious objection that, using this reasoning, a unitary model would be 
even better. My response to this is that yes, such a model would be preferable if it were possible, but it 
is not. The entire point of the ambivalence cases is to reveal that no such unitary response can be 
adequate. 
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agent’s moral conduct as faulty, and may have certain reactive attitudes toward him 
such as contempt or disdain (a la Shoemaker), and may further be inclined to alter my 
interpersonal relations as regards the agent. Scanlon (2015: 91-92) gives a good 
overview of the kinds of alteration to our interpersonal relationships this may include, 
such as: withdrawing my trust, decreasing my readiness to help him with his projects 
or emotionally invest in his success or failures78 –  all alterations that align with the 
attitude of disdain. Scanlon takes these responses to be reactive attitudes “in the 
general sense that Strawson defines: attitudes toward a person, including changes in 
one’s intentions about how one will treat or respond to him or her, that are adopted in 
response to that person’s attitudes toward oneself or others.” I am inclined to agree 
with him, but nothing in my account hangs on whether these responses are thought of 
as reactive attitudes. Agents can of course be praiseworthy as well as blameworthy on 
this account, and when this is the case the reactive attitude legitimated is that of 
admiration. Where the interpersonal relationships are concerned, we will see the 
opposite movements to what we saw with blame: an increase in trust, increase in 
readiness to help, and greater emotional investment in the agent’s successes and 
failures – again, changes that align strongly with admiration. Despite this symmetry, I 
will generally focus on cases of blameworthiness, as these have generally been the 
source of greater contention. Quite clearly these types of responses seem appropriate 
in cases such as that of Skip and Harris. When discussing a variant of moral 
responsibility, there are two important elements to consider: what are the conditions 
of this variant, and what responses does the presence of this variant legitimate? We 
have already been introduced to the responses legitimated by attributability, and so 
turn now to its conditions. 
I take the condition for moral attributability to be some version of the conditions for 
responsibility put forward by QoW accounts.  As such, rather than introduce my own 
condition of attributability, I will instead endorse MORAL EXPLANTORY BLAME 
(CREDIT) as the appropriate condition. To recall: 
                                               
78 Scanlon also includes in his list a decreased willingness to enter into special relationships such as 
friendship with the person. This may be a justified response, but I would argue that it is actually a 
result of the other three shifts in interpersonal relations. The reason that I would be less willing to be 
friends with such an agent is because of my withdrawal of trust, lack of willingness to support him, and 
lack of emotional investment in his success or failures. 
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MORAL EXPLANATORY BLAME (CREDIT): X deserves moral blame 
(credit) for Y if and only if Y is morally bad (good) and is explained in a normal 
way by X’s quality of will falling below (above) what could be properly 
morally demanded of X 
However, recall this condition only allows for differences in degrees of responsibility 
based on the moral valence of the given outcome and how much the degree of the 
agent’s deviation from the normatively expected level of care is required in the 
explanation of the object of blame or praise. So, as it stands, this condition is not 
exclusively linked to those responses legitimated by accountability. In order to 
introduce this aspect into the condition, it is necessary to differentiate between those 
behaviours that are “explained in a normal way” involving control, and those without 
(I will be limiting my discussion to behaviour, given my overarching argument, but 
Björnsson certainly does not take his account to be limited to such, presumably 
attitudes and judgements could just as easily be accounted for). As we saw in Section 
3.2., Björnsson argues that the perceived need for a control condition can be wholly 
accommodated by the requirement that the explanatory link between behaviour and 
quality of will must be a normal one. However, there is an ambiguity involved here: it 
can be asked whether or not the explanation of the behaviour was normal relative to 
the kinds of responses that we take to be legitimated. In other words, what would 
count as a normal explanatory link between behaviour and quality of will for 
legitimating the response of withdrawing trust, may be very different to what would 
count as such for legitimating the response of moral anger. Recall the stream of 
activity and the process of individuation. Just as there are many ways to individuate 
out activities relative to what is used as guidance for the individuation (such as 
intentional status for example), so too are there many ways to understand an 
explanation as normal relative to the purpose the explanation serves. 
To see what the implications of this may be, consider this example from Björnsson 
(2017a: 147): 
Knockout: Leaving the room, Victor pushes the door open quickly and with 
great force, inadvertently knocking unconscious the person just about to open 
the door from the busy corridor outside. At the moment of action, it didn’t cross 
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Victor’s mind that opening the door in that way might hurt someone, though he 
would have realized this if the question had come up 
For Björnsson (ibid.: 158), Victor would be responsible if it were the case that his 
failure to appreciate the information available in memory and perception – “based on 
which Victor could have realized that he might be putting others in danger or distress” 
– was due to a deficit in concern. Björnsson makes the further point that Victor is 
responsible in this case despite not meeting the kind of control condition of the sort 
proposed by Levy (2017b: 152-153), and that it does not seem plausible to think that 
this could be a case resolved by tracing (2017a: 147). I agree that Victor is 
responsible in this case, and that this is despite Victor not having conscious control 
over the outcome, but my contention is that this is a case of attributability only, and 
Victor’s behaviour legitimates only the responses that follow from this. In order for it 
to be the case that Victor be open to those responses legitimated by accountability – 
which I will discuss in the next section – it is in fact necessary that a he meet some 
control condition (though not necessarily conscious control). It is on this point that I 
hope to expand on the explanatory quality of will account by illuminating this second, 
more stringent understanding of what it means for an agent’s behaviour to be 
explained in a normal way by the agent’s quality of will. 
4.3.2.  Accountability 
Holding an agent accountable involves strong reactive attitudes such as anger and 
indignation, and legitimates, merely on the basis of the morally relevant behaviour, 
sanction in the case of moral blameworthiness. These responses then involve the 
adverse treatment of the agent being held accountable – not merely in that it alters our 
personal relationship to them, as attributability legitimates, but that, as Scanlon (2015: 
90) might say, it changes our obligations toward them. I may no longer be obligated 
to save an accountable individual from certain harms, or may be justified in taking 
certain actions that in fact impair the agent’s liberty without violating obligations that 
I would otherwise have not to do so. The presence of such responsibility could, for 
example, justify the purposeful removal of liberty from some blameworthy individual, 
purely as desert for his or her behaviour. It is the fact that this variant of responsibility 
legitimates these responses that places a demand on an account thereof to meet the 
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concern of fairness, which – as Watson identified – entails the need to include a 
control condition. On the positive side, if an agent is praiseworthy in the 
accountability sense then this legitimates the reactive attitude of gratitude. It will also 
legitimate changes in my obligations toward the agent, but in this case, it might mean 
that I come under new obligations that hadn’t been there before: e.g. if someone goes 
out of their way to return my missing wallet to me rather than keep it for himself or 
simply ignoring it, then it seems reasonable that if I notice that he has dropped his 
wallet I am more obliged to return the favour than would a bystander. It is often the 
case that meeting these obligations strongly aligns with our gratitude, and this does 
not seem to be an accident, any more than the fact that the presence of moral anger 
aligns with the negative alteration of obligations in the case of blameworthiness. In 
both directions, the reactive attitude and the alterations to obligation legitimated are 
complementary to each other, though the former is a conative state and the second 
concerns what we take to be normative reasons for action. 
As such, the condition on accountability is stricter than that on attributability. The 
understanding of “explained in a normal way” must in this case be: 
Strict Interpretation: for some behaviour, X, to be explained in a normal way by 
the quality of will of an agent, Y, such as to justify the moral responses 
characteristic of accountability, the behaviour must be under normal System 2 
Oversight.  
What this interpretation clearly does is to introduce a control condition, one that is 
related to the control condition on intentional status that was developed in Chapter 2. 
In line with the discussion of different volitionist positions in Section 3.1., the notion 
of control here involves reason-responsiveness, but not conscious control. It also 
incorporates an epistemic element since System 2 Oversight has inbuilt epistemic 
requirements. What is different about this notion of control as compared to that 
captured by S2O, however, is the addition of the qualifier, “normal.” I will explore 
this in the next section, where I develop in detail how this control condition is to be 
understood.  
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Having outlined my two variants of responsibility, I now tackle answering questions 
(1) and (2). Beginning with (1): what binds both variants together, what makes them 
both variants of moral responsibility, is, as Scanlon says (2015: 108) in discussing his 
own two variants of responsibility: 79  “They are both properly called forms of 
responsibility because they both assign moral significance to what an individual is 
like or has done.” Another way to grasp this is to consider the similarity that was 
identified between volitionist and attributivist accounts in Section 3.3., namely: that 
both approaches take moral responsibility for behaviour to fundamentally be a matter 
of responding to some revealed morally relevant feature of the agent. In the case of 
both variants, the assignment of moral significance depends upon the way in which 
the agent’s behaviour is explained by the agent’s quality of will, where they differ is 
in what must be involved in this explanation. It is also the case that both variants 
legitimate commonly recognized moral responses, which is most pertinent for 
attributability, as it reinforces it against the criticism that it is not a genuine kind of 
moral responsibility. In response to this criticism from the volitionist direction, that 
attributability is not properly moral responsibility, I am inclined to agree with 
Björnsson’s contention that such positions are so at odds with our responsibly 
practices, and would require such a sacrifice of conservatism, that this should be 
counted as a disadvantage to their approaches. 
Question (2) asks after the relationship between the variants in an account, and in the 
case of mine this relationship is one of Dependent Satisfaction. Accountability can 
only be present if attributability is present. This follows from the fact that the 
condition on accountability is simply stricter than that on attributability by adding the 
requirement for control. So, accountability will be present in any case of 
attributability where the control condition is met. This raises the worry that it might 
not be clear why accountability should be seen as a distinct type of responsibility. 
However, this does not seem a strong objection, given that the different variants 
legitimate different – and widely recognized – moral responses, and do have 
different, even if partially shared, conditions. It is also the case that whereas the 
responses legitimated by attributability are somewhat passive, those legitimated by 
accountability “implicate confrontation of a kind” (Shoemaker, 2015a: 87). This 
                                               
79 Moral reaction and substantive responsibility (Scanlon, 2015). 
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confrontation should be understood as communicative, it aims to communicate moral 
anger and indignation to the target, without necessarily implicating harm to him or 
her. This kind of call to confrontation is not present in cases where only attributability 
is present. 
As I have mentioned, I take it to be the case that attributivist accounts of moral 
responsibility have been largely aimed at explaining the conditions for moral 
attributability, whereas volitionists have been concerned with the conditions for moral 
accountability. It should therefore be no surprise that, as long as the assumption of 
invariantism is retained, these two approaches would find themselves in tension over 
the role that control should play in the condition on moral responsibility. By giving up 
on this assumption, it becomes possible to embrace the keen insights presented by 
both approaches. I take this possibility to count in favour of pluralist accounts of the 
kind I have sketched. Even so, this is far from a complete resolution of this tension – 
and such an enterprise exceeds the scope of my arguments. It is unlikely, even if 
invariantism is rejected, that volitionists and attributivists will agree to the 
formulation of the two variants I have put forward, or perhaps with how I understand 
the relationships between them. After all, within each approach there are important 
questions: “what kind of control is necessary for responsibility?” and “which feature 
of an agent is the morally relevant feature that must be disclosed?” for example. But 
at the least it presents the hope of a resolution. 
Another advantage of endorsing this pluralist picture is that it helps us to make sense 
of the case of the panicked skipper who jettisoned his cargo raised by Fischer and 
Ravizza in Chapter 2: Section 1.1. In the discussion of that case, I compared a skipper 
who was truly driven by an irresistible fear to act as he did to a person emerging from 
a truly blind rage for the first time, and claimed that in both cases the actions 
undertaken should not be counted as intentional, as they were not under appropriate 
control. It should then be no surprise that I do not take these agents to be fitting 
candidates for accountability. They may well be open to attributable responsibility, 
however, if it were the case that their behaviour is explained in a normal way 
(understood in the looser sense, where control is not relevant) by their poor quality of 
care. This will depend how the details of the case are specified, as the degree to which 
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each agent’s situation reduced their capacity to care will determine both whether the 
agent is attributably responsible, and to what degree. 
4.4. Concluding remarks 
In this section I have introduced the notions of invariantism and conservatism, and 
shown that they are in tension. I proceeded to argue that given the existence of so-
called ambivalence response cases – those where certain types of moral response feel 
justified while others certainly do not – no invariantist conception of moral 
responsibility can adequately maintain conservatism. In light of this, I followed 
Watson and Shoemaker in arguing in favour of a pluralist approach to moral 
responsibility. After investigating the pluralist accounts of these two thinkers, I 
identified two important questions that such accounts must answer. The reason being 
that the nature of these answers does much to determine the persuasiveness of the 
given account. I then presented my own dual-variant account of moral responsibility, 
which takes there to be two variants: attributability and accountability. The crucial 
distinguishing feature between these two variants is that the latter has a control 
condition, whereas the former does not. In laying out my understanding of these 
conditions I borrowed heavily from the explanatory quality of will account of moral 
responsibility. I then attempted to improve upon it by introducing a pluralist element 
in the form of two interpretations of what it means for a “behaviour to be explained 
by an agent’s quality of will in a normal way”, and attempted to answer the two 
questions identified prior. 
In the next section I continue the development of my account by fleshing out what I 
take to be the control condition on moral accountability:  normal System 2 Oversight. 
And once this is done, show how the intentional status of an agent’s behaviour and an 
agent’s moral accountability for that behaviour are necessarily linked through what I 
call the nexus of control. 
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5. The nexus of control 
5.1. Control condition on accountability: normal System 2 Oversight 
As my discussion of reason-responsiveness in Chapters 1 and 2 revealed, there are 
several distinct similarities between the control necessary for the exercise of 
intentional agency and the control necessary for moral accountability. In both cases 
the presence of this control is necessary (and in the case of intentional status, I take it 
to be sufficient) for a given behaviour to be reflective of an agent’s autonomy. The 
kind of control in question must be both reason-receptive and reason-reactive (though 
the degree required may differ). And lastly, there is an epistemic component to this 
control, but it falls short of a demand for conscious awareness. It is therefore 
unsurprising that those who endorse the role of a control condition on moral 
responsibility (i.e. the volitionists) would be drawn to limiting the scope of 
responsibility to that which is done intentionally. However, adopting this position is 
untenable, given the cost to conservatism. But once we adopt a pluralist approach, it 
can be readily seen that accountability, which does demand control, may well be 
limited in this way. This indicates that System 2 Oversight will again be a useful way 
to understand the kind of control at stake. 
This is not to say that the set of behaviours that are intentional is coextensive with the 
set of behaviours for which an agent is accountable. As has been previously noted 
there are many things that we do intentionally for which we cannot be held 
accountable. This is because, despite the similarities, there are also important 
differences between the nature of control required for intentional status and that 
required by accountability. I argue that this difference can be captured by the 
difference between S2O and normal S2O, and by the fact that the presence of S2O is 
both a necessary and sufficient condition for positive intentional status, normal S2O is 
by itself only a necessary condition on moral accountability. In the next section, I turn 
to unpacking what exactly is meant by this notion of normalcy. But first I must 
consider two of Björnsson’s arguments against the inclination to understand the 
requirement that behaviour must be explained in a normal way in terms of control. 
The first argument, which is very much aimed at those who require the presence of 
conscious control, is that it seems that we frequently hold agents responsible for non-
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akratic behaviours, which such a stringent demand would seem to rule out. The 
second involves the case of The Catch, and is a more general objection applied to 
accounts that take the presence of some appropriate notion of control to be necessary 
and sufficient for moral responsibility. 
My response to the first objection is to agree that the demand for conscious control is 
simply too stringent, and would require a very significant revision of our moral 
responsibility practices. The kind of control that I seek to introduce is not control of 
this variety, but rather control through the oversight of the agent’s dual process 
mechanism. Further, the underlying assumption of this objection, that conservatism 
should be taken seriously as a virtue for an account of moral responsibility, I take to 
be a motivation in support of my own pluralist position, as without the recognition of 
the need for a variantist understanding of moral responsibility we would not be able to 
capture the fact that our responsibility practices call for different responses in 
different cases, not only in degree but also in type, and that it seems that these 
different types demand different conditions. 
The second objection is more troublesome. Björnsson introduces an example that he 
takes to show that even when control is present – and in this case full-blown 
conscious control – this is still not sufficient for moral responsibility. Rather what is 
necessary is the explanatory role of the agent’s quality of will (2017b: 156): 
The Catch: There was only one way in which you could prevent the deadly 
explosion, and you knew it. If you were to press the button, you would prevent 
the explosion, but only if you would not be acting for ultimately moral reasons, 
out of concern or respect for potential victims. (Those meddling neuroscientists 
were at it again, monitoring your deliberation and tracking your motivation.) 
Moreover, you were able to press the button, and able to prevent the deaths by 
doing so for non-moral or immoral reasons: perhaps to listen to the somewhat 
interesting sound emitted by the button, or to save the explosive device for an 
even deadlier occasion later on. As it happened, however, you did not at the 
moment care about those other things. So you did not press the button. 
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My response is to claim that this would only be an objection to my account if my 
argument was that the presence of control is sufficient for moral responsibility. This, 
however, is not my claim. Instead I argue that the presence of control is merely 
necessary for the presence of accountability. What I would argue is that the presence 
of a deficit or surfeit of good will is also in the same way necessary, though not 
sufficient, for moral accountability. Both elements are necessary and jointly sufficient 
in order for an agent to be morally accountable for a behaviour. What is certainly true 
is that when the correct explanatory link exists between the quality of will and the 
behaviour, this is sufficient for moral responsibility. However, in the particular case 
of moral accountability, this link must necessarily involve control. 
5.1.1. Normal functioning 
There are undeniably times when an agent acts intentionally but is an unfitting 
candidate for being held accountable. However, such cases come in three different 
forms. In the first the agent is open to moral accountability on the basis of some 
behaviour, but is not praiseworthy or blameworthy because this behaviour is morally 
neutral given the moral reasons in the vicinity. For example: 
Reader: Megan, a young doctor, comes home from a day’s work at the hospital and 
after getting comfortable sits down to read the novel Ender’s Game in her spare time. 
Megan is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy for her reading of the novel, if there 
wasn’t a sufficiently weighty moral reason for her to stop doing so – such as a need to 
call and check up with her ill mother for example. 
The second variety is where the agent’s behaviour is morally valent, and intentional, 
but the agent lacks sufficient control for moral accountability, and so is not open to it: 
Psychopath: Skip – from the ambivalence cases – breaks a woman’s arm when she 
resisted his attempt to force her onto his lap. His response is to blame the woman for 
resisting, and he feels no remorse for his actions. 
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Skip may well be attributably – and, for the record, legally – responsible for breaking 
the woman’s arm, but he lacks a sufficient capacity to be responsive to reasons to be 
open to moral accountability. More particularly, he lacks a sufficient capacity to 
respond to moral reasons, as a result of his insufficient capacity to care, which in turn 
is the result of his lack of empathy. This relationship between the capacity to care and 
the capacity to respond to moral reasons is an important one. My talk of control has 
largely been couched in terms of responding to reasons, and it is just such a notion of 
control that I seek to plug into MORAL EXPLANATORY BLAME (CREDIT) in 
order to provide the condition on moral accountability. Yet, the explanatory quality of 
will account is couched in terms of caring or moral concern. How these two ways of 
talking about the subject matter relate needs to be clarified. 
My view is that the capacity to care80 is necessary for the capacity to respond to moral 
reasons (as moral reasons). Importantly, this does not mean that a failure of an agent 
to actually care in a given situation undermines that agent’s capacity to respond to 
reasons. Rather, changes in an agent’s actual degree of care will influence the agent’s 
actual responsiveness to moral reasons. It is important to separate these out: an agent 
can have the capacity to respond to a certain moral reason, but fall short of this 
standard. On my view, openness to moral accountability is only jeopardised when the 
capacity to respond appropriately to moral reasons falls below a certain threshold. A 
reduction in actual empathy that reduces the actual responsiveness that is not 
accompanied by a reduction in the capacity for care, and so a reduction in the capacity 
for reasons-responsiveness to moral reasons, does not prevent openness to moral 
accountability. It is also the case that reductions in capacity to respond to moral 
reasons may reduce the degree of responsibility if this reduction explains the agent’s 
actual responses. This still leaves the threshold below which the capacity to respond 
to moral reasons must fall for an agent to no longer be open to moral accountability 
undefined, and I will rectify this soon, but first let us look at the third variety of 
intentional behaviour where moral accountability is absent, as it relates directly to 
foregoing discussion. 
                                               
80 We can substitute “care” for “moral concern” or “an intrinsic desire for the right or good” here, and I 
take the point to be unchanged. 
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These final cases are ones where the agent has no capacity to respond to moral 
reasons. For example:  
Ideal psychopath: Judith is a psychopath. What is more, she is an idealised 
psychopath – as was also introduced in Chapter 2: Section 1.1. – and so, is incapable 
of responding to moral reasons at all. Judith is bored one Friday night and because it 
gives her a thrill, traps the neighbour’s dog and kills him. 
There may well not be any actual adult humans that fit this description, but it remains 
an important theoretical possibility. Importantly, Judith is not the same as a non-
human animal since she can still respond to an otherwise normal spectrum of non-
moral reasons. She is also different from a child, who may lack the capacity to 
respond to moral reasons, but who possesses (in the clear majority of cases) the 
chance to develop such a capacity. Due to her incapacity, and presuming that it’s 
permanent, Judith will never be open to moral accountability. Indeed, I am inclined to 
concur with Fischer and Ravizza (1998: 82) that an agent such as Judith does not 
qualify as a moral agent. 
Given the discussion of these cases, it seems clear that the capacity to respond to 
moral reasons beyond some threshold is a necessary condition for moral 
accountability. I will call this capacity Moral Competency. But how does the demand 
for moral competency relate to the control condition on moral accountability? Very 
naturally, or so I will argue. A human agent’s System 2 oversight mechanism, if it is 
functioning normally, will have the capacity to be responsive to moral reasons beyond 
the mentioned threshold. The reason we should think this is the case can be illustrated 
by the very fact that agents who are sufficiently unresponsive to moral reasons – such 
as Skip and Judith – are both agents where we would say that they have abnormal 
reason-responsive mechanisms. But to make this point more clearly, we must unpack 
the notion of normalcy. 
The use of normalcy here is technical, not colloquial. For a process or mechanism to 
function normally is for it to function sufficiently in line with its operative 
characteristics, where these operative characteristics are understood as normative 
expectations constitutive of the mechanism, and “sufficiently in line” should be 
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understood as a bandwidth. A dual process mechanism is a reason-responsive 
mechanism, that it be reason-responsive is a normative expectation we have of it. For 
such a mechanism to function normally then, means that it must have the capacity to 
be receptive and reactive to reasons within a certain bandwidth (let’s call this the 
Normal Band). The functioning of two mechanisms – or one mechanism at different 
times – may deviate from each other within the Normal Band, yet still be normal 
provided they still fall within it. In this sense, normalcy comes by degrees. 
Another aspect of normalcy is that raised by Martin Smith (2010: 15), that whereas 
abnormal states of affairs call for special explanations, normal states of affairs do not. 
This is abundantly clear in the cases of Skip and Judith, where the functioning of 
these agents’ System 2 oversight mechanism calls for a special explanation, precisely 
because of their lack of capacity to respond to moral reasons. However, note that 
using this notion of normalcy an agent can have a normal capacity to respond, yet fail 
to actually respond consistently. To see this, consider the case Smith uses of the man 
driving home from work: 
Other times—when we say things like ‘Tim would normally be home by six’ or 
‘When I turn my key in the ignition, the car normally starts’—part of what we 
are trying to express, I believe, is that there would have to be some satisfactory 
explanation if Tim wasn’t home by six or the car wasn’t starting. 
In this sense of “normal” it could be true that Tim is normally home by six, even if 
this occurrence is not particularly frequent. What is required is that exceptions to this 
generalisation are always explicable as exceptions by the citation of independent, 
interfering factors—his car broke down, he had a late meeting etc. If this condition is 
met, then the best way to explain Tim’s arrival time each day is to assign his arrival 
by six a privileged or default status and to contrastively explain other arrival times in 
relation to this default. (ibid.: 15-16). 
It is also important to note that the operative characteristics, though being normative 
expectations, are not ideal expectations. A coffee machine does not always function 
more normally the closer it comes to the perfect execution of its operative 
characteristics. Similarly, a certain dish of food might have, as an operative 
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characteristic, a certain level of flavour. This level is not “ideal” flavour, or perfect 
flavour, or “the most flavour that the dish could have”, but rather the level 
normatively expected of the dish. In the case of the dish of food, certain instances 
may be more flavourful or less flavourful than this expected level, and if they were 
sufficiently so then special explanation would be called for: “Why is this soup so 
terrible!” or “What did you do with this, it tastes great!”. At the same time, dishes 
within the Normal Band can still be discriminated between in terms of their distance 
from the expected level: “That was a pleasant soup” or “That was a less flavourful 
than I expected”. The dishes in these cases are both still normal, but they are less 
normal than an instance that falls closer to the expected level: “this is how it normally 
tastes”. What is true of dishes of food holds also for coffee machines or dual process 
mechanisms: the closer that the reason-responsiveness is to the expected levels, the 
more normal its functioning, and if it falls sufficiently away from this level, then the 
functioning is abnormal (super- or subnormal). 
Now, in the case of the functioning of the System 2 oversight mechanism, there are 
two dimensions of normalcy that could be violated: the first I will call Normality in 
Exercise (NiE), and the second Normality in Capacity (NiC). Consider:  
NiE: an agent could simply be failing to respond to moral reasons that we would 
normally expect an agent in her context and with a normally functioning System 2 to 
respond to. She is abnormal in her exercise of her capacity to respond to moral 
reasons. I take violations of this sort of normative expectations to constitute moral 
failings, and that our demand for agents to answer for them goes hand-in-hand with 
the fact that they call for special explanation. I take it that in most cases such 
explanations will bottom out in a lack of (though not a lack of capacity to) care, 
usually because of the influence of the agent’s egoistic reasons. 
NiC: an agent could be failing to respond to moral reasons that we would normally 
expect an agent in her context to respond to, and the explanation for this is that the 
functioning of her System 2 violates our expectations in that either: (i) it lacks the 
capacity for System 2 oversight, or (ii) the reasons-responsiveness to moral reasons 
falls below the Normal Band. She is abnormal in her capacity to respond to moral 
reasons. I take violations of this sort to undermine openness to moral accountability. I 
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take it that explanations for such violations will usually bottom out in stories about 
the agent’s psychological history and capacities (e.g. an abusive childhood, a 
significant mental handicap, etc.). When I speak in this dissertation of a normally 
functioning System 2 oversight mechanism, I mean in this dimension. Also note that 
for an agent to be open to moral accountability, they need have at least a normal 
capacity to respond to moral reasons. Agents with a supernormal capacity remain 
open to accountability. 
For us to know whether an agent violates NiE or NiC in a given case, particularly 
when we are looking at that case in isolation, will usually (if not always) require 
further examination. However, I take it that in the vast, vast, majority of cases the 
violation will be of NiE, and that this is the reason why we usually assume someone 
to be exhibiting a moral failing, rather than a lack of moral agency, in almost all 
cases. This helps to highlight that the practice of holding an agent responsible is a 
process. As Rosen (2003: 61) says, 
morality, like the law, operates with a defeasible presumption of responsibility. 
Suppose Jane does something wrong. Suppose she steals a candy bar from the 
corner store. Until we hear more we are entitled to suppose that she is liable to 
blame for what she’s done. But if it turns out that she is only five years old, or 
that she was coerced, or that she has just contracted kleptomania, we may 
conclude that even though the act was wrong, it would be a mistake for us to 
blame her or for her to blame herself. 
Where Rosen says that we are entitled to suppose that Jane is open to blame, I would 
say that it is understandable for us to provisionally judge her to be to blame, and to 
even respond as though she is. However, we are morally obligated to discover 
whether our provisional judgement is in fact correct, and so whether Jane is actually a 
fitting candidate for blame. I take McKenna (2012) to be providing an account of this 
process in his Conversational theory of moral responsibility.81 In this theory, he 
argues that there are three usual steps in the process: firstly, when an agent acts, and 
her acts are morally charged, she appreciates that she might be introducing a 
                                               
81 As a volitionist, when McKenna talks about responsibility, I take him to be talking about 
accountability particularly. 
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meaningful contribution to a kind of conversational exchange with others. This initial 
stage McKenna calls Moral Contribution. The second stage, in which that agent is 
blamed (or praised) by a respondent on the basis of the morally charged action, he 
calls Moral Address. In the third stage, Moral Account, the blamed agent extends the 
conversation by offering an excuse, a justification, or an apology, for example. The 
respondent might at this point continue the conversation, perhaps by forgiving or 
punishing.82 
My own understanding of the process is similar to McKenna’s though not identical. 
On my view, Moral Address involves a provisional, and defeasible, judgement and 
response on the part of the respondent. And Moral Account is not only a matter of the 
agent putting forward excuses or justifications, but also of the respondent 
investigating the facts of the situation – most relevantly here the normalcy of the 
agent’s reason-responsive mechanism. And I take there to be a further step, call it 
Final Address, which is when the respondent arrives at their final judgement and 
response to the agent. Note that this process can break down at any step, and that the 
final judgement and response are by no means infallibly correct. There is, however, a 
pro tanto moral reason for the respondent to arrive at an accurate judgement – and so 
pursue Moral Account. A failure to do so can be morally blameworthy itself. At the 
same time, there is a pro tanto moral reason for the agent to meet the respondent’s 
address and account for her or himself when so confronted. Of course, the moral 
reasons operative in these cases may be outweighed by other reasons, but they are 
there. This is a helpful way to understand what’s going on in what could otherwise be 
confusing cases: the woman whose arm Skip breaks would, for example, be entirely 
understandable in holding him accountable during the step Moral Address. However, 
in the course Moral Account she should, and is likely to, recognize that Skip’s reason-
responsive mechanism violates NiC, and this should lead her to form the final 
                                               
82 This is somewhat akin to Gormally’s (2016: 281-282) description of responsibility as a three-level 
concept, by which he means: 
It may be used in reference, firstly, to being a cause or contributory condition of x happening; 
secondly, to being callable to account for x happening; and, thirdly, to being guilty for the 
occurrence of x, i.e. when one lacks an exonerating answer when called to account for causing 
or contributing to x happening. 
Though Gormally’s description of the first of these levels differs from McKenna’s notion of Moral 
Contribution in that he seems to be identifying this level with causal responsibility, the overall 
structure of the three levels is strikingly similar to McKenna’s Conversational theory, with the second 
and the third levels having clear commonalities with Moral Address and Moral Account. 
 181 
judgement that Skip is attributably responsible exclusively, and respond 
appropriately. 
Having laid all this out, I can now present my formulation of the control condition on 
moral accountability: 
Normal System 2 Oversight (nS2O): an agent’s X’ing, undertaken at time t, is under 
normal S2O, and so a legitimate basis for moral accountability, iff: 
(1) At time t the agent X’d 
(2) X is under some degree of guidance by the operation of (a) System 2 or (b) 
System 1 with System 2 oversight, such that the agent could bring it about 
with sufficient reliability through this guidance at time t 
(3) The System 2 oversight mechanism is functioning at least normally 
(4) The agent has a belief that she will at least try to X 
A key feature of this control condition is that it does not posit any ownership 
condition in the vein of Fischer and Ravizza. The reason for this is that I share 
Björnsson’s view that – when dealing with normative responsibility – why an agent 
has a given capacity is irrelevant, what matters is that the capacity is present, and the 
degree of its presence. This allows for responses to manipulation cases, as was 
discussed in Section 3.2. This condition also clearly rules out both Skip and Harris 
from accountability, as in both cases the agents presumably do not meet (3). 
However, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 2: Section 1.5., this condition only 
applies to activities and effects, not to consequences. In the next section I argue that, 
just as with intentional status, openness to moral accountability can be transferred to 
the consequences of activities. 
5.1.2. Accounting for consequences 
To recall, I have argued that intentional status transfers from intentional activities to 
intentional consequences via: 
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Transfer of intentional status (TIS): a given consequence, X, of an agent’s activity, 
Y, occurring at time t, is intentional iff: 
(1) The agent has the belief that bringing about X is, given her evidence, a 
possible part of the fulfilment of an aim to Z, which involves Y’ing 
(2) X is brought about under sufficient guidance of System 2 Oversight by Y’ing, 
in line with the agent’s plan to Z 
As may be guessed, I argue that openness to accountability can be similarly 
transferred via: 
Transfer of openness to accountability (TOA): an agent is open to accountability 
for a given consequence, X, of the agent’s activity, Y, occurring at time t, iff: 
(1) The agent has the belief that bringing about X is, given her evidence, a 
possible part of the fulfilment of an aim to Z, which involves Y’ing 
(2) X is brought about under sufficient guidance of normal System 2 Oversight by 
Y’ing, in line with the agent’s plan to Z 
Probably the most significant ramification of TOA is that moral accountability cannot 
extend to foreseeable but unforeseen consequences. Such consequences can also not 
be intentional, and the clearest way to understand why is to consider again the 
example of Victor from Knockout. In this example, having knocked down the person 
on the other side of the door, Victor is suddenly being blamed by her. In response 
Victor declares, “I didn’t do it intentionally!” And this seems to be a plausible 
response, we do not think of such consequences as intentional. On the responsibility 
side, though his declaration may not exculpate Victor entirely, it will at the least shift 
the type of responsibility from accountability to attributability. However, if it was the 
case that Victor has made a habit of such reckless door openings, and become aware 
of this fact yet has taken no steps to remedy this habit, then he will be open to moral 
accountability for the failure to take remedial steps. This will be a case of 
accountability for an omission – a case of negligence. 
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This would also be an example of tracing. Though my account does not employ 
tracing as a means of accounting for cases of responsibility where control is absent – I 
take my endorsement of a dual-variant account to see to that – it remains the case that 
in at least some situations an agent might bring about a consequence that is 
unintentional and not itself open to accountability, but where the agent might still be 
open to accountability for some preceding activity that was intentional. 
5.2. Concluding remarks 
This then is the answer to the question of how moral responsibility relates to the 
intentional status of activities and outcomes: an agent can be morally accountable 
only for those activities and outcomes that are intentional. This follows from the 
shared role played by a kind of reason-responsive control best understood as System 2 
Oversight. However, an agent is not open to moral accountability for all her 
intentional activities and outcomes, which follows from the fact that moral 
accountability has a stricter control condition than intentional status, namely: normal 
System 2 Oversight. What an agent is accountable for is also not exhaustive of what 
she could be morally responsible for, since my account endorses a dual-variant model 
of moral responsibility. So, behaviours that may be closed to accountability – such as 
unintentional activities and outcomes – may still be open to responsibility understood 
as attributability. 
This unknotting expedition was originally motivated by the consideration of 
Anscombe’s concerns regarding Truman’s responsibility for the innocent deaths that 
resulted from the deployment of the nuclear bombs, and the viability of the response 
that since these deaths were unintended he should be exculpated (or have greatly 
reduced responsibility). Now that I have developed a solid account of the relationship 
between moral responsibility and intentional activity (and the outcomes of such), in 
the next and final section, I will attempt to see what consequence it may have for 
understanding this motivating example. 
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6. Consequences for the Doctrine of Double Effect 
Anscombe’s protest was based on the claim that honouring Truman was comparable 
to honouring Genghis Khan, Nero or Hitler, as he was a war criminal for the use of 
the atomic bombs. More particularly, for bringing about the deaths of many innocents 
(including children literally boiled alive in bath tubs) by dropping the weapons on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Anscombe would, presumably, have not had these same 
reservations had the bombs been deployed on purely military targets, such as an 
enemy fleet. One line of opposition to her view about Truman’s moral responsibility 
for the bombings was that the former president was not morally responsible for the 
bombings, or at least not in the way or to the degree that Genghis, Nero, and Hitler 
were for their crimes, because he did not intend to bring about the death of the 
innocent victims in the two cities. This defence is not a novel one, and is an example 
of the general strategy of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), which roughly holds 
that “other things being equal, harm that is strictly intended is harder to justify than 
harm that is merely foreseen” (Woollard, 2017: 142). On initial brush, it may look as 
though my dual-variant approach would agree with the DDE defence, if it is read as 
claiming that: an agent is accountable for what is intended, but can merely be 
attributably responsible for what is merely foreseen. However, this answer is too 
swift. On my account, it is not only what is intended (strictly or otherwise) that can be 
open to accountability, but also all behaviour that is intentional. And such behaviour 
includes many foreseen (but unintended) effects and consequences of intentional 
activities. To get to an answer then we will have to dig deeper, starting with a fuller 
understanding of the DDE.83 
There are many different formulations of the DDE.84 Given this background, it is not 
my intention to propose a new formulation of the DDE, or to argue for new 
constraints or conditions to be added to it. However, if I am to discuss the subject I 
will have to adopt some formulation or other. In trying to reconcile these two realities, 
I have chosen to simply adopt Delaney’s formulations of the DDE, as he is a strong 
                                               
83 Note, it is not my intention to deliver any final verdict on Truman’s fateful decision. Even if the 
DDE fails to render his decision permissible, there may well be other considerations that do – such as 
lesser evil justifications. My interest is in whether the outcome of his decision, i.e. the bombings 
themselves, being intended or merely intentional is morally relevant. 
84 Some good examples are those of Mangan, 1949, McIntyre, 2001, and Masek, 2010, though there are 
many others. 
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defender of the DDE, and is not one of those thinkers who wish to either constrain the 
Doctrine85 or revise it away from its roots.86 It is my hope that by doing so the thrust 
of my argument can hit home against the strongest opposition. 
The DDE is classically formulated as a set of conditions that help in adjudicating the 
moral permissibility of an action. In most such formulations of the Doctrine there are 
four stipulated conditions, which if met means that an action is morally permissible, 
or at least more permissible than an otherwise identical action that fails to meet these 
conditions. These are: (1) the act is not bad in itself, (2) the act also issues in 
proportionally good results, (3) that the bad result is not intended but merely foreseen, 
and (4) the bad result is not a means to the good result (Mangan, 1949; Quinn, 1989). 
All the conditions must be met in order for an action to be permitted by the DDE. 
Delaney (2008: 335-336) offers what he calls a more “modern” formulation that runs 
as follows: 
[I]t is sometimes morally worse to act with the intention to produce a bad effect 
as a means to a good end than to act while merely foreseeing that an equally bad 
effect will come about as a byproduct of one’s endeavouring. 
In his notes (Ibid.: 359-360) he also provides the following, more precise, 
formulation: 
[A]n action may be morally permissible if (1) the end is good (2) the means is at 
least neutral (3) the foreseen bad effect is not directly intended and (4) the 
foreseen bad effect is proportional to the good end after which the actor strives. 
This formulation of the DDE captures what Masek (2010: 567) considered to be the 
most pertinent element of the DDE, the claim that “someone who causes bad effects 
must have both a good intention and a morally acceptable reason for permitting the 
bad effects.” 
                                               
85 See Anscombe, 1982 and McIntyre, 2001. Both these thinkers, in different ways, propose 
understandings of the DDE which would limit the range of cases to which it is applicable. 
86 I include Woollard here, as though she is a strong advocate for the DDE or some replacement 
thereof, for her “a replacement for the DDE need not appeal to the agent’s intentions” (2017: 143). As 
my interest is directly on the role played by intention, this is the variety of the DDE that concerns me. 
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For the purposes of my investigation, the focus is on (3) in Delaney’s account, which 
posits a crucial morally relevant difference between acting “with the intention to 
produce a bad effect” and acting “while merely foreseeing that an equally bad effect 
will come about.” Likewise, for Masek the requirement is that the agent must have a 
“good intention.” In his discussion of what he means by “good intention,” Masek 
clarifies that, for her intention to be good, the agent must not intend the bad effects of 
her actions. This becomes particularly clear when considering that he argues that a 
key challenge for a defender of the DDE is to “distinguish intended effects from side 
effects (or unintended effects)” (Masek, 2010: 567). In other words, for both Delaney 
and Masek, the distinction between the intended effects and the merely foreseen side 
effects87 of an activity – and the difference in openness to moral responsibility that 
they take to track this distinction – continues to play the key role in the plausibility of 
the DDE. For shorthand, I will be referring to this set of ideas as Distinction from 
here on out. 
My argument is that Distinction cannot be maintained. The distinction between 
outcomes that are intended and those that are merely foreseen does not necessarily, 
nor even characteristically, track a distinction in moral responsibility, of either type or 
degree. This is not to say that intended outcomes and merely foreseen ones are always 
alike in openness to moral responsibility, even if they are the same outcome. There is 
a morally relevant distinction in the vicinity (a few in fact, but one of particular 
note):88 the distinction between outcomes that are intentional, and outcomes that are 
merely foreseen. Provided that the facts of the case are otherwise identical, an 
intentional outcome, X, is equally open to moral accountability whether it is intended 
or intentional – and likewise for attributability. Recall that the difference between an 
intended outcome and a merely intentional outcome (following from Bratman, in 
Chapter 1: Section 3.1.) is that the former requires an intention to bring about that 
outcome, whereas the latter does not need an intention to be present. 
                                               
87 My use of the term side effects will follow that of Masek, so far as it applies to the unintended 
effects of actions. I am not entirely certain that this is the most adequate use of the term, but for the 
sake of clarity I will employ it in this way for the duration of my arguments presented here.  
88 One such distinction is that between doing and allowing, often called the Doctrine of Doing and 
Allowing (DDA). As the role of intentional status is not used as a discriminator in this doctrine I will 
not consider it here, but Woollard provides an excellent overview and defense of the DDA in Woollard 
(2012a; 2012b; 2017). 
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Since moral attributability does not involve any necessary role for intentional status, I 
take it for granted that the DDE will have no bearing on this variant of responsibility. 
Looking at accountability, however, where positive intentional status is a condition 
for a behaviour to be open to responsibility there is reason to think that the DDE may 
well play a role in determining responsibility. So, if we assume that what is morally 
relevant for the purposes of moral accountability is whether the behaviour in question 
is explained in the normal way by the agent’s quality of care – and this “explained in 
the normal way” is understood under the strict interpretation – then to think that what 
is intended and what is merely intentional marks a morally relevant distinction 
implies that an agent’s intended outcomes are explained by the agent’s quality of care 
to a greater degree than her merely intentional ones. I argue that this is not necessarily 
the case. A merely intentional outcome may be explained by an agent’s quality of care 
to at least the same degree as if it was intended: 
Intentional: Paul is caught in the classic trolley problem. Paul, as it happens, is a 
committed Utilitarian, and thinks that, as a general rule, it is always best to try to save 
the greatest number of people. He forms the intention to pull the lever and does so, 
regretting that his action will bring about the death of the single man tied to the track, 
but thinking it for the best. 
Intended: Pauline is caught in the Fatman version of the trolley problem. Like Paul, 
Pauline is a committed Utilitarian, and thinks that, as a general rule, it is always best 
to try to save the greatest number of people. She forms the intention to push the 
Fatman and does so, regretting that her action will bring about the death of the 
Fatman, but thinking it for the best. 
The death of the single man tied to the track and the death of the Fatman are both 
equally explained by Paul’s and Pauline’s quality of care respectively. Were it not for 
Paul’s degree of care, he may well not have pulled the lever, and were it not for 
Pauline’s degree of care, she may not have pushed the Fatman. In this case, both Paul 
and Pauline would seem to be open to accountable (and so of course attributably 
responsible as well) for their behaviours. There may of course be independent moral 
reasons for not pushing the Fatman, whereas there are no such reasons for not pulling 
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the lever, in which case Pauline would be more blameworthy than Paul.89 Or some 
version of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing could hold, in which case arguably 
Pauline would be more blameworthy. However, neither of these ways of 
discriminating between Paul and Pauline employs the intentional status of their 
behaviour. 
Next consider the following, which is closer to the example of Truman’s decision to 
order the use of the atomic weapons: 
A paradigmatic application of DDE yields different assessments as to the moral 
permissibility for the respective action plans of two wartime pilots, one a 
strategic bomber (SB) and the other a terror bomber (TB). SB bombs a weapons 
cache as means to defeating the enemy while foreseeing that his bombing will 
bring about a number of civilian deaths. TB bombs the same number of civilians 
directly as a means to defeating the enemy (he intends to demoralize the 
enemy). (Delaney, 2008: 336) 
Defenders of the DDE regularly argue90  that the TB’s action plan is morally 
impermissible as it involves an intention to bring about the civilian deaths, whereas 
the SB’s action plan might be morally permissible as it does not entail an intention to 
bring about the civilian deaths, these deaths are merely foreseen. In the case of TB, 
the deaths are intended. What about in the case of SB? According to TIS, the deaths 
of the civilians are an intentional consequence of SB’s intentional activity of bombing 
the weapons cache. The death of the civilians is a consequence of bombing the 
weapons cache, and SB both has the belief that bringing about the deaths of the 
civilians is, given her evidence, a possible part of the fulfilment of her aim of 
defeating the enemy by bombing the weapons cache and it is the case that the death of 
the civilians is brought about under sufficient guidance of System 2 Oversight and in 
line with the agent’s plan to defeat the enemy. Here again we have an intended 
consequence and an intentional consequence. 
                                               
89 I take it that this is what is going on in cases like Transplant Surgeon. It seems plausible that 
surgeons have, as one of their operative characteristics in the role of doctors, the expectation that they 
will not intentionally kill, or not harm those who don’t require it for treatment. 
90 See Delaney, 2007, 2008; Masek, 2010; and Sartorio, 2015, among others. 
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This case unfolds in the same way as that of Paul and Pauline. Both TB’s and SB’s 
behaviour are equally well explained, and in an equally normal way, by their quality 
of care. Both TB and SB are prepared to bring about the same number of deaths to 
meet their aims – both may regret this, or wish there were alternatives, but both are 
prepared to make the ‘hard’ choice. On the matter of alternatives, it should be noted 
that these do matter significantly. If it was the case that if SB had an alternative means 
to achieve his goal that did not involve the death of the civilians he would take it, but 
TB would not, then TB’s behaviour is clearly explained by a greater lack of care than 
SB. But note that this works both ways. But it may be thought that because TB 
intends to kill the civilians he is less open to alternatives. However, it is important to 
remember that both TB and SB have the same aim – this is a necessary feature of a 
DDE case. This aim is to defeat the enemy, and if TB becomes aware of an alternative 
means to defeat the enemy that does not involve killing the civilians, he would be 
perfectly rational to change his plans. 
Finally, it could be argued that the DDE can be defended by stressing (2) – that the 
means must be at least neutral.  The argument will go that even though the intentional 
status itself might not be what captures the morally relevant difference, the moral 
valence of the means does. I find this unconvincing for two reasons: the first and most 
obvious is that my interest is purely in whether the outcome of a given activity being 
intended or intentional is morally relevant, all else equal. The second response is to 
question why the distinction between means and by-products should be thought of as 
morally relevant. It seems again that whether a means or a by-product are explained in 
a normal way by the agent’s quality of care is not dependent on its being a means or a 
by-product. What an agent chooses as her means toward an end may be no more or 
less an expressive of her care than a by-product of this action. 
In conclusion then, once the relationship between moral responsibility and intentional 
status is properly understood, the objection against Anscombe’s protest that sought to 
diminish Truman’s responsibility by denying positive intentional status to the 
outcome of his decision can be seen to be misguided and incorrect. If Truman is in 
fact off the hook, it is not thanks to any consideration of the intentional status of his 
behaviour. 
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Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have sought to provide a partial account of moral responsibility 
sufficient to the task of allowing for the unravelling of the relationship between moral 
responsibility and the intentional status of activities and outcomes. This involved 
locating my account as one that was merit-based, rather than consequentialist, and 
explicating that my account can be treated as modular for the purposes of the free will 
debate. 
After briefly clarifying how I understand the relationship between moral 
praiseworthiness, blameworthiness, and responsibility – which involved 
differentiating between the conditions for an agent to be open to moral responsibility 
and the conditions for an agent being praiseworthy or blameworthy – as well as 
exploring some of the complexities that arise when tackling the relationship between 
moral responsibility and intentional action, I proceeded to investigate the current 
discussion regarding the role of control in moral responsibility. This involved 
expository work on the volitionist and attributivist approaches to moral responsibility, 
since the former argues that there is necessary control condition on responsibility, 
while the latter do not. Of particular importance here was my consideration of the 
explanatory quality of will account which I took to be the most compelling 
attributivist account overall, and on which I build much of my own account. 
Having explored these existing accounts, I then followed Watson and Shoemaker in 
pushing an objection applicable to accounts of both approaches: that no invariantist 
account of moral responsibility can capture the ambivalent nature of our responses to 
certain cases of moral responsibility. I also follow them in taking the best solution to 
this objection to be the endorsement of pluralism about moral responsibility. After 
briefly considering both Watson’s and Shoemaker’s attempts at pluralist accounts of 
moral responsibility, I introduce my own dual-variant account. This account builds on 
the excellent foundations of the explanatory quality of will account, but introduces a 
pluralist element into the account by exploiting an ambiguity in what it means to say 
that a behaviour is explained in the normal way by an agent’s quality of care. The 
pluralism in question takes there to be two variants of moral responsibility: 
attributability and accountability. Crucially, the latter variant – which legitimates 
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more severe moral responses than the former, and so is open to a demand from 
fairness for control or avoidability –  has a control condition, while the former does 
not. Given the central and constitutive role of control in the account of intentional 
activities and outcomes that I developed in Chapter 2, at this point I conclude that it is 
accountability, not attributability, that stands in a necessary relationship with 
intentional behaviour. 
To prove that this is the case, I showed that the control condition on moral 
accountability is best understood as normal System 2 Oversight, a qualified version of 
the control condition on positive intentional status, where this requires that the System 
2 oversight mechanism in question be functioning at least normally. Such a 
mechanism is taken to be functioning normally when it is functioning sufficiently in 
line with its operative characteristics, in what I called the Normal Band.  It was shown 
that sufficient capacity to be responsive to moral reasons was part of System 2 
oversight’s operative characteristics, and that this explained why cases such as those 
of Skip and Harris are ones where the agent is not open to moral accountability 
despite acting intentionally – these agents lack the sufficient capacity to be responsive 
to moral reasons. I then extended this condition on accountability to intentional 
consequences, by similarly producing a qualified version of Transfer of intentional 
status, namely: Transfer of openness to accountability. Due to the relationship 
between the control condition on positive intentional status and moral accountability, 
I argued that the relationship between moral responsibility and the intentional status 
of a behaviour is best understood in the following way: an agent is open to 
accountability for a given behaviour only if that behaviour is intentional. 
Finally, I closed out the chapter by returning to consider the motivating case, that of 
Anscombe and Truman. I argued that the defence of Truman that employed the DDE 
is unsuccessful, as there is no morally relevant distinction as far as responsibility is 
concerned (both variants) between an agent’s intended outcomes and intentional 
outcomes solely based on whether they are intended or intentional. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the preceding three chapters I have set out to unravel the relationship between 
moral responsibility and intentional action. As has been shown, this relationship is 
best understood neither in terms of undifferentiated moral responsibility nor merely 
intentional action. Rather, I argued that the crucial relationship was between moral 
accountability and intentional activities and outcomes, and that this relationship is a 
necessary one. To do this, I set out to first provide a convincing account of intentional 
activity that featured a central control condition on positive intentional status: System 
2 Oversight. I then turned to an investigation of moral responsibility and the eventual 
development of a pluralist account thereof, with one of the variants of responsibility I 
argue for – accountability – having a similar (but not identical) control condition to 
positive intentional status, namely: normal System 2 Oversight. In promulgating these 
two accounts, I demonstrated that the necessary relationship between accountability 
and positive intentional status is found in the nexus of control, by which I mean the 
fact that both notions share aspects of the same control condition: System 2 Oversight.  
This relationship can be explicated as: if an agent is open to moral accountability 
based on some activity or outcome, this activity or outcome must necessarily have 
positive intentional status. With this insight in hand, I returned to the original 
motivating case, that of Anscombe and Truman, and played out some of the 
consequences of my arguments for the Doctrine of Double Effect. I concluded that, at 
least so far as Truman’s decision to use the atomic weapons goes, the fact that he did 
not intend to kill civilians but that this was only an intentional consequence has no 
inherent bearing on his openness to moral responsibility for this outcome – either in 
terms of the type or degree. 
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